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At the beginning of each of his sermons, Pastor Joel Osteen raises his bible 
and leads his congregation in a proclamation: “This is my bible. I am what it says I 
am. I have what it says I have. I can do what it says I can do…” In the individual-
state relationship, the identifying document is the bible. The congregation of 
migrants rises, holds up their asylum seeker permits, student visas, passports and 
temporary residence permits (like black South Africans held up their passbooks 
during the Apartheid era) and chant: “This is my ID. I am what it says I am. I have 
what it says I have. I can do what it says I can do…!” Or am I? A few months ago, 
I travelled from Zimbabwe to South Africa. At the South African border, a young 
lady stood a few paces ahead of me in a line to show our modern day passbooks to 
an immigration official. The young lady clutched what appeared to be a corporate 
permit (characteristic A4 size sheet of paper). Her bible. Her permission slip. Upon 
closer inspection, I noticed that the photograph on the permit was that of a young 
man in his early thirties. “This is my ID. I am what it says I am…” 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 From the moment a person enters a state, whether by birth or migration, the individual-
state interaction is often mediated by some form of (supposedly) official state-issued document. 
This is particularly the case in cross-border migration. Documentation is often viewed as an 
instrument of the state, with passports containing declarations within them stipulating to them 
being “the property” of the government issuing them. Yet, documentation is borne by individuals 
whose use of it in the context of migration indicates incongruence between their view of 
documentation and that of the state. This research examines migrants‟ perceptions of 
documentation, what informs those views, and the ways in which those perceptions inform 
migrants‟ views of and interaction with the nation-state, citizenship, identity and state control. It 
explores contestation over the ownership of and rights over documents. In an effort to explore the 
levels of connection and disconnection, the study contrasts migrants‟ perceptions against those of 
the state. It moves away from the functionalist, policy-directed approach to the study of 
documentation that often characterises migration literature. It is informed by post-positivist, 
relativist commitments to examining the perspectives of individuals while adopting the 
constructivist recognition that meaning is created, as informed by history, context and experience. 
Focusing on Zimbabwean migrants resident in Johannesburg, this study draws on information 
gathered through in-depth interviews and group discussions, examined through discourse analysis 
and thematic content analysis.  
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DOCUMENTATION 
 
   
In this paper, “document” or “documentation” shall be taken to mean any form of 
certificate originally intended for the state‟s registration, documentation, enumeration or 
regulation of the presence and movement of people. This includes (i) official documents issued 
through state approved channels or through irregular means (e.g. bribery of state officials, 
misrepresentation of reasons for flight) (ii) documents forged in part or in whole, fashioned after 
official documents, which are used in lieu of official documents. Among these are birth 
certificates, national IDs, passports, asylum seeker permits, refugee booklets, emergency travel 
documents, corporate (farm worker) permits, work permits and visas. Note however, that 
Counelis (2000: 384) defines a “document” as “any object, artefact, behaviour, or natural material 
which provides symbolic meaning.” Central to this study is the recognition that the symbolic 
meaning that attaches to identity documents can stem both from the state (their producer) and 
from the individual (their bearer).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the South African Department of Home Affairs announced the introduction of 
Special Dispensation Permits for Zimbabwean migrants in April 2009, there was the hope that 
this would result in a decrease in the number of asylum applications. Carried in this policy change 
is an assumption that some Zimbabweans apply for asylum simply because it is the only legal 
option available to them. The state‟s actions are based on their assumptions about migrants‟ 
views, yet as Polzer (2004) finds in a study of Mozambican refugees in South Africa, there can be 
a disjuncture between the state‟s assumptions and perceptions and those of migrants. The actions 
of the young lady using a man‟s permit to enter South Africa, described above, are informed by 
an understanding of documentation and state control that appears somewhat incongruous with the 
state‟s view.   
This study seeks to examine what (if any) meaning migrants attach to identity documents; 
what informs these meanings; and how these meanings are articulated. It explores these questions 
in view of documentation not only as a factor in access to services, but as a means of access to 
ways of being, and as an instrument of state control. It examines the relationship between identity 
documents and identity itself, asking whether  reference to documentation as “identity 
documents” is appropriate, asking who and what it is that is being identified; in what ways (i.e. 
identified as what); and to whom. Recognising that while documents are issued by the state for its 
purposes, they are borne by individuals, in this case migrants, the study explores the ways in 
which migrants themselves conceive of documentation. It asks in what ways migrants‟ 
perspectives are informed by their experience of and relationship with (i) the state that issues the 
documentation (ii) their country of origin and (iii) their view of the nation-state more broadly. 
Consequently, how does documentation relate to migrants‟ understanding not only of the rights 
but also of responsibilities of migrants, citizens, non-citizens, and the state? What are migrants‟ 
views on the role of the state, especially in matters pertaining to facilitating and controlling 
movement, regulating belonging, giving and denying privileges/access? In asking to whom 
identification documents actually belong and how this ownership is understood, claimed, and 
negotiated by migrants, the question arises: who determines the boundaries of belonging and the 
extent and nature of their fluidity? Ultimately, to whom does the state belong? The inquiry can be 
summed in the following questions: 
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RESEARCH QUESTION/S 
 
Main Question:    
What meanings do migrants attach to documentation? 
Sub Questions:   
What informs these meanings? (e.g. migrants‟ condition as non-citizens) 
 How are these meanings expressed? 
What are the socio-political implications of a possible mismatch between migrants‟ 
perceptions of documentation and the state‟s?  
 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT  
   
In examining the questions above, the report begins with a review of literature, first 
examining the nature and use of documentation in the nation-state, in order to situate the analysis 
within broader discourses on state control, identification, membership and belonging. It discusses 
documents with regards to their dual symbolic elements – both as linking individuals to states, 
and as identifying individuals with respect to their allotted rights and responsibilities. It goes on 
to look at documentation in the context of migration, when the “individuals” are non-citizens 
resident in foreign countries. The paper then moves from migration in general to examining why 
a case study of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg would be particularly illuminating, 
exploring Zimbabwe and South Africa‟s histories with regards labelling and state control of 
movement and access, as well as resistance against both. It then goes on to discuss how the study 
of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg was structured and conducted, the methodology 
section concluding with a brief discussion on the ethical issues that arose during fieldwork. The 
second half of the report presents the findings of the inquiry, examining them against the 
literature on documentation with regards to migration and the nation-state, organising the section 
thematically. The report concludes with a summative review of the general findings of the 
investigation as to the question of how migrants perceive documentation, what informs these 
perceptions, and how this affects the broader socio-political implications of documentation in the 
nation-state.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
Before there was the document, there was the state that produced it. The debate on the 
history and nature of the nation-state plays itself out time and again in academic discourse. 
Hobbes (1651) argues that out of a state of nature, a protective political society emerges almost 
naturally, inevitably.1 This central authority becomes a state when it establishes monopoly over 
the “legitimate” use of coercive force “within a given territory” (Weber 1919: 1). As the result of 
upheaval processes like wars, treaties and colonialism, the territorialisation of the “state” 
becomes increasingly entrenched, the state defined within specific geographical boundaries,2 to 
the point where literature on nationalism is premised on the view of states as “sovereign, spatially 
discontinuous units” (Malkki 1992: 26). As the political state becomes increasingly associated 
with an ideological “nation,” there emerges an association of land with people and the state: the 
invention of the nation-state. Aided by historical short-sightedness, academic scholarship 
contributes to the naturalising of the nation-state as the “natural social and political form of the 
modern world,” what Wimmer and Schiller (2002: 302) term “methodological nationalism.” In 
this conception of the nation-state, borders are particularly central, so much such that Wilson and 
Donnan (1998) claim that as international borders lose their ability to limit movement and to 
serve “as markers of the extent and power of the state,” this failure of borders heralds the demise 
of the nation-state “as the pre-eminent political structure of modernity” (1). 3  
The invention of the nation-state is captured in Massimo d'Azeglio‟s proclamation after 
the Italian unification of 1871: "We have created Italy, now we must create Italians" (Billig 1995: 
25, as cited in Haste 2004: 417). Haste (2004) describes how the creation and presentation of the 
new Italian nation-state involved the generation of “a „mythic‟ history,” and along with it, 
“symbols of nationality that would coalesce the people into a new national identity” (417). Haste 
cites language as one of the main symbols “uniting” the new Italy. Language lends itself as a 
symbol not only for the Italian state but also of the Italian nation in a way that makes palatable a 
statement like: “I am Italian therefore I speak Italian.”  
  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Note Marx and Engels‟ (1845) critique of the view that society needs the state to hold it together. (Reference 
courtesy of Machado (1992)) 
2
 Consider the manner in which Palestine‟s struggle for its recognition is tied to a battle over territory.  
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Parameters of Belonging: Re-actualisation of Fences 
 In many ways, language can serve as a point of unity and as a symbol of the nation, 
whether by becoming part of the national myth of unity in identity as in Western states where to 
be Italian is to speak Italian, or as a historical point of national resistance as in South Africa, 
where the nation‟s “rainbow” quality is reflected in its embrace of its numerous languages. 
Documents much like language can be and are often used as tools of systematic racism and 
xenophobia; yet documents stand apart from language and other such symbols of the nation-state. 
The main point of difference is that documents are more clearly an instrument of the state in 
marking “belonging”. Instituted by the state, the system of documentation is established and 
regulated by the state, supposedly for the state‟s purposes.4  
Similarly, even though national anthems and flags can serve as “modern totems [of the 
nation-state] (in the Durkheimian sense)” (Cerulo 1993: 244), and Haste (2004) would probably 
agree that they help with the “creation of Italy and Italians.” A critical distinguishing difference 
between national emblems like flags and documentation, which stems from documents‟ nature as 
state instruments, is access. Valued though national emblems may be,5 unlike flags,6 national 
anthems or language, the acquisition of documentation is controlled by the state and access to it is 
deliberately determined, upon the satisfaction of very specific state-determined requirements. 
Rights to documentation depend on the nature of one‟s relationship with the state, and its value 
goes beyond its symbolism. 
 Documents serve as fences – ostensibly to limit physical access into a territory, but also to 
demarcate who of those within it has rights to what. This is particularly important in the 
“imagined” nation-state, where the “nation” is imagined into existence. One may be born legally 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 In the European Union, as internal borders disappear, the borders of the EU itself become increasingly 
impenetrable (Gallagher 2002). Globalization‟s ability to promote both the opening and fortification of states in 
this context is still in line with Wilson and Donnan‟s observation that the nation-state may be ceasing to be the 
“pre-eminent political structure of modernity” (1998: 1). In the EU, the nation-state is being superseded by a 
supranational union.  
4
 There are cases where language is also used as a state-regulated instrument of identity, such as in France, 
where attaining French citizenship by marriage requires mastery of the language (Civil Code Article 21-2). 
Also, see Kamusella‟s (2001) “Language as an Instrument of Nationalism in Central Europe” for a more 
extensive discussion. 
5
 The desecration of flags and distortion of national anthems has been seen to cause considerable uproar, even in 
the United States (NB Texas v. Johnson 1989 in which the US Supreme Court held that the burning of flags was 
protected under the First Amendment right to freedom of speech). Currency is also a state symbol though its 
destruction may be viewed differently from that of flags. Unlike a flag, currency can rarely ever belong to a 
person completely but remains the property of the Treasury of the state that issues it (the same is true of many 
passports). In the US, destroying money is prohibited under Title 18, §333 of the US Code, if the disfiguration 
of the currency is “with intent to render such item(s) unfit to be reissued” (reference to currency law courtesy of 
MSNBC.com http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7148966/ ). 
6
 There is wide variety between countries in their control over access to emblems like flags. Some countries with 
less liberal freedom of speech clauses, like Zimbabwe, regulate the acquisition and treatment of flags (NB the 
Flag of Zimbabwe Act of 1985, as do Middle Eastern countries whose flags bear the Islamic declaration of faith 
(like Saudi Arabia). (Wikipedia.com)  
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Italian, but one is made culturally and affectively Italian. In the making of the nation and the 
emergence of nationalism – in the “making of Italians” – there are three processes that occur: “the 
purification of culture, the universalization of chosen-ness, and the territorialisation of memory” 
(Smith 1996: 449). The selection and instrumentalisation of mythological narratives, 
geographical features and cultural artefacts produce a nation and nationalism (Ibid) then requires 
a tangible instrument, a marker, upon which membership to the nation is recorded, particularly in 
the context of globalisation. Documentation becomes that apposite symbol of the modern nation-
state. 
 Globalisation is changing the configuration of the nation-state, and therefore the criteria 
for membership. According to Dauvergne (2004: 84), globalisation is “…shifting the boundaries 
of the insider-outsider dichotomy.” For Dauvergne, this boundary no longer coincides with 
political borders within which “discrete categories of “us” and “them” correspond... to legal 
categories of citizen and alien...” (2004: 84). In Johannesburg, for example, a city Landau 
characterises as a city of immigrants, local and international, belonging is not determined along 
ethnic lines. Rather, nationality has become “the divide between a coalescing South African 
nationalism7 and a reified foreign other,” and it is nationality that serves as the “fulcrum for 
conflict, exclusion, and identity formation” (Landau 2005: 7). This is in line with Nyamnjoh‟s 
observation that globalisation has resulted in “an even greater obsession with citizenship, 
belonging and the building or re-actualisation of fences” (2002: 774).  
 Where the conceptualizations of citizenship, membership and belonging are complicated 
by more permeable borders (Dauvergne 2004), and other “symbols of nationality” become 
important, documentation‟s centrality in delineating membership is highlighted, as it remains 
more and more the only criterion and marker of membership access to which the state retains 
even a modicum of control.  
 
Delineation of Membership and Labelling 
 Part of the process of configuring the nation-state is labelling those who are supposedly of 
it. Where national borders are generally ineffective at regulating membership (except perhaps 
North Korea‟s), documentation serves to mark belonging to the unity. While it may not 
“coalesce” people the way language may, to borrow Haste‟s term, documentation is a form of 
proof of membership (c.f. Bakewell 2007: 17). Often, “belonging” requires the exclusion of some 
                                                 
7
 According to Smith (2002: 6), nationalism consists of three parts: “a language and symbolism, a sociopolitical 
movement, and an ideology of the nation.” Also, Benedict Anderson (1983) gives an interesting account on 
nationalism. 
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“other” in order to create an entity to which one can belong.8 As Croucher (2003: 40) puts it, 
“…belonging to an “Us” necessitates the existence and recognition of a “Them.” Belonging as 
such necessitates and implies boundaries.” In the modern nation-state, there is need for a system 
for identifying and labelling who is of the “Us” and who is not. Where separators like language 
and borders are rendered increasingly ineffectual (Wilson and Donnan 1998), it becomes 
necessary to consider alternative markers of belonging – alternative “borders” – to delineate the 
extent of the nation-state.  
 Documentation lends itself to this purpose. FitzGerald and Cuesta-Leiva (1997) propose 
that if citizenship were to be traded, the actual item to change hands would be passports. Where 
migration law may be “concerned with the limit of the nation, the border... and the mythology of 
national identity” (Dauvergne 2004:87), the tool migration law uses to actually mark those it has 
endowed with rights and signal the nature and limits of those rights is documentation: visas, 
permits, etc. Documentation is at the heart of the propagation of the “mythology of national 
identity” and of the nation-state. It is central to the state‟s ability to monopolise symbolic force 
(see Bourdieu 1989:9). According to Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 15), the Weberian state‟s 
coercive force “includes the power to name, to identify, to categorize, to state what is what and 
who is who” (as cited in Bakewell 2007: 18), and documents serve all these purposes. 
 Each document identifies its bearer in a specific, state-prescribed way, affording to each 
certain rights and privileges (Vasta 2006). In so doing, the state marks even those who do not 
avail themselves to this element of its control as “undocumented” and therefore “illegally 
present.” Thus, documentation allows the state to label all those present – document-holders by 
virtue of their having documents, non-holders by virtue of their not having them. For Gardner 
(2005: 2), it is during the migrant-state encounter that individuals are assigned certain identities – 
aliens, residents, citizens. A case in point is the South African Government‟s proclamation of 
their intent to issue Special Dispensation Permits to Zimbabweans illegally present in its country, 
effectively regularising their immigration statuses. While Special Dispensation Permits had still 
not been issued at the writing of this paper, that a state can change the legality of a person‟s status 
by issuing or revoking a document highlights the fact that the power to label lies with the state. 
Thus, it is the state that renders one “legally” or “illegally” present; documentation being central 
to its ability to “name the other... as not-us or not-legal” (Dauvergne 2004: 94; c.f. Engbersen and 
van der Leun 2001; De Genova 2002).  
                                                 
8
 For a discussion on belonging, see Hedetoft 2002, wherein he breaks down various levels of belonging, noting 
that “cultural belonging,” among the affective elements of belonging, “does not presuppose the existence of an 
“Other,” let alone a contradictory Other for its existence, viability and maintenance…” In reading through 
Hedetoft‟s examination, it is important to recognize the frequency with which discussions on “othering” in 
migration literature are often linked with those on the use of arboreal metaphors (c.f. Malkki 1992). 
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Given the constructed nature of labelling, it should be noted that in this paper, the use of 
the term “identity documents” is merely as a result of convention. There is need to recognise and 
set aside presumptions on the nature of documentation to allow room to explore the actual 
relationship between identification documents and identity. A constructivist approach to the study 
of individuals‟ perceptions of documentation requires appreciation of Brubaker and Cooper‟s 
(2000: 15) claim, that self-identification “takes place in dialectical interplay with external 
identification, and the two need not converge” (as cited in Bakewell 2007: 17). As for citizenship 
and documentation, is citizenship merely reflected on documents or does documentation 
participate in the creation of that which it purports to symbolise, and how do the implications 
change when unofficial or fraudulent documents are concerned? 
 Consider that from a realist, state perspective, documentation serves as a means through 
which the state is able to regulate “belonging”9 (despite what Croucher (2003: 40) terms the 
individual‟s “affective dimensions of attachment and identity”). By delineating membership, 
there is a “system of belonging and not belonging...” that is brought about by immigration 
regulations (Gardner 2005: 3). Within this system, documentation is the physical manifestation of 
the incorporeal process. It is the “adoption certificate” that attests to the existence and describes 
the nature of the state-individual relationship.  
 Documentation positions the individual in relation to the state. If asked what documentary 
evidence one has of the social contract, as propounded by Rousseau (1762) as a contract between 
the state and the individual10 were to be represented on paper, it can be argued that that would 
present itself in the form of identifying documents such as passports and national IDs. A case in 
point is the South African Government‟s policy with regards to non-citizen children born in its 
hospitals. A record of birth is issued – the state‟s acknowledgement of the existence of the new 
born – but not a South African birth certificate, as the latter would indicate the state‟s recognition 
of the child as its citizen. Therefore instead, the child is positioned as an “alien” baby, its rights 
and responsibilities with respect to the state signalled by the record of birth and lack of a birth 
certificate.  
 
                                                 
9
 It is important to recognize that “belonging” is constructed and contested, both by the person entering society, 
and by the receiving community. Bell (1990: 3) puts it well when she says “One does not simply or 
ontologically “belong” to the world or to any group within it. Belonging is an achievement at several levels of 
abstraction” (as cited in Croucher 2003: 41). For a discussion on the complexity of belonging from a 
constructivist perspective, see Cornell and Hartman (1998: 77) who describe belonging and identity as 
something that “people create, resist, choose, specify, invent, redefine, reject, actively defend, and so forth” (as 
cited in Croucher 2003: 40). Furthermore, the xenophobia witnessed in South African attests to the 
disconnection between state-recognized (documented) rights to be present, and the host community‟s system of 
(non-)recognition.   
10
 Proudhon (1851) presents a divergent view of the social contract, suggesting that it is between individuals, 
and not between an individual and the state.  
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Documentation’s Dual Function: Categorizing and Imparting Unique Identities 
Documentation serves two key purposes. It categorizes individuals into groups, and it 
ascribes to each individual what it considers a unique identifier, representing a unique identity. 
That is, after grouping individuals into nationals and non-nationals, it further distinguishes 
between those within the same group – Mr. Smith versus Mr. Jones – its issuance of unique 
national identity numbers to each signifying its belief in the disaggregation of the groups. Before 
exploring intra-group differentiation, it is necessary to briefly examine the need to differentiate 
between groups, the logic for the latter feeding in somewhat to that of the former, particularly 
where migration is concerned. 
Torpey (1998) posits that states need to distinguish between “mutually exclusive” groups 
of citizens (and non-citizens) and regulate movement, particularly across external borders (245). 
For Torpey (1998), modern, territorial states: “rest... on distinctions between citizens/nationals 
and aliens” (240). The ability to differentiate between individuals, as well as to monopolize “the 
right to authorize and regulate movement” has not only been “intrinsic to the very construction of 
states” (Torpey 1998: 241) but in fact “contributes to constituting the very “state-ness” of states” 
(240). Tilly (1985) argues that “in the classic European state-making experience… [state-making] 
depend[s] on the state‟s tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion” (182, 181). 
Documentation allows for this, as identity- and travel-documents are codification “devices” 
which became the penultimate tools of administration upon which other means of “embracing” 
one‟s citizens (e.g. through taxation) and excluding non-citizens (visa denials, detention, 
deportation) came to rely (Torpey 1998: 247, c.f. 241). To extend Weber‟s (1919) notion of 
sovereignty to documentation, Weber (1919) would agree that monopoly over movement and 
presence, as well as over the power to name and exclude is central to state sovereignty (1). 
Salter (2002:8) notes that passports are part of “the larger discourse of sovereign 
statehood…” (as cited in Wang 2004: 355). This is particularly so given, as Wang (2004) and 
Torpey (1998: 250) would agree, that document-mediated control of movement “within and 
across delimited spaces... affirm[s] states‟ control over bounded territories and enhance[s] their 
embrace of populations.” In stressing the centrality of documentation both for the state and the 
individual, Wang (2004: 355) writes that “the passport… embodies the sovereignty of the issuing 
state… [and] signifies the citizenship… of the bearer.” For him, the passport is the “nexus [on 
which] sovereignty and citizenship imply each other” (Ibid). Documentation therefore allows for 
the state to tangibly and symbolically express and exercise power and sovereignty.  
 As Torpey (1998) rightly points out, “if… modern states… seek to monopolize the 
legitimate means of movement, they must have means to implement the constraints they 
enunciate” (244, emphasis in the original). The primary means for implementation are documents 
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(Ibid). In his evaluation of the Lesotho-Free State border, Coplan (2001) notes the existence of 
individuals he terms as having “indeterminate nationality” (82). For Coplan (2001), this was as a 
result of originally Lesotho citizens “carrying South African passports and identity documents” 
(82). While it is difficult to adequately respond to Coplan, given that it is unclear whether this 
was a result of fraud or of naturalization, the term “indeterminate nationality” is provocative and 
illustrates the fallibility of the system of documentation. In a world where nation-states are 
presented as “spatially discontinuous units” (Malkki 1992: 26), it is such ambiguities that the 
system of documentation seeks to eliminate, by making legible the belief that each individual can 
and should be “allocated” to a state in a way that is unchallengeable (Wade 2007).  
 The second function of documentation is the assignment to individuals a “unique and 
unambiguous” identity within the groups to which they are allocated (Torpey 1998: 239). It is the 
logic of this first function of documentation that the young woman with a man‟s permit at the 
border defies. Understanding that she is of the group of individuals termed “Zimbabweans” who 
need written authorization to enter South Africa, she uses a permit assigned to another in her 
group. The South African Government authorized the entry of a Zimbabwean migrant, and she 
enters on that permission, never mind the disaggregation of individuals within that group. A 
Zimbabwean enters South Africa; what does it matter whether it is a Smith or a Jones, a Mr. or a 
Miss. If some migrants understand documentation‟s function of differentiating between groups 
but have a different take on the second function of linking the permit to a specific individual in 
the group, this could lead to discrepancies in the use of documentation. Similarly, the reverse 
could occur with Zimbabwean migrants using Mozambican passports, having their legal names 
on the documents, respecting the first function of documentation, but bearing attestation to 
membership in a group other than that to which states assigns them. 
 
Documentation in the Context of Migration  
 The use of documentation in migration is a fertile area to examine incongruities between 
the state‟s perspective of documentation and that of individuals, particularly given the centrality 
of classification of individuals in the context of migration. Even though the logic in migration 
literature may be that documentation is a means of “implement[ing] the constraints [states] 
enunciate” (Torpey 1998: 244), this does not always necessarily play out in actuality.   
 Documentation is at the heart of migration and migration is at the heart of the re-
conceptualisation and reconfiguration of the nation-state. Migrants‟ co-opting of systems of 
identification becomes particularly significant when considered in light of documentation‟s role 
in defining the nation-state (Klaaren and Rutinwa 2004: 13 as cited in Bakewell 2007: 5).   
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 Migration literature which examines documentation shows both its importance and its 
contentious nature. Polzer‟s (2007) observations on the necessity of availing documentation to 
migrants are echoed in most policy recommendations on migration which call for the same. 
Studies have shown that migrants‟ vulnerability to exploitation and exclusion increases when 
they are denied access to documentation. Polzer (2005: 10) cites Reitzes and Crawhall (1999) as 
arguing that without documents, Mozambican would-be refugees “exist in a legal vacuum… 
and… are subject to arrest and deportation” as they are viewed as “prohibited persons.” Yet, even 
when migrants have documents, this neither guarantees them access to social services (Polzer 
2004) nor serves to protect them11 from police harassment (Landau and Monson 2008; Landau 
2005). Not only does documentation not always provide access, state actors themselves often 
have a contemptuous regard of it. In Johannesburg, “police often destroy or refuse to recognize 
work permits or refugee identity documents in order to justify arrests” (Landau and Monson 
2008: 329-330).  
 While Landau and Monson‟s (2008) observations hint at the motives behind police 
officials‟ destruction of identity documents, their discussion leaves unaddressed the question of 
the philosophy on which the police base their motives. Often, studies which report similar actions 
by South African officials simply bracket such action under corruption (Landau 2005:1123; 
Sisulu et al. 2007; Landau and Haupt 2007), neglecting to examine what this treatment of 
documents says about the officials‟ perceptions of the documents and of the state (c.f. 
Vigneswaran (2008) who underscores intentionality on the part of police officers‟ interference in 
migrants‟ access to documentation)12. It is one thing for a layman to discard a migrant‟s 
documents but another altogether for a uniformed officer of the state to destroy them. Thus, while 
the state may have a particular concept of the purpose, symbolism and value of documentation, 
this may not align with that of the individual. Considering that the actual document-mediated 
interface been state and (non)citizen occurs at the level of the individual, between individuals, an 
examination of documentation ought to be conducted at the level of the individual then examined 
with respect to the state.  
                                                 
11
 Consider Polzer‟s (2005: 10) account of the way in which the availing of documentation for Mozambicans in 
South Africa in 1993 actually increased the vulnerability of some of them, because of erroneous assumptions 
made by the state about migrants‟ desires and views. This case illustrates that it is possible for there to be a 
mismatch between the state‟s perspective and that of the individual, particularly where that individual is a 
migrant and the relationship is characterized by mistrust. 
12
 Vigneswaran (2008: 17) posits that this can be attributed to “the obstructionist behaviour of DHA officials 
[which] is an expression of a discretionary institutional culture that has become defined by the objective of 
excluding undocumented migrants…”  Thus, Vigneswaran takes the debate beyond officers‟ desire for financial 
gain, instead suggesting that their end is immigration control. However, this does not speak to the question of 
how officers‟ actions relate to their perception of documentation. There are many ways to “exclude 
undocumented migrants” that do not include destroying (possibly) state-issued documents. Besides, it is 
something of a misnomer to call document-bearing migrants “undocumented”. 
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The destruction of documents recorded by Landau and Monson (2008) hints at a 
disjuncture between the state‟s perception of documentation and the individual‟s. On the one 
hand, documentation is a symbol of the state‟s authority over the regulation of movement; on the 
other, it is pieces of paper an officer can simply rip up. It is possible that officers destroy 
migrants‟ documents where they perceive them to be fraudulent, thereby reclaiming the state‟s 
authority usurped by the migrant by substituting a “real/official” authority for the “false” one. 
Where officers destroy authentic documents, it may be that they wish to assert themselves as the 
dominant authority – the living flesh representative of the state‟s power over the flimsy 
documentary representative (c.f. Bakewell and Biao‟s (2006) “paper tigers”). In so doing, the 
officer presents the state‟s right to revoke permission – a whirlwind of a state which can change 
the migrant‟s fate on a whim, taking back what it has given. This view is more tenable where the 
officer actually purports to act on behalf of the state, within authority that the state has bestowed 
upon him/her. Otherwise, like the migrant with fraudulent documents, the officer usurps the 
state‟s authority over monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion.13 The complexities of 
arrogation of state authority and what it represents are discussed in greater depth later in the 
paper. Note though that the ceding of authority is complex, particularly in Johannesburg, where it 
may be a case of the abuse of discretion by street level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1983), or semi-
authorized violation by quasi-state agents operating within a state of exception (Landau 2005), 
though this relies on an assumption that the state had control to begin with, in order that it may be 
able to cede it.14 Landau (2005: 5) posits that there exists a state of exception around documents, 
where “the state authorises its agents to act outside the law in an anomalous zone where they 
retain the power of law, but are not constrained by it” (citing Agamben 2005). The matter of who 
has the right to regulate belonging – private individuals or state the machinery – raises the 
question of to whom the state actually belongs.15 Whether officials represent the state or rebel 
against it, the act of destroying documentation16 has implications for the manner in which 
individuals (both state officials and migrants) conceive of documents and of a possible mismatch 
between their views as individuals and those of the nation-state.  
                                                 
13
 Whether in that migrant-officer interaction, one is an officer first or a citizen is debatable. Several studies 
have shown the complexity of the question of who has the right to regulate belonging, and who actually controls 
it in practice. For Southern African examples, see Bakewell 2007; Landau and Monson 2008; Misago 2005; 
Nyamnjoh 2002; Polzer 2005; along with literature on the May 2008 xenophobic violence.  
14
 Thanks to Ingrid Palmary for raising the question of whether the state ever had control to begin with.  
15
 The Preamble to the South African Constitution (1996) proclaims a belief that “South Africa belongs to all 
who live in it.” Xenophobic sentiments and actions witnessed in post-Apartheid South Africa imply that this 
constitutional view is not universally held, further hinting at a mismatch between the state‟s ideologies and the 
people‟s sentiments. 
16
 I recognize that this assertion depends on a Weberian view of humans as rational beings. In order to make any 
sort of claim about human action, there needs to be that presupposition. For a discussion on rationality, see 
Weber (1921) and Haberman (1884).  
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The examination of the perception of identity documents from the individual‟s 
perspective allows for consideration of the views of the “identified”. The young lady at the 
Zimbabwe/South Africa border preferred to present what was obviously someone else‟s permit 
rather than not present anything at all. What does this signify about her understanding of 
documentation, and of the relationship between IDs and actual identity? If documentation is seen 
as one‟s guarantor of some measure of protection – that is, if it is seen as a bulletproof vest – how 
does one‟s perception of the system of documentation change when a police officer rips up the 
document, bringing the migrant face-to-face with the fact that the vest is made of paper?  
Vasta (2006) and Scheiden (2009) both present a picture of the pragmatic migrant, who 
engages with notions of legality and citizenship. Vasta (2006) highlights an interesting 
contradiction where migrants, in an effort to retain and remain in “legal” status, undertake illegal 
activities, such that their contravention of the system actually stems from their desire to adhere to 
the law. Vasta (2006) notes that immigrants would strive to “regularize” their statuses, even 
through illegal means, a process she terms “irregular formality,” that is, “the attempt to regularize 
one's status within the constraints of irregular immigration and labour market status” (2006: 7; 
c.f. Polzer 2008: 483).  
So central are documents that Landau (2005: 14) believes the police‟s destruction of 
migration documents “… effectively denies non-nationals a legal identity, making them non-
people in the state‟s eyes.”17 For Landau, one is a “person” in the state‟s eyes if one is a person 
on paper. That is, that the identity the state recognises is that which is codified/recorded on paper.   
Given the centrality of documentation in migration, as well as in the symbolism, 
projection and propagation of state power, there is need to develop a more pragmatic approach to 
the study of documentation. This is particularly so considering the possible mismatch between the 
state‟s perception of documentation and those of individuals, not least among whom are non-
citizens. There is need for the examination of this individual-state interface to consider the 
manner in which documentation allows for the physical representation of the terms of relation 
between the individual and the state, exploring the relationship (or lack thereof) between identity 
documents and identity, from the perspective of the “identified,” as well as how a tool for state 
control becomes the locus of resistance; and how resistance works to challenge and reconfigure 
the system itself. Consider Landau and Monson‟s (2008: 319) observation that as migrants 
“…move through space ostensibly regulated by the state [they] … transform it…” and how “such 
behaviours… consistently fragment and destabilize localized systems of authority and power.” A 
comprehensive examination of the destabilization of these systems necessarily involves a 
                                                 
17
 Compare with George Orwell‟s (1949) description of how the (fictional) Government of Oceania could render 
one an “un-person” by destroying all record of that person‟s existence.  
  
20 
reconceptualisation of who it is the nation-state belongs to and how membership is negotiated. 
Part of this negotiation is the meanings document bearers themselves attach to identity 
documents. What exactly is it that is being identified? To whom does the document (read: right to 
control movement) belong? What are the implications of discrepancies between the state‟s view 
of documentation and those of the document bearer?  
Gordillo (2006: 173) suggests that documents like passports are “…worthless without the 
social relations that produce them and give meaning to them as symbols of something else. The 
power that people invest in those documents lies there, in those relations and conventions, rather 
than in the physical materiality” (as cited in Bakewell 2007: 20). Gordillo‟s assertion may hold in 
states where the destruction of a document does not result in migrants becoming, as Landau puts 
it, “non-people” in the state‟s eyes (2005: 14). Yet, in Johannesburg, this is not always the case. 
Additionally, when documentation is possessed and used outside of the “relations and 
conventions” within which it finds its validity and symbolic value, it has implications for the 
social contract and the nation-state more broadly. Compelling though Gordillo‟s argument may 
be, it is necessary to examine the ruptures that occur when documents are used outside of or at 
cross-purposes with the “social relations” Gordillo claims “give meaning to them.” When the 
assumptions behind the value of documentation are challenged, do documents really become 
“worthless,” and what do the come to symbolise?  
 
 
RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY 
 
When documentation is studied in developing countries, studies are largely policy-driven, 
presenting a utilitarian perspective of documentation concerned with migrant access to social 
services, often examining the absence of documentation (Polzer 2007; Campbell 2005). This has 
resulted in migration studies in Johannesburg narrowing in on low-income migrants in densely 
populated residential areas, limiting the discussion on migrant needs, and presenting only one 
aspect of the complexity of migration.  
Yet, there is a dearth of literature on the perceptions attached to documentation by 
individuals, especially migrants. The few studies that consider the socio-political implications of 
documentation focus on western nations, where the state machinery is strong, documentation is 
almost inescapable, and the rights discourse is particularly liberal democratic (Higgins and Leps 
1998; Böcker 2002; Vasta 2006; Engbersen et al. 1999; Guild 2007). Migration studies in non-
Western settings is still emerging as an academic discipline. Even as literature strives to effect 
positive social change, there is need to engage with and develop migration theory (Landau and 
Jacobsen 2003).  
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Turton‟s (1996) assertion that “research into others‟ suffering can only be justified if 
alleviating that suffering” (as cited in Landau and Jacobsen 2003: 186) is compelling. Yet, this 
exhortation appears to connote inseparability between migration and suffering. While migrants 
often undergo great suffering, persistently portraying elements of their suffering without 
considering the strategies they employ in response denies certain elements of their agency. While 
presenting oneself as a victim may be a strategy for negotiating rights (Polzer, pers. comm.), 
when it is academia that consistently presents migrants in this way, it can promote the view that 
the only legitimate stance by which a migrant rights can be claimed is from the migrant-as-victim 
stance. As Shireen Ally (2009) points out, academia‟s portrayal of the heroic victim is 
problematic in migration studies when it requires that the migrant be a victim before s/he can be a 
hero, and the migrant becomes a hero because s/he is a victim (pers. comm.). The image of the 
“migrant victim” is troubling in that it can lead to the construction of a very particular image of 
“the true victim migrant” when it becomes the only image of migrants presented.  
Migration literature‟s emphasis on effecting policy change is unsurprising, given the 
inadequacy of migration policy and the failings of African states in providing services and 
ensuring protection not only to foreigners but also to their own nationals. However, social science 
research has what Landau and Jacobsen (2003: 185) call a “dual imperative” to be both 
“academically sound and policy relevant.” Even as research is problematic if academic rigour is 
compromised for the sake of policy (Landau and Jacobsen 2003), a narrow construction of 
migration research as merely a vehicle for policy change is also problematic. 
 While documentation and membership studies have been conducted in rural areas or 
borderlands, where communities are described as being somewhat “beyond” the reach of the state 
(Bakewell 2007); migration is seen more as local-local movement between related peoples 
(Polzer 2004); and rights to be present and to participate are determined largely by local 
communities without recourse to material symbols of belonging like documents (Bakewell 2007; 
Misago 2005; Polzer 2004), non-Western urban settings where the state machinery is stronger, 
like Johannesburg, are understudied.  
 Furthermore, the migrant perspective often goes unstudied. Even FitzGerald and Cuesta-
Leiva‟s (1997) attempt at computing an empirical value for passports fails to consider the 
perceptions of document bearers from a socio-political perspective. For example, Misago (2005: 
6) acknowledges the “innovative, if occasionally illegal strategies” migrants employ in order to 
survive in Johannesburg, and how many of these strategies often “at least partially exist outside 
of or in contravention to laws and regulation.” Misago notes that many of these strategies involve 
documentation, yet he does not engage with migrants‟ perspectives on these tools which they 
modify, nor does he consider the implications of such actions on the nation-state.  
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Similarly, when Landau and Monson (2008) examine extra-legal practices in South 
Africa, their focus is on the actions of state officials like the police, such that the “reshaping of 
networks of corruption” (328) is done by state officials. In effect, theirs is an account of the ways 
in which state representatives co-opt the law and subvert the system. Even in presenting the 
scenario where SA police officials arrest migrants and release them in exchange for bribes, it is 
through the lens of the police that Landau and Monson (2008) examine this. It is the officials who 
“provide undocumented migrants with the chance effectively to purchase territorial access” 
(Landau and Monson 2008: 330, emphasis added) and not migrants who stake a claim to 
territorial access.  
Bakewell (2007: 17) is one of the few to engage with migrant views. Locating his study 
in rural borderlands, where the state machinery is weak and people live “away from the centre of 
state power,” Bakewell (2007: 12) notes that among the Angolan turned Zambian migrants he 
spoke to, there was “no obvious link between a person‟s sense of national identity and the papers 
that they hold.” While Bakewell‟s study explores the affective elements of citizenship and 
identity, his discussion does not engage with the greater implications of migrants‟ perceptions, 
nor does it consider migrants‟ experience of multiple states.  
Examining migrants‟ perspectives is particularly important in so far as they help 
contextualise migrants‟ actions in response to state attempts to control their presence and 
movement. Landau and Monson (2008: 335) stress the need to broaden the area of focus in 
migration studies. They caution that agentive practices “remain invisible if we solely focus on 
state actors, laws and border control” (Ibid). This is particularly significant not only for its 
recognition of migrants‟ agency, but also because migrants‟ co-option of state systems and their 
resistance of state control, if studied, has the potential to “shift how we understand sovereignty as 
practice” (Ibid).  
Even as the “interaction of migration with the embodied state... has stimulated interesting 
mutations in what are ostensibly state practices” (Landau and Monson (2008: 334), so it has also 
affected the manner in which the nation-state, symbolism, and state control ought to be 
conceptualised. Migration literature needs to go beyond the tendency to examine such practices 
solely as emerging from within the state apparatus. Sensitive study that neither vilifies migrants 
(e.g. for being “fraudsters”) 18 nor propagates the discourse of victimisation allows for the 
recognition of migrants as pragmatic actors, whose actions, as Misago (2005: 2) records, “... are 
generating new ...political formations” (Misago 2005: 2). Migrants become what Haste (2004: 
425) terms “active beings” involved in the construction of meaning. Additionally, an approach 
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 This is particularly crucial considering, as Ingrid Palmary put it, “people live or die by those documents” 
(Pers. comm.). 
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which  privileges a view “from below” in migration studies, has as a consequence “the centrality 
of agency by policy target groups… in creatively adapting to, rather than merely accepting, 
policy-driven constraints” (Polzer 2005: 4).  
There is also need to examine the manner in which documentation acts as a locus of 
resistance and transformation. This is critical particularly since it is intended by the state as a 
means of control. As Landau and Monson (2008: 335) note, documentation can be an arena in 
which migrants “claim rights to space from which the state would formally exclude them – for 
instance by falsely claiming refugee status or doing so on a basis not recognized by the state....”  
In reality, the state merely attempts at regulating access to documentation and sometimes 
not even that. Polzer‟s (2004) account of residents of Bushbuckridge shows that it was 
conceivable that people could go through their lives without identification documents. This is 
largely because state-erected barriers (like policing) aside, obtaining documentation is within the 
purview of the individual. While it is the state that produces and issues documents, it is up to the 
migrant to apply for, collect and use them. By not doing so, migrants are able to circumvent state 
control19 (see Polzer 2008). 
The role of documentation is different for residents of Johannesburg though, where 
informal forms of identification are not as acceptable as they are in places like Bushbuckridge 
(see Polzer 2004; Bakewell 2007). Yet, even in Johannesburg, where state‟s efforts at ensuring 
compliance with documentation regulations are less escapable (Landau 2005: 16-18), migrants 
are still sometimes able to elude policing and remain outside the state‟s system of documentation. 
Kihato and Landau (2006: 9, 12) give an elaborate account of migrants‟ creative ways of evading 
state control and becoming “invisible” to the police, either remaining without documentation 
altogether or obtaining fraudulent documents, either way, navigating the system in spite of the 
state.20 
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 One could object to their assertion however, pointing out that avoiding documentation does not translate into 
circumventing state control. Rather, state control is exerted perhaps even more so in the absence of documents 
than it is when one has them, as one‟s movement is influenced by a need to evade state agents and an inability to 
access state services. However, this reasoning while valid can be applied to all manner of resistance – that even 
in resisting, one is controlled by virtue of their need to resist. 
20
 Vidal (2008) discusses Mozambicans in Johannesburg‟s attempts to become “invisible” through efforts at a 
micro-level, attempting to evade detection by the local population more so than the state.   
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Historical Context of Movement and Access Control in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
A study of documentation among Zimbabweans in South Africa necessitates a review of 
some of the historical specificities of the two countries with respect to (i) the state‟s imposition of 
labels/identities and (ii) the control of movement through documents.21 Central in South Africa‟s 
legislative history was the passing of the 1950 Population Registration Act, through which the 
state defined four racial categories into which it then required each person to be classified. One 
was “black” because the state said they were. The racial labels ascribed by the state were then 
inscribed in documents people were required to carry. Laws restricting movement and requiring 
the use of permits to effect racial segregation and “population control” were enacted as early as 
1857.22 In 1923, the Native Urban Areas Act was passed, requiring black men in urban areas to 
carry passes indicating their “identities” and permission to be present. Perhaps the most 
significant legislation in the control of movement was the 1952 Natives (Abolition of Passes and 
Coordination of Documents) Act, which extended the requirement to carry “pass books” to all 
black people over 16. In these “reference books,” as the legislation term them, were records of 
who a person was (meant to be seen as), where they could go, and what they could do – much 
like modern day visa-endorsed passports that non-nationals are required to carry in post-
Apartheid South Africa, as required by the Aliens Control Act (1991).  
Zimbabwe‟s history of repressive laws is similarly littered with state attempts to control 
presence and movement, as well as to impose identities (see Muzondidya 2002). Southern 
Rhodesia‟s Land Apportionment Act (1930) and Native Land Husbandry Act (1952) were 
intended to regulate the allocation and use of as well as access to land [read: space], with the 
former described by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 39) as having “legally institute[ed] racial 
segregation.” From as early as 1902, Southern Rhodesia passed laws requiring “male Africans 
over 14 to register and carry the situpa [ID] at all times” (Austin 1975: 13). Two years later, 
another law was passed rendering it illegal for black people to live in urban areas except in 
“locations” unless they were “domestic servants” (Ibid). The 1936 Native Registration Act 
introduced a second pass to be borne by black men in the cities, in addition to their situpas 
(Austin 1975: 14). Ten years later, the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration 
Act (1946) was passed, extending the document requirement to women and allowing for the 
expulsion of unemployed people from towns (Austin 1975: 13). Through such laws, 
documentation-mediated systems of movement control were established, the 1946 Urban Areas 
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 A major part of the control of movement was residential segregation, which was intensified in the early 1950s 
through a flurry of laws including the Group Areas Act (1950); the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
(1951), the Bantu Authorities Act (1951), and the Natives Law Amendment Act (1952). 
22
 The Kaffir Pass Act was passed in 1857 preventing Xhosa people from entering the Cape except to work 
(O‟Malley, n. d.) 
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Act cementing not only the notion that one needed a piece of paper to attest to one‟s right to be 
present, but also that one‟s reasons for being present needed to be vetted by the state – people and 
activities being classified as “legitimate” and “illegitimate.”  
Gussman (1953) records that in colonial Southern Rhodesia, “up to as many as fourteen 
different documents may be required by a [black] man leading a normal life in town. He requires 
a pass to have his wife in town and another for his children; his visitors must obtain a certificate if 
they spend the night with him, and he requires a permit to seek work or to walk in the European 
part of the cities… a receipt for the watch they wear or the parcel they carry as police are liable to 
stop and question them…”  (139).  
 Granted, the post-colonial state with “democratically” elected officials operating under 
“majority rule” may appear quite distanced from the colonial regimes of Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, but the histories of the two countries with respect to state oppression and popular 
resistance form part of the context within which current individual-state interactions occur. 
Furthermore, neither country appears to have made a completely “clean break” from its colonial 
state systems. Independence notwithstanding, Muzondidya (2009: 176) records of post-colonial 
Zimbabwe that as early as the 1980s, “[t]here was a strong continuity with the Rhodesian state, 
perpetuated through the application of… [Rhodesia‟s] repressive laws…” As for South Africa, 
the continuity in the letter and enforcement of movement control laws from Apartheid is not only 
well documented (see Crush 1999; Peberdy 2001), but is not lost on migrants themselves, as will 
be seen in the discussion section of this report.  
 
Why from the Migrant’s Perspective? 
In the examination of the perspective of the individual in the document-mediated 
interaction between the individual and the state, studying the views of non-citizens in particular 
can be illuminating because of their condition as non-citizens. Given that “… regimes of power 
and of knowledge create points of resistance” (Foucault 1982, as cited in Vasta 2006), migrants 
are particularly interesting in that they are a population whose survival sometimes hinges on 
resisting precisely in the areas where the state would control them.23  
The rights of non-nationals (excluding bona fide asylum seekers and refugees), including 
the right to documentation, are neither automatic in a host state nor inalienable.24 Rather, rights 
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 While this may seem like a moderately anarchist characterisation of the individual as an unwilling subjugate 
who views state control as something to be forever resisted, it is not wholly inappropriate considering the 
dubious nature of migrants‟ position in the social contract scheme, and the recentness of Southern Africans‟ 
resistance of oppressive government. However, it is important to bear in mind that the view of the ever 
antagonistic migrant can quickly become xenophobic. 
24
 Even where refugees and asylum seekers are legally guaranteed rights to documentation and certain privileges 
(e.g. in South Africa, as provided by the Refugee Act (1998)), de jure rights do not always translate into 
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and access to rights must forever be negotiated (often with an unwilling state).25 In that 
interaction, documentation becomes a point where migrant and state meet, rendering it a locus of 
resistance. Whether by “legitimate”, state-sanctioned means (like applying for permits), or 
through “illegitimate”, non-state-sanctioned channels (bribing state officials, obtaining 
documents under false pretences), migrants either work the system or work around it.  
 Sartre (1961) would probably agree that like that of the “native” during colonial times, 
“the condition of [migrant] is a nervous condition.” Ironically, the post-Apartheid foreigner has 
moved to take the place of the Apartheid era black “native” in the South African hierarchy, while 
the “native” takes the place of Fanon‟s “coloniser.” In South Africa, when the label “foreigner” is 
coupled with “black” and “poor,” it often translates to the pejorative moniker “Kwerekwere” 
(Mathers and Landau 2007; Nyamnjoh 2002). Thus, the negotiation of access is done, not by 
bearers of human rights, but by so called “Makwerekwere,” whose rights are “vulnerable to 
question and revision by the locals” (Nyamnjoh (2002: 767). Ironically, rights which are 
supposedly signified on paper are not in fact indelible. It is no wonder Bakewell and Biao (2006) 
asks whether documents are “paper tigers,” bearing the image of power yet impotent in reality.  
Whether non-citizens are included in the social contract has been highly contested in 
political science, given that the “individuals” Rousseau refers to are actually “citizens” of the 
state to which they are bound. Some scholars have expanded on Rousseau‟s theory to present a 
broader construction of “citizenship” which includes nominal citizenship, incorporating those not 
defined as “formal citizens” (see Marshall 1964, Raskin 1993).26 Whether or not non-citizens are 
part of the social contract, their interaction with the state is also mediated by documentation 
which is specific in the rights and privileges it affords (visas, refugee booklets, residence permits, 
etc).  
The migrant interacts with the host state as a non-citizen, while bearing the memory of 
having interacted with another state as a citizen. It is likely that the non-citizen‟s perception of 
documentation, state control and the very nation-state itself may be both mediated by their 
condition as a non-citizen and informed by their experience of another state. Migrants move 
between two (or more) state-individual interactions where the rights/obligations relationships 
may differ. In addition, Zhang (2004) observes that “the [very] experience of diaspora produces a 
                                                                                                                                                        
concrete benefits. See Klaaren and Ramji (2001) for an account of ways in which protection is obviated through 
delays in the processing of claims as well as other faults in the asylum and immigration system in South Africa.   
25
 The state in both South Africa and Zimbabwe earned a reputation for hostility during colonial times, the 
memory of which may still inform Zimbabweans‟ perceptions of either or both states. The colonial governments 
of both countries instituted repressive laws restricting the movement of black locals (both pass laws and land 
apportionment laws). Such elements may have produced a view of the state not only as hostile, but as an 
obstacle instead of facilitator. Given perpetually unjust laws, skirting state control may not only have been 
acceptable but taken for granted, pervasive, permissible and laudable. The decline in democracy in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe may have resulted in a continuation of these sentiments.  
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shift in perspective… through which different cultural temporalities are re-configured against the 
spatial dislocation…” Foreign nationals are at once non-nationals in one land and nationals in 
another.27  
When the land in which they are non-nationals is South Africa, low-income black 
migrants are not simply “aliens,” they are so called “Makwerekwere.” They are bearers of 
documentation that marks28 them as “not of this place.”29 Their “permission” slips, when they 
have them, have expiration dates. Non-nationals are constantly moving towards expiration dates, 
whether literally as marked in their passports or as recorded on the Until-Caught-And-Deported 
Calendar.     
 
POPULATION UNDER STUDY 
 
The study focuses on Zimbabwean migrants resident in Johannesburg. I recognize 
Polzer‟s (2004) cautionary note, that categories like “refugee” and “Mozambican” (or in this case, 
“migrant” and “Zimbabwean”) can be “counter-productive at the local level,” and that limiting 
research to the experience of those in the categories is problematic when the “vulnerability, 
marginality, and displacement of “locals” [are only seen] as context factors instead of the very 
content of local (two-way) integration” (8-9). This is particularly key in examining the conditions 
under which people live, especially as studies have shown that the experiences of nationals and 
non-nationals are similar when it comes to accessing social services, housing and employment 
(Wits ACS, 2006). However, as this inquiry is specifically about documentation, nationality is at 
the heart of the issue. Additionally, non-nationals have the unique quality of interacting both with 
their own states (as citizens) and with a foreign state (often as non-citizens). This allows for the 
construction and expression of meaning both from the condition and perspective of a citizen and 
of a non-citizen, allowing them to be their own “control” group, in the broadest application of the 
term.     
Zimbabweans in particular are interesting for three reasons. Firstly, they are the targets of 
DHA‟s proposed Special Dispensation Permits. While the permits do not appear to have started 
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 References are courtesy of Tienda (2002: 588) http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3180822.pdf  
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Not all migrants are in this condition and not all the time. For example, stateless people may not be nationals 
of any land, though they may at some point have been privy to this experience.     
28Consider Waugh‟s (1982) discussion of “marking.” Though Waugh‟s (1982) analysis is intended for the 
examination of semiotic items, it can be mapped onto the labeling of “insiders” and “outsiders” – “citizens” and 
“aliens.” In this case, there is a dual system of marking – by race and by nationality. Low-income black non-
South Africans are doubly marked.  
29
 While all non-permanent resident non-citizens bear documents with “expiration dates,” the significance of this 
is greater for low income black foreigners who are constantly reminded of the temporariness of their statuses by 
state officials who stop them for spot-checks, demanding to see their passports. It is the greater likelihood of 
harassment, detention and deportation that compounds the condition of “alien.”     
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being issued at the time of the writing of this paper, there has been a change in the South African 
Government‟s approach to regulating Zimbabwean migration, both in terms of policy and 
implementation, as was signalled by the proposal of Special Dispensation Permits. As individuals 
whose “documented” rights to movement have recently changed, they present a case for 
examining the relationship between policy and perception, particularly during a period of 
transition. Secondly, their colonial history involves an experience of pass laws, and their history 
of struggle against the state machinery renders them particularly interesting. Thirdly, they were 
among the most targeted groups of xenophobia in South Africa. This is also the case in Botswana, 
where Nyamnjoh (2002: 767) describes the existence of four main categories of foreigners, 
among which all black foreigners are seen to fall into the fourth and lowest category, upon which 
the derogatorily label “Makwerekwere” is applied. This group‟s negotiation of access occurs 
under such conditions. Nyamnjoh (2002: 767) notes that “the residence and immigrant status of 
Makwerekwere are most vulnerable to question and revision by the locals… [a]nd among 
Makwerekwere, Zimbabweans are those whose presence is most contested and most devalued by 
locals who perceive them as “monsters…””30 Whether Zimbabweans have also attained the status 
of “monsters” over black foreigners of other nationalities in South Africa is uncertain. However, 
they are among the main targets of xenophobic sentiments and actions (see Landau and Monson 
2008), that is, among the most “other”. Yet, this is contrasted against the quasi-proximity brought 
about by the shared history between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the linguistic ties, and the 
geographical proximity (and therefore ease of access) between the two countries. The interplay 
between distancing and proximising factors, the “us-ing” and “othering” elements, may affect 
their perception of the manner in which their host country views them, and similarly their 
attitudes towards documents.   
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 Nyamnjoh (2002) takes “monster” reference from: S. Chimururi, „The Agony of Being a Zimbabwean‟, 
Mmegi, 27 April 2001. 
 
  
29 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 This study is informed by post-positivist, relativist commitments to examining the 
perspectives of individuals, and privileging their views of the world. While also adopting the 
constructivist recognition that meaning is created, and that there are multiple realities (Schwandt 
1994, as cited in Ponterotto 2005: 129), it does not espouse the notion that all positions are 
necessarily “valid.” Rather, it recognises that meaning is informed by history, context and 
experience, where “the meaning of experience and behaviour [is viewed]... in context, and in its 
full complexity” (Robson 2002: 25, referencing Fletcher (1996) and Steinmetz (1998)).  This is 
apt as the study‟s central purpose is to explore meaning as constructed and attached at the level of 
the individual. Ponterotto (2005: 129) notes that one of the core elements of relativist approaches 
is the recognition that the researcher is not wholly removed from the process of constructing and 
conveying knowledge. Rather, the investigator and investigated co-construct meaning (Ponterotto 
2005: 129). Relativist theoretical frameworks underline as an objective understanding “the lived 
experiences… from the point of view of those who live it day to day” (Ponterotto 2005: 129 
citing Schwandt 1994, 2000). This hermeneutic perspective rejects the constructivist belief that 
there is no truth independent of interpretation, holding rather that “our understandings of reality 
are influenced by what happens in the world” (Liamputtong and Ezzy 1999: 28) and those 
understandings can only be garnered from the individuals who experience the world.  
 Going beyond the limiting narrative of victimisation commonly espoused in migration 
literature, this study seeks a more holistic view of migration, regarding the migrant as what Mead 
(1934) terms a “pragmatic self”: an agentive being who acts upon the world even as it acts on 
him/her. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Scope of the Study 
The study limited itself to Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg, with the data 
collection and analysis period spanning four months. Because the study sought diversity of 
experience, respondents were selected from across racial, “ethnic”, linguistic and socio-economic 
lines. Similarly, variety of employment, educational and migration experience was sought. The 
three major exclusion areas were ability to consent; linguistic ability; and citizenship. Only 
people able to give informed consent unassisted were included because anonymity and 
confidentiality are reduced and the observer effect is aggravated by the presence of a third party 
such as a parent. The same is true about a translator. Hence, only people comfortable in English 
and/or Shona were interviewed because of the researcher‟s linguistic (in)ability.  
All of the participants self-identified as Zimbabwean, save for one South African woman 
who was not officially part of the study group but whose account proved compelling and has 
therefore been included in this report. At the conceptualisation of the project, it was intended that 
only migrants who were legally Zimbabwean citizens would be included.31 However, I realised 
during the course of my investigation that this would necessarily exclude all those who once had 
Zimbabwean citizenship and had renounced it. Yet, such individuals would deeply enrich the 
study. To opt out of Zimbabwean citizenship requires formally renouncing it and actively taking 
up a new citizenship, a process that is facilitated by and represented in documentation. The same 
is true for assuming Zimbabwean citizenship and renouncing some other citizenship. All but one 
of the official respondents had Zimbabwean citizenship, the exception having taken up South 
African citizenship while retaining Zimbabwean permanent residence and strongly self-
identifying as Zimbabwean.  
The study group consisted of seventeen respondents: twelve female and five male, with 
the majority of respondents aged between 23 and 39. All the respondents‟ reasons for migrating 
to South Africa were either to study (5) or to work (10), except for one woman who had come to 
join her family and another who engaged in cross-border trading. Of those who had not migrated 
to study, two were unemployed but actively seeking work; the rest who had jobs worked in the 
formal sector (mostly as professionals) except for one woman who was a live-in domestic worker. 
                                                 
31
 For the purposes of this study, if one was either a Zimbabwean citizen at the time of the study or was one at 
some point during their life, where they were considered as having or having had “Zimbabwean citizenship,” 
given that at some point they met the (current) Zimbabwean constitutional requirements for citizenship, even if 
they would not have been one under previous versions of the Constitution (see Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act 
(Act No. 23 of 1984 as amended by Act No. 7 of 1990,  Chapter. 4:01: 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/zimbabwe/citizenship.htm)  
.  
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Thirteen of the seventeen respondents had some higher education, with nine having completed at 
least one college degree. The majority of respondents had been resident in Johannesburg for one 
to three years, and all seventeen indicated that they had family in Zimbabwe and that they 
travelled frequently between Zimbabwe and South Africa (i.e. at least once a year). Five 
respondents were married (two males, three females), and six had children (one of the males, five 
of the females). There was one white and sixteen black respondents. While the black respondents 
were from different parts of Zimbabwe and spoke different languages, primarily Shona and 
Ndebele, and different dialects of Shona (ChiNdau, ChiZezuru, ChiKaranga), only one of the 
respondents expressed any strong connections with a collective identity other than their 
nationality, the exception self-identifying as Ndebele.  
 
Collecting Data 
 
Sources of Data 
 The initial conceptualisation of this project drew on insights gathered from semi-
participant observation in Johannesburg and Beitbridge, as well as desktop research. Media 
coverage of Zimbabwean issues and issues pertaining to migration in South Africa were useful as 
context-building sources, both in form of news broadcasts on television and newspaper articles 
over the year that the researcher was resident in Johannesburg, though these are not drawn on 
directly in this report. The same is true of both Zimbabwean and South African policy documents 
on migration, which were reviewed cursorily, as supplementary, supporting, and comparison 
background information.    
While some of the backgrounding data mentioned above was gathered through 
quantitative means, this study approach was qualitative, as this was the most fitting lens through 
which to examine perceptions. Ambert et al. (1995: 880) maintain that qualitative research is best 
suited for studies that do not hope for generalisability, such as this study, but rather “in-depth, 
intimate information... [which focuses] on how and why people behave, think and make meaning 
as they do...”  
 Thus, the main source of data was fieldwork conducted by the researcher. The main 
investigative tool was open, in-depth interviews of Zimbabwean migrants, which were conducted 
face-to-face. The study drew on the principles of ethnographic fieldwork which espouse 
observation of everyday interactions and being embedded in the study area. During the course of 
the four months during which interviews were conducted, it became clear just how central the use 
of observatory methods was both for facilitating the process of fashioning an interview guide and 
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for developing an eye for when best to conduct interviews. Interviews alone without participant 
observation would probably not have been as successful an investigative method.  
 
Sampling: Finding the People 
Two sampling techniques were used to identify respondents: snowball sampling, and 
convenience/spot-sampling. With snowballing, potential participants were found through 
referrals. This form of purposive sampling was suited for this study in that it allows for working 
with an “underground” population (Bernard 1988: 98 as cited in Liamputtong and Ezzy 1999: 
48). Zimbabwean migrants are anything but few in Johannesburg, and they are a somewhat 
visible group, especially Shona-speaking Zimbabweans who “betray” themselves with a single 
word, and Shona is readily discernable to the researcher as I have spoken it all my life. However, 
my hope was to include among my respondents migrants who had contravened immigration laws. 
During the planning of the study, I had only anticipated the fraudulent obtaining and/or use of 
documents as “underground” activities. However, in carrying out fieldwork, it became evident 
that I had overlooked the bribing of state officials as an activity that would also drive respondents 
and responses “underground.” In light of this, identifying migrants was greatly facilitated by the 
network nature of snowball sampling, where the referral system also assisted with the initial 
stages of trust-building. This was illustrated by one interview in particular where the respondent 
was notably reticent about divulging information that could potentially land them in trouble, 
despite my assurances of confidentiality and anonymity. While there is a host of possible factors 
that probably intermingled to bring about the respondent‟s reticence, it is likely that the trust-
building process was infirm. Had the respondent been selected through a referral method, perhaps 
they would have felt more confident about openly disclosing, as the fact of there being no 
relationship between the respondent and the interviewer can be somewhat compensated for by a 
respondent having been referred by a trusted party. 
The study bore in mind Liamputtong and Ezzy‟s (1999: 48) caution that since 
snowballing pools from social networks, it may result in a sample with distinctive characteristics. 
Snowballing may also rapidly lead to redundancy and a deceptive appearance of 
similarity/uniformity between respondents largely as it involves interviewing people from within 
the same network. This can be particularly problematic when a study includes a small number of 
participants. However, people are often members of several networks that branch out in many 
different directions, only a few of which are closed networks. To guard against the possibility of 
sampling within a small closed system, potential respondents were identified from multiple 
“snowballs.” Perhaps the main strategy employed to counteract the above mentioned potential 
shortcomings of snowballing and sampling through referrals was that for potential respondents 
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identified through referrals, those who referred or identified them were themselves not 
interviewed.   
The second means through which respondents were identified is what I have termed here: 
“spot”-sampling, where respondents were identified by the researcher during the course of 
conducting participant observation. Here, it was necessary for the researcher to invest time into 
establishing a loose relationship with the potential respondent in order to build trust and lay the 
groundwork for in-depth interviews.   
 
Interviewing as a Methodology  
 Interviews are not without limitations, the bulk of which are associated with 
methodologies that rely on self-reporting. A concern going into the study was that what it would 
learn would be limited to some extent by participants‟ ability to express themselves, which was of 
particular significance given the nature and purpose of the study. To minimise this, interviews 
were conducted in the participant‟s language of choice, where it was explained to participants that 
they ought to feel free to use whatever language they wished and to feel free to switch languages 
if they so desired. This was done both overtly, through an outright invitation to enjoy freedom of 
language selection, and covertly, with the interviewer deliberately code-switching during the 
conversations before the interview, as well as during the introductory portions of the actual 
interview themselves (up to and including the questions on biographical data). Questions were 
phrased simply and succinctly (see Appendix B for sample interview questions), and the 
interviewer kept a close eye out for quizzical expressions, rephrasing questions where necessary.  
 Another shortfall associated with self-reporting is that people tend to represent 
themselves positively, omitting information that would cast what could be seen as a negative light 
on them. This was particularly pertinent in this study, given that conversations centred on 
documentation, the perceptions of which I believed are closely tied to its acquisition. However, 
this element of self-reporting became a positive attribute to interviewing as a methodology, as 
respondents‟ surprising willingness to be forthcoming with regards to seemingly unfavourable 
activities became a point of analysis. The same is true of the manner in which self-reporting 
allowed for a clear expression/conveyance of migrants‟ attitudes towards and perceptions of what 
is and is not favourable, what is and is not “immoral,” what is and is not acceptable, as expressed 
in the presentation of their narratives.    
Thus, despite some of the commonly cited limitations of interviewing, self-reporting 
remained the best tool for this study, given that the primary objective was to ascertain what 
meanings individuals attach to documentation, with special emphasis on the manner in which 
they – migrants themselves – express those sentiments. Therefore, other factors often seen as 
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limitations of self-reporting, such as subjectivity, were in fact welcome in this study, as the 
emphasis was on the way individuals perceive symbols and express their perceptions.   
The interviewer was careful to ensure that discussions did not carry undertones of a 
moralising discourse on ethics and legality. To encourage candidness, the establishment of 
rapport and the building of trust between the respondents and the researcher were key, as was 
conducting interviews in places conducive to privacy. This was also helped by the fact that 
translators and interpreters were not used (Mackenzie et al. 2007; 3045). Consider Volosinov and 
Matejka‟s (1929) assertion that “meaning is the effect of interaction between speaker and 
listener...” and does not simply lie within words independent of that dialogic interaction (103). 
 
Group Discussion  
 While it was intended that a focus group discussion be held towards the end of the 
fieldwork process, in order to triangulate data, one such formal session was not held. Instead, a 
relatively unplanned mini-focus group discussion “generated” itself while the interviewer was 
attending a social event in Berea, to which she had been invited by chance and only knew the host 
and none of the other attendees, and was asked what she was studying in college. When she 
explained what her research area was, a group of four Zimbabweans expressed interest in 
participating. After the researcher explained issues of confidentiality, explained the study in 
detail, and obtained consent to record and use material from the discussion, a focus group 
discussion was held, with the researcher facilitating the discussion. The conversation occurred 
somewhat organically, was held in a kitchen, and was between people who were familiar with 
each other, such that the researcher was the only stranger.  
 The group discussion presented an opportunity to collect data in a more direct way than 
observation, by allowing for the asking of questions, though in a somewhat more organic way 
than interviews. That which is said in a one-on-one interview may differ from what comes out in 
a group discussion because of the influence of audience, decreased level of privacy and possible 
changes in the perception of shared history, shared beliefs, and commonality. During a 
communicative interaction, the audience is a major factor in determining what is said and what is 
not (note Grice‟s (1975) theory on communicative intentions). Expanding on Searle‟s (1990) 
notion on the cooperative nature of communication, Fussell and Kreuz (1998) note that: 
“...communicative intentions are generated by collaborative interaction between speaker and 
hearer.” This interaction changes depending on who makes up the audience. In a group 
discussion, there are other members of the immediate audience besides the interviewer and 
interviewee. Similarly, meaning is constructed both at an individual (private) and group (public) 
level, and the expression of those meanings occurs at both levels. Thus, a group discussion 
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provided an opportunity to gather comparative data to allow for triangulation both of sources and 
of methods. 
 
 
Reflexivity: “Insider” or “Outsider” Researcher? 
Daniel (1996), in describing Clifford Geertz‟s interpretive anthropological style, notes 
that in Geertz‟s writings, culture became dialogic; that is, not a given but something “co-created 
anew by anthropologist and informer” (198). In this co-creation of knowledge and of meaning, it 
becomes critical to reflect on the particularities on a researcher. This is especially so considering 
Holmes‟ (1992) claim that social distance, status and the function or goal of the interaction affect 
the product of the interaction (29, 30). “Social distance” is a subjective quality that is highly 
variable depending on the interaction. Tied in with it are notions of power (and with that, class) 
and “insider/outsiderness.”  
Migrants are often seen as a vulnerable group, research among whom can embody 
hierarchical structures wherein the interviewer is cast as being in a position of authority. This is 
particularly true where there are racial, nationality, linguistic, educational, and “class” differences 
between the researcher and the informants.  
 Perceptions of power tie in to a broader debate on distance, and whether one is allowed 
into the “inner circle,” where distance can be seen as enabling or hindering access not only into a 
community but to people‟s thoughts. Distance not only pertains to perceptions of a researcher but 
also to his/her ability to be an objective observer. At least, this is a concern raised about “native 
anthropology,” wherein a researcher is part of his/her research population. Critiques of native 
anthropology are in line with Emily Dickinson‟s (1870) claim that “the mind is so near itself it 
cannot see [itself], distinctly.” Naturally, a researcher is never studying his/her own “mind,” no 
matter how close s/he feels to the population of interest. However, the principle behind 
Dickinson‟s metaphor is that some level of distance is required for examination. Researchers 
sometimes express this concern by warning against “going native.” However, being close to the 
research population allows for more emic ethnography (Ponterotto 2005), and as I found during 
interviews, the use of linguistic devises like figures of speech and Zimbabwean-ese lingo was 
present, which I took as a sign that those respondents who perceived little “distance” assumed I 
would understand them and therefore felt free to express themselves somewhat unreservedly. 
This therefore allowed for some analysis of the use of metaphors with particular attention to 
aspects of avoidance metaphors make possible. With emic ethnography, issues of cultural 
relativism are also reduced. Above all, a view from the “inside” is just as legitimate as one from 
the “outside,” each having its own advantages and shortcomings.  
  
36 
  Actually, the question of whether one is an “insider” or an “outsider” is deceptive in its 
reductionist presentation of two seemingly diametrically opposed, mutually exclusive options. 
Miller (1985) takes issue with the un-encompassing nature of the insider/outsider binary, where 
the two positions are seen as two sides of a sheet of paper, “[leaving] no room for a third element, 
endowed with a positive shape of its own” (16). According to Miller, all elements “tend… to be 
associated with one side or the other or to be nullified due to the lack of an available slot in our 
intellectual apparatus” (16). Rather than seeing insider/outsiderness as a zero sum either/or 
matter, it is more helpful to view the perception of distance as a continuum along which one 
moves constantly. During any one interaction, a person can be an insider at one moment and an 
outsider the next. Where I was viewed as an “insider” by a respondent, it was probably the 
aggregate perception of a series of movements along the insider/outsider slide. Besides, as I 
discovered when I actually conducted sit-down interviews, it is incredibly presumptive to imagine 
that one can predict how a person will receive you and for what reason. For this reason, the 
question of “insider/outsiderness” was a real learning point for me, and awareness of it was vital 
in my study, given that its object was the perception of meaning. For one such study, one cannot 
but acknowledge the subjectivity of the judgment of social distance and espouse a belief in the 
variation of the same.  
Going into fieldwork, I expected that different elements of my biographical history would 
likely push me in different directions at different times along the power scale. What I did not 
anticipate (and what therefore caught me by surprise) was which elements that biographical 
history would be most relevant, when. Going in, I expected that being a black Zimbabwean 
migrant, who is a first language Shona speaker, my demographic elements would work as 
“equalizing” factors, allowing for me to be perceived as somewhat close to the research 
population, at least at first blush. This was true, at least in so far as one can make an accurate 
assessment of how they were received. However, I discovered that these factors – race, language, 
nationality – did not work in isolation, but formed the basis of the perception of closeness.  
My greatest concern going into fieldwork was the potential effect of my less immediately 
observable characteristics; the other (less obvious) factors that would contribute to perceptions of 
difference. I thought that my status as a Masters student at a prestigious university and the fact of 
my entering the interaction as a researcher would have me positioned as the more “powerful” in 
the interviewer/interviewee interaction. I was most concerned about this for interviewees whose 
highest levels of education attained were lower than my own, and their financial means were not 
greater than mine. I expected that money would compensate for schooling in terms of positioning, 
as I was wary of having the aggregate perception of myself as “higher” for fear that it would 
impede the establishment of rapport and affect the information respondents were willing to share. 
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With regards to the “prestigious university” element, respondents often asked how I was paying 
for school. When I informed them that I had a scholarship that covered my tuition and rent, that 
my father was a migrant and that my parents were teachers/civil servants – that is, that I was a 
“regular” person and not some Zimbabwean heiress – prestige became less of an issue. However, 
on the whole, among the respondents whose level of schooling and income were both lower than 
mine, I did not get the sense that they perceived social distance in the way I expected. Instead, 
what became more important than education and income was the fact that I had spent less time in 
Johannesburg and in South Africa than they had, which positioned me as something of a novice. 
Also, consequently, all of the interviewees who fell into my preconceived “sub-group of concern” 
ended up being older than me, most of them either being married and or having children. Age, 
marital status, and their status as mothers or fathers, along with the attendant consequences – 
status as breadwinner, provider for their families, migrant providers – all worked to class me 
rather as a “child”32 and them as adults, as relatively new to the migration scene, and them as 
seasoned migrants with a story to tell. Also unexpectedly, the subject of my inquiry seemed to 
cement the “interviewee as provider of information” dynamic, where respondents had the upper 
hand and other elements of social distance decreased in importance. That is, where interviews 
highlighted interactions with the state, respondents appeared to assume that as a fellow black 
Zimbabwean migrant resident in Johannesburg, I was united with them in their criticism of the 
exercise of state power, as evidenced by their use of linguistic cues such as “unongozivawo” [you 
also just know].      
Among those whose income level and/or schooling was the same as or higher than mine, 
the perception of social distance was relatively less. I wore jeans and no jewellery; the handbag I 
carried was old and had been purchased on the streets of Johannesburg. My plain R199 Nokia 
cellphone is about as far from a Blackberry as one can get these days. Thus, more often than not, 
I was less dressed-up than my female respondents. Interviews with these respondents employed a 
considerable amount of English and my non-descript tape recorder was sometimes toyed with but 
did not itself appear to be a huge distraction. That is, the fact of being recorded had a greater 
effect on the interview than the aesthetic attributes and monetary value of the recorder itself.    
Perhaps the most interesting and telling case of insider/outsiderness that I experienced 
during my fieldwork was when I interviewed a white Zimbabwean resident in South Africa. Here, 
the insider/outsiderness element came about in relation not directly to the respondent‟s 
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 In what is sometimes termed Shona “culture,” systems of social ranking consider age, marital status, status as 
parent as outweighing education and income, and though this may be changing in some contexts with the 
breakdown of the “traditional” extended family structure, the ranking system remains in principle and people 
can draw on it during interactions. 
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experience, but rather to the claim to Zimbabwe.33 That is, to who is and who is not perceived as 
“truly” Zimbabwean. By this, I mean that the respondent appeared mildly defensive and 
reflecting on the interview and reviewing the tape, the voices – both of the interviewee and the 
interviewer – betray some element of tension, and the tension arose during the course of the 
interview, largely as a result of the questions. Now, the questions asked were the exact same ones 
used during all the interviews. I learnt that a question like, “What makes you Zimbabwean?” is 
not the same question when posed to a person whose family was dispossessed of their land and 
whose claim to that national identity has been challenged time and again in political discourse. 
This is true even when it is preceded by disclaimers about not intending on challenging their right 
to claim Zimbabwean identity. What I did not account for was that it would probably have been 
both wise and beneficent to establish more trust and build better rapport before the interview. 
Presumptive as it may be, I reckoned that my status as a black Zimbabwean female would mean 
that I could inhabit a “lower” stratum where race, gender and nationality were elements of power 
determination; I could position myself as one seeking knowledge and not as an authority. In their 
exposition of the effects of Affirmative Action in the United States, Sokoloff (1987) note after all 
that black women are seen as having a ““doubly disadvantaged” status – being black and being 
female” (61). Perhaps to be seen as occupying a lower stratum would render me benign, 
facilitating the perception of “closeness” with Zimbabwean respondents. Yet, as I discovered, 
when it comes to claims to citizenship and belonging, claims to a nation, to be a black 
Zimbabwean is to be grouped with a more “powerful” dispossessor. It is to risk being perceived, 
even subtly and subconsciously, as claiming to be a custodian of national identity. The 
peculiarities of this interview have proved incredibly educational in matters of belonging, 
identity, and perception. 
 
Audience 
 The effect of audience is key during ethnographic fieldwork. While the observer effect 
was less in interviews than it may have been had observation been the key research methodology, 
it still needs to be accounted for. During face-to-face interviews, the researcher constitutes an 
audience for the respondent. Similarly, the respondent is an audience unto him/herself. Goffman 
(1959) put forward the notion of the “self” as a performed character produced during social 
interaction for an audience of which s/he is a part of. As the respondent observes him/herself even 
in responding, what s/he says in an interview is also informed by what s/he considers the 
“appropriate” response. According to Beeman, one strives for “appropriateness” by “perceiving 
                                                 
33
 Here, the issue was not so much a claim to “Zimbabweanness” but rather to the country itself – the right to 
call it home; to consider it one‟s “native” land; to stake a claim in its past, problems and future. 
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expected predictable behavior in interaction and monitoring one‟s behavior to conform to 
expectations” (203). Thus, even as interviewing uses, as Guba and Lincoln (1981) describe, a 
method of “human as instrument,” so the human instrument affects what it measures.  
 The issue of audience came to a head during the above mentioned educational interview 
with a white Zimbabwean. Two aspects of audience came into play: that of an unseen but ever-
present “listener” whose hearing was aided by the use of recording devices, and that of the 
interviewer herself as audience. After the interview, when I reiterated that the information that 
had been shared would not be associated with them and efforts would be made to ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality, the respondent intoned that information can always leak. Should 
there ever be a time when it is decided to attempt to see who among those claiming ties to 
Zimbabwe is “truly” Zimbabwean, such information could be used against them. In this case, the 
issue of the unseen observer, present in an unknown future, affected the nature of the information 
the respondent was willing to share, as well as the manner in which they shared it.  
 As for the interviewer as audience, the respondent noted after the interview that they 
hoped that I had not “taken [their] comments personally.” I was surprised by the utterance, as it 
had not occurred to me that there was the possibility of the interviewer taking comments 
personally. What I had not realized until that moment was the extent to which the interview is a 
personal interaction between individuals. The interviewer is a being with the ability to take 
offense and be affected by the utterances of the interviewee, and more importantly, the 
interviewee is aware of the interviewer – not as a detached, impartial observer removed from the 
material they are gathering – but as a person liable to take offence. Thus, the interviewee 
measures his/her responses. While the fact of the self as a performed character is a constant 
(Goffman 1959), during the interview, the self is that much more a performed character – and 
both the interviewer and the interviewee are performing selves.  
 
 
Analysis of Data 
What was produced during discursive interactions was then examined with Phillips and 
Hardy‟s (2002: 6) delineation of discourse analysis as an exploration of how “socially produced 
ideas and objects…were created… and how they are maintained and held in place over time” (as 
cited in Liamputtong and Ezzy 1999: 262). 
This allowed for a thematic analysis of: what was said, how it was said, and what was not 
said. In addition to examining the content of discourse, I looked at the discursive context in which 
things are said, for example, the manner in which issues are framed, and the speaker‟s 
positionality.  
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I examine the way in which meaning is presented. That is, word choice, language choice, 
incidences of Shona/English code-switching where relevant (Myers-Scotton & Ury 1977), as well 
as the use of metaphors, allusions and analogies. This, while bearing in mind Hymes‟ (1974) 
exhortation when investigating language use, it needs to be in “contexts of situation,” where 
context should be taken as “a community, or network of persons” such that the analysis situates 
itself within that community‟s “communicative aspects as a whole, so that any use of ... code 
takes its place as part of the resources upon which the members draw” (3, 4).  
Metaphors and allusions are useful not only in what is said but also in what they allow the 
interlocutor to not say (Johnstone 2002). Thus, in the “analysis of silences,” I examine the areas 
of avoidance. This involves looking not only at what actual topics are not embraced in certain 
circumstances, but also what discourses and ideologies are not called upon to explain, justify or 
rationalise actions or beliefs. Some of the silences are partly a result of an assumption of shared 
history, knowledge or belief – what “needs not be said” largely as it is seen as being obvious. 
While it is difficult to determine the motivations for individual silences (or motivations in 
general, short of what respondents actually say), it is important to remain aware of the possibility 
of assumptions of commonality.  
While each interview is treated individually as the representation of a single person‟s 
thoughts, I am attentive for similarities, overlaps or areas of commonality, whether in word 
choice, ideology or even language choice.  
  A critical aspect of research is the presentation of findings. In his examination of the 
effects of writing, retelling and reporting, Daniel (1996) notes that these processes, while a means 
of “preserving” truth, also serve to obfuscate it. Thus, reflexivity is employed throughout this text 
in recognition firstly of the researcher as enmeshed in the research, and secondly of her role as an 
intermediary between respondents and readers (and therefore another layer of interpretation). If 
we accept Daniel‟s (1996) assertion that “no narrative… is a straightforward representation, made 
up of transparently decodable constatives… not a mere telling; it is a performative,” then this can 
be true both of the narrative presented by a respondent during an interview and of a text produced 
by a researcher.   
Some elements of the analysis described above rely on the use of recorded material, as 
they require verbatim transcription and translation. Such analyses were therefore only done in 
cases where respondents agreed to have their interviews taped. Where interviews could not be 
recorded, detailed notes were taken.  
 
  
41 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Vulnerable Population and Illegality 
Jacobsen and Landau (2003: 187) caution that “research into vulnerable populations like 
refugees, some of whom might be engaged in illegal or semi-legal activities raises many ethical 
problems.” This raises two issues particularly relevant in this study: vulnerability and illegality. 
While migrants differ in the sources, nature and extent of their vulnerability, in Johannesburg, 
low-income, black African migrants have been found to be more susceptible to be targets of 
crime, police harassment, and xenophobia, and this group made up a significant part of my 
respondents.    
 Going into the study, it was likely, indeed expected, that some respondents would 
disclose knowledge of or participation in illegal activities, which they did. These included 
acquiring and using falsified documents and passports that belonged to other people, as well as 
bribing police officers and immigration officials. The disclosure of participation in illegal 
activities was a critical area of consideration given that documentation is central to migrants‟ 
daily lives in Johannesburg, and since I was explicitly asking them to share such stories. The 
University of the Witwatersrand‟s ethics guidelines stipulate that when working with human 
subjects: 
 
 “A researcher's paramount responsibility is to those studied. Where there is conflict of 
interest, they must come first. Researchers must do everything within their power to 
protect their informants' physical, social and psychological welfare and to honour their 
dignity and privacy.”  
 
In keeping with this principle, I committed to not reporting illegal matters to the police, unless 
they are later found to pertain to crimes which endanger the welfare of other people, such as 
trafficking in persons. It is highly unlikely that this will happen, and at the writing of this paper, it 
did not appear that that would be an issue. Should cause ever arise, the decision whether to 
disclose will be made in close consultation with my supervisor and with Wits‟ Forced Migration 
Studies Department, who are bound by the University‟s ethics standards. While it is improbable 
that the Governments of Zimbabwe and/or South Africa should wish to extract information on the 
few issues that emerged during the course of this study for legal proceedings, if my records are to 
be subpoenaed by the state, I would turn them over in compliance with the law. However, my 
research notes are unlikely to highly endanger respondents, as the information was recorded 
anonymously, and it would not be possible to trace information back to any particular respondent 
or place.  
  
42 
In light of the potential implications beyond the scope of the study, ensuring 
confidentiality, anonymity and informed consent become particularly important. Macchiavello 
(2003) stresses that the confidentiality of the informant is “[t]he first ethical issue a researcher of 
forced migration needs to consider… during interviews” (7). Thus, the following measures were 
taken: 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 
Collection and Storage of Data  
Interviews and the group discussion were conducted in locations that were both public 
enough to ensure some degree of security both for the participants and the researcher, yet 
removed enough from unintended audiences, such that discussions could be confidential. It was 
my intention not to ask respondents their names, but because of the multiple interactions that 
were necessary prior to interviews in order to establish some degree of trust and to work through 
the logistics of setting up interviews, this quickly became impracticable. However, during 
interviews, especially those that were recorded, I addressed respondents as “you” rather than by 
their names, so that their actual names would not feature in the recordings. Informants have 
therefore been assigned codes by which they are identified in place of pseudonyms. I assigned the 
codes based on numbers pulled out of a hat. The list of codes has not been and will not be 
disclosed to anyone. Codes were assigned prior to the interview, and were used to keep track of 
interview notes and tape recordings. 
Biometric data was collected, such as age, sex and education level, the presentation of 
those details has been carefully considered to ensure that the combination of personal details does 
not render them recognisable in this text. (For example, if one were to combine my age, sex, 
home town and educational biography in a report, it would considerably threaten my anonymity; 
see Stevenson et al. 1993 as cited in Penrod et al. 2003: 101).  
While some conversations were recorded, this was only done with the permission of the 
respondent, and tapes are identified by codes picked from a hat, as mentioned above. While 
taking notes during an interview is a more involved process than recording it, participants‟ right 
to decide whether or not to be recorded is of paramount importance. Interview tapes and notes are 
being stored away in a secure place. All the steps taken to ensure anonymity and confidentiality 
were explained to respondents before the conversations and re-explained afterwards. 
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Analysis of Data 
Conversations were transcribed and translated by the researcher due to budgetary 
constraints. However, given that accuracy is often compromised when work is done and checked 
by the same person, the researcher worked in consultation with “key informant” first language 
speakers of Shona, English, and Ndebele on translation, to supplement dictionaries and other 
language texts. I have held consultative discussion sessions with migrants to review the findings 
of the research. However, recordings were not used in this verification process, as voice 
identification and association would compromise anonymity and confidentiality. 
In the writing of the research report, the use of pseudonyms has been avoided. While 
pseudonyms mask the name of the particular person being referred to, their use often does not 
account for the existence of some other person (albeit unconnected to the research project) whose 
name might be the pseudonym selected, and who bears resemblance to the person described in 
the report. While the person directly referred to in the report may be protected, pseudonyms can 
expose other people to association with research. Thus, respondents have been identified by the 
researcher by their numerical codes, and are only referred to in this report, for example, as “one 
young lady.”  
While anonymity may be best served by destroying tapes now that transcription has been 
done, the tapes have not been destroyed and will be kept for five years. This is to allow for data to 
remain useable for further analyses (e.g. a sociolinguistic examination of the incidence and nature 
of code-switching, particularly since interviews will centre on meaning and identity), and 
particularly to facilitate checking of transcription and translation during such use.  
 
Informed Consent  
& Beneficence  
 
Informed consent is a particularly important ethical issue in research involving migrants. 
Major concerns often surround issues such as the effect trauma, repeated abuse, and a sustained 
sense of insecurity on migrants‟ ability to fully consent, though none of these elements factored 
among the respondents in this study.  
Participation was on a strictly voluntary basis, where every effort was made to ensure that 
should people consent or decline, the decision was truly informed. The nature and purpose of the 
research was explained to potential respondents, along with what participation would entail. They 
were made aware that there was neither a penalty for declining nor a reward for participating, and 
that there was no expected direct benefit for the participant. Interestingly enough, the question of 
what respondents would benefit came up in many pre-interview interactions, which made it that 
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much more important to be upfront with potential respondents. Additionally, interviewees were 
told that they could choose to answer only the questions they were willing to respond to, and that 
they could stop the interview at any point without penalty. That is, consent could be withdrawn at 
any point, including at any time even (long) after the end of the interview. 
All these terms were explained to respondents in a language they indicated they 
understood. The interviewer employed a consent guideline to ensure that each element of consent 
was covered. Interviewees were not be asked to sign consent forms though, as asking respondents 
for signatures may reduce the sense of anonymity as well as the revocability of consent. Instead, 
respondents were given a copy of the consent form for their own records (see Appendix D).  
At one point during the first interviews, I was startled by black respondents‟ willingness 
to talk about their contraventions of immigration laws, and I was concerned that perhaps 
respondents did not understand the attendant risks of disclosing potentially incriminating 
information. I was caught in something of an ethical dilemma. Part of me wished to reiterate the 
caution and perhaps almost persuade them that while all possible steps would be taken to ensure 
the protection of their identities, there was always some residual risk of discovery. Yet at the 
same time, I was (uncomfortably) aware of the fact that the richness of the study‟s findings 
depended on the extent of their willingness to speak, the very study itself hinging on gaining 
insight into the respondents‟ perceptions, which were linked to their actions. 
 The mandate to “do no harm” applies not only to study respondents directly, but also to 
those whose lives and experiences are similar to and/or captured in those presented. It is this 
aspect of my research that presents perhaps the greatest moral and ethical dilemma – one which 
remains unresolved. In their editorial introduction on “Invisible Displacement,” Polzer and 
Hammond (2008: 418) note that “invisibility… is a survival resource for many displaced…” and 
studies such as this one potentially “lift the veil… inadvertently alerting powerful states … to the 
ways in which their rules are circumvented, and thereby reduce the space for life-saving creativity 
and flexibility in remaining invisible.” My only hope is that this paper is not in fact revealing 
practices that were completely unknown to the Zimbabwean and South African authorities, and is 
therefore not an uncovering of activities but rather an exploration of the meanings behind 
(known) actions of migrants. I hope the collective of perspectives betters the image of migrants, 
particularly in academia by moving away from the discourse of victimhood that presents migrants 
as two dimensional beings, presenting them rather as pragmatic actors who engage with notions 
of citizenship, membership, rights, and state control.      
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
“The passport is not for the police…” 
 
 This second half of the report is divided into four main sections, each with thematically 
presents and analyses sub-sections wherein the key findings of the study are explored. Underlying 
and running throughout the discussion are notions of membership, ownership of documents and 
identity; movement and resistance to control; the relationship between the person, the paper, and 
the person on paper; the utility of documents in terms of access, where access goes beyond access 
to social services. Many of respondents‟ comments around documentation were centred on state 
officials, primary among whom were the police. As one respondent simply stated:  “The passport 
is not for the police…” His sentiments capture some of the general contestation around the issue. 
Thus, the first section on identification and membership begins with a brief look at his statement 
as to how and why passports are “not for the police.” The respondent objects to the manner in 
which spot inspections of migrants are conducted. The report therefore goes on to look at how 
migrants perceive selection to be conducted by the police, exploring visible markers of non-
belonging, and the determination of “otherness,” which leads into a discussion of notions of 
“good citizens” and “good migrants” as those who are not (determinately) “other.” The second 
section on resistance to state restrictions examines how migrants perceive and respond to some of 
the limitations placed on them through documentation-mediated control, among the unexpected 
findings being the dually limiting and liberating nature of documentation in times of death. This 
leads into a discussion of migrants‟ perceptions of a disconnection between identity 
documentation and identity, among which documents are asylum seeker permits. The paper goes 
on to look at the access to ways of being, concluding the section with a discussion of that which 
documentation does not necessarily grant access to: welcome. The third section on documentation 
and defence examines the role of documentation in individual-state interfaces, exploring 
migrants‟ perceptions of the exchanges, their implications, and through that, of documentation 
itself. This highlights tensions in migrants‟ perceptions of state officials, and how that relates to 
and informs their perceptions of the state. If migrants believe that “the passport is not for the 
police,” then who is it “for” and how does a migrant rationalise the confliction they perceive, 
given for example the historical context of Apartheid and the asymmetric application of 
regulations. This feeds into a discussion on the ownership of documentation, and with it the 
ownership of the right to identify and be identified, and the tension that arises when migrants 
exist in and make use of a system that they are able to manipulate to their marginal benefit, while 
remaining somewhat confined by the same. The section ends with a brief revisit of the tension 
between being dependent on the state while simultaneously attempting to resist it.  
SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION & MEMBERSHIP 
 
The Passport is not for the Police 
 Migration literature on documentation is largely characterised by a rights based discourse, 
and I half expected that to ask migrants in Johannesburg about documentation is to ask them 
about rights. Yet, surprisingly, respondents only spoke of rights in one context: to express 
contempt for the requirement that foreigners carry their passports around. Their issue was not 
rooted in the fact that they were required to carry their passports, but that they were required to 
present those documents to the police, and upon demand. Migrants protested that this violated 
their right to freedom of movement in principle. It is perhaps fitting to begin the discussion on 
findings on that singular note of rights, with a brief discussion of attendant issues.  
 
“Passport haisi yemapurisa. An immigration 
officer – I would understand. Kwete kuti 
ndichingozvifambira. That‟s interfering with my 
freedom of movement. I don‟t agree with that. 
South African cops in general – it‟s not kuti vari 
kubvunza for any noble reasons but for 
alternative motives. Not kuti vane interest yekuti 
unepassport. Because kana vakakubata usinayo, 
ukavapa mari, vanokusiya... Hapana munhu 
anofanira kundibvunza passport. Kwete kuti 
wese wese anondimisa anongoti, “Passport?” 
Kana ndapara mhosva – yes. Mupurisa 
anekodzero. Kwete kuti ndiri kungofamba 
zvangu. If you see me driving, you can ask for 
my license, because I‟m driving... [The random 
asking for passports] it‟s morally wrong. It might 
be technically correct. Ende futi mapurisa amuno 
anobvunza in such a xenophobic way.”  
- 38 year old man 
“The passport is not for the police. An 
immigration officer – I would understand. Not 
when I‟m just walking around. That‟s interfering 
with my freedom of movement. I don‟t agree 
with that. South African cops in general – it‟s not 
that they are asking for any noble reasons but for 
alternative motives. Not that they are interested 
in whether you have a passport. Because if they 
catch you without it, if you give them money, 
they leave you alone…No one should ask about 
my passport. Not this that whoever just stops me 
says, “Passport?” If I‟ve committed a crime – 
yes. The police have the right. Not this – that I‟m 
just walking. If you see me driving, you can ask 
for my license, because I‟m driving... [The 
random asking for passports] it‟s morally wrong. 
It might be technically correct. And also the 
police here ask in such a xenophobic way.”  
 
 The objection is not against all forms of control. Rather, it is against the enforcement of 
the control by police officers. For the respondent, the police‟s mandate ought not to extend 
beyond the policing of criminal activity. He allows for the officers to question him if his conduct 
is criminal: “If I‟ve committed a crime – yes. The police have a right.” He does not see the 
policing of immigration as a policing of crime. Interestingly, the respondent allows for officers to 
ask to see a driver‟s license from someone who does not necessarily appear to have committed a 
“crime,” for the simple fact that they are driving. One can only drive if they have permission to 
do so. However, officers should not ask to see a pedestrian‟s authorization for “just walking.” 
The offense in this case is not “just walking”; it is walking in South Africa. Ultimately, the 
respondent‟s greatest qualm is with the fact of the asking of passports from pedestrians and in a 
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seemingly unwarranted manner – the idea of one always being liable to inspection, almost 
perpetually vulnerable to it. Also, he objects to the manner in which policing is conducted: who 
does the inspecting (police officers – rendering immigration control a law enforcement activity, 
casting immigrants as criminals); their motives (money; self interest) and their approach 
(xenophobic). 
 The gentleman quoted above had never himself been stopped and asked to produce his 
passport, despite having lived in Johannesburg for almost a year. However, he carried the 
passport around with him everywhere he went. His assertion that “the police here ask in such a 
xenophobic way” is remarkable in that he had not had first hand experience of the asking. Yet, he 
spoke with conviction.34 Interestingly, both the respondents who had been asked to produce 
passports by the police and those who had never had that experience, expressed discontent over 
the requirement. Their narratives were similar in that they underscored that they took issue with 
the same three things: the manner in which immigration policing was done, the police‟s 
corruption, and the wrongs of spot-checks.  
 It was interesting how all the respondents presented the same three elements, albeit in 
varying order and with different emphasis. The point of distinction was what migrants drew upon 
to explain or justify their discontent. It was only migrants who had never been subjected to spot 
inspections who invoked a narrative of rights, complaining, as the 38 year old gentleman cited 
above does, that spot checks “interfere with [his] freedom of movement.”  It is noteworthy that all 
of the migrants I interviewed who had never been inspected had valid passports and visas.  
Perhaps their impassioned protests were the result of having served as a conduit for others‟ 
emotions, or of being aware that there existed a group of people subject to random inspection, 
and they were part of that group, as evidenced by them carrying around their passports.  
 These same migrants when asked whether they would vote to abolish passports 
altogether, vehemently said no. Passports were of great value to them. Their point of objection 
arose with regards the manner in which the documents were used in immigration policing in the 
city.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 An argument can be made that media coverage and to a lesser extent migration literature, provide a language 
of xenophobia, creating a discourse from which people can borrow. For an examination of xenophobic threads 
in media coverage in southern African countries, see McDonald and Jacobs (2005).  
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How to Spot an Alien: Visible Markers of Non-Belonging 
 
 
Not of here:  
 Before a person is asked to show their identification documents in the street, they are 
identified as a possible “transgressor”. That is, as a foreigner, in this case a Zimbabwean, and as 
one who (i) may possibly not have the correct documents, and if respondents‟ assessment that the 
police‟s objective is to extort bribes (or exert power) then (ii) as one who may be coerced into 
offering monetary “witness” and “restitution,” (or over whom power can be exerted). It is not 
enough to simply be a Zimbabwean. Some people are never stopped and asked to produce 
documents, a case in point being one respondent who had not been accosted in over five years, 
even when others around her were. What then are the physical/visible markers of non-
membership that clue the police in to one‟s alienness, betraying their bearer? In order to get at 
what respondents believed to be the visible signs, I asked them in a group setting what I would 
have to do to mark myself as a Zimbabwean, so that I too could get stopped and asked to show 
my passport (having never been asked in the eleven months I have been living in Johannesburg). 
The women in the group responded while the men laughed and nodded. They said that I would 
need to: 
  
 carry around a changan bag 
 “kana uchigona kuimba nechiShona”  
 “mikwende mikwende”
35
 
 walk around Jeppe Street 
 carry ma-two-in-one (blankets)  
 “tsvaka someone wekufamba naye 
anomakisa” 
 wear a skirt nemasocks, woolen hat, 
nescarf,  
 pfeka masocks eorange 
 “wakasunga juzi muchiuno – wonyatso 
kuita bharanzi”
 36
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 “Mukwende” is defined as “piece of luggage, 
baggage tied in a bundle” (Duramazwi 1981). 
36
 The term “baranzi” in the original is a derivative 
of the word “balance” where a bharanzi ironically 
is one who lacks balance, and is unsophisticated. 
 carry around a changan
37
 bag 
 “if you can sing in Shona”  
 “lots of large bulky bags” 
 walk around Jeppe Street 
 carry two-in-ones (blankets)  
 “look for someone to walk with who is 
unseemly/scruffy (anomakisa)” 
 wear a skirt with socks, a woolen hat, and 
a scarf 
 wear orange socks 
 “while you‟re tying a jersey around your 
waist – so that you‟re really a 
bushwhacker/rustic”  
                                                 
37
 Changan bags are rectangular bags made of what 
look like woven plastic strips – often red, white and 
blue. The etymology of the term is unclear though 
some respondents indicated that they believed the 
name was derived from the term “Machangan” 
meaning “Shangans”, though the association 
between the bags and Shangan people is unclear. A 
Zimbabwean respondent who lived in Botswana for 
many years noted that in Botswana, the bags were 
termed “MaZimbabwe”, as they were associated 
with Zimbabweans travelling back to Zimbabwe, 
bags filled with groceries.   
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 The caricature of the Zimbabwean migrant woman is essentially a rural woman, because 
what urban woman would wear a skirt and socks, a woolen hat, and tie a jersey around her waist. 
Yet, she is not rural in that she is from a rural area. Rather, she is by nature a rural woman, 
regardless of her place of abode. She is the rural Zimbabwean woman; they are urban 
Johannesburg women. This woman is the anti-assimilated cosmopolitan woman who lives in 
Johannesburg. She wears her woolen hat like a badge of foreignness. She is the woman that they 
may once have been, but that they are no longer, at least to the extent that they can recognize and 
ridicule her.  
 The respondents said to walk around with a person “amomakisa.” The verb contained in 
that term is “kumaka”, stem “-maka-”, a Shonafied version of “to mark.” Someone “anomakisa” 
is one who causes to be marked, where marking is of the sense of marking a target, X marking the 
spot, marking an opponent in a game/sport. “Kumakisa” also implies being “uncool” or 
embarrassing. Citizenship and non-belonging are tied to geographical locations within the city, 
localizable to specific streets. They are worn by the migrant in his/her clothes.   
 Respondents drew both on speculative notions they had on what South Africans were/had 
and personal experience and what they felt Zimbabweans were not/did not have. Some 
respondents listed complexion, hair length and styling, and even facial features among 
distinguishing attributes. It was suggested that South Africans wore “colourful clothes”; had 
nicely styled hairdos, though apparently their actual hair was often not long. One female 
respondent noted that she was constantly identified as a foreigner; her foreigner-ness ascribed to 
her on sight. She described an incident when she went to Randburg to subscribe for DSTV for her 
Johannesburg home, and was asked three times by three different people, including the security 
guard whether she wished to subscribe for Zimbabwe. After having queued at the South African 
subscriptions counter, the DSTV employee behind the counter asked her if she was not instead 
looking for the Zimbabwe counter. Whether it was her hair, skin or dressing, this respondent like 
many others believed that physical appearance played a significant part in the identification of 
otherness. The DSTV woman and respondents like her challenge Salter‟s (2004) assertion that 
“guilt is not written on the skin or in the passport” (87), given that people seem to read it on 
others‟ faces, in their hair, and in their clothes even before it is read in their passports or lack 
thereof. Whether it is or is not, migrants and police officers walk around believing that it is, a 
belief that has real-life implications, whether it leaves the former paranoid and fearful, or leads 
the latter to single out and stop those whose appearance matches the officers‟ picture of 
alienness/foreignness.     
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But of Where?  
 The use of physical markers of non-belonging sometimes operates on a less subjective, 
more institutional level. On the 22nd of April 2009, national and provincial elections were held in 
South Africa, the first part of selecting the fourth President of post-Apartheid South Africa. After 
casting their ballots, a characteristic black ink mark was made on voters‟ hands to prevent them 
from voting more than once – a common, seemingly harmless practice. However, unlike the Ash 
Wednesday markings on foreheads of observant Catholics, the ink dots remained visible, 
indelible, for several days following the election. Only South African citizens can vote; only 
South African citizens could get an ink marking. Thus, for several days, a certain element of the 
population walked around with an obvious, temporarily indelible marker of their participation, 
their membership, their citizenship. Marking the one marks the other as the unmarked, the 
antithesis of the marked group, in this case, either as non-South Africans, or as South Africans 
who had defaulted on their civic duty. There was a means of quickly identifying who among the 
adults was not “acting” South African. During the time of the election, nationalist sentiment was 
expectably high. This was only the third presidential election in the “new South Africa.” 
Television, radio and billboards proclaimed infomercials on being “proudly South African” and 
“home made.” While “proudly South African” reference originates in an economic initiative to 
promote the sale of local products (NEDLAC 2001), it is not clear from the adverts themselves 
what product they are promoting. Instead, the infomercials are more readily seen as marketing 
national pride. What is proudly South African is not simply a local agricultural product but a local 
person; the condition of being native. Thus, there is fashioning of the “good South African” in the 
media as one who is “home made,” who speaks local languages, who votes. The marking of that 
“good South African” at the voting booth then occurs against a backdrop of fervent nationalist 
sentiments, which potentially jeopardizes migrant security. At one point, I wished I could go into 
Hillbrow with a marker and put black dots on foreigners to protect them by helping them “blend 
in” and be less visibly “other.” 
 There exists a significantly more permanent mark of membership, etched into rather than 
written on the bodies of its bearers: a vaccination scar. While it is less obvious to the passer by, it 
is accessible to immigration official, serving as an almost inescapable witness for or against its 
bearer.  
 Before a moratorium on deportation was announced in April 2009, deportations from 
South Africa to Zimbabwe would occur on a daily basis, with suspected Zimbabweans delivered 
to IOM‟s Beitbridge office on the Zimbabwean side of the border. Because of an agreement 
between IOM and the Zimbabwean Ministry of Home Affairs, immigration officials were posted 
at the IOM Beitbridge Reception Center to process deportees and thereby officially receive 
people on behalf of the Zimbabwean Government. Only Zimbabwean citizens could be deported 
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to Zimbabwe. However, offloading truckloads of migrants at an already strained border crossing 
would have presented considerable challenges, particularly given the migrants were in 
deportation proceedings. Thus, South African Home Affairs vehicles, dubbed 
amagumbakumba,38 did not stop for processing at the border, instead offloading at IOM‟s base, 
where Zimbabwean immigration officials had set up a quasi-border post especially for them. 
Given that a significant number of the migrants apprehended by South African officials either did 
not have or did not present state-issued identification documents, there was little or no 
documentary evidence to attest to their nationality. Thus, some migrants were classified as 
“Zimbabwean” through a document-free process. The onus was then upon the Zimbabwean state 
to identify who among those delivered to it were not in fact its citizens and whom it therefore did 
not have a duty to accept and admit into the country. One morning while I was working at the 
IOM Reception Centre, a gumbakumba arrived with around eighty migrants, all in the custody of 
three South African officials. The migrants alighted from the truck after their six to seven hour 
journey from Johannesburg, where most had spent time at the SA Government‟s Lindela 
Detention Facility. The migrants were made to line up and were taken past the first desk where a 
police officer recorded which province they claimed to be from, supposedly for research and 
statistics purposes. At the second desk, immigration officials made determinations on the 
migrants‟ citizenship. It was at this desk that two of the deportees were called aside and informed 
that they were Mozambicans and not Zimbabweans. Thus, Zimbabwe could not receive them as 
deportees and they were to return to South Africa for repatriation to Mozambique. The two men 
protested, insisting that they were Zimbabweans. Despite their fervent claim that they were 
Zimbabweans, the Zimbabwean immigration officials ruled that they were not, and the men were 
half dragged, half carried kicking and protesting back to the gumbakumba. The officers‟ case: the 
men did not speak much of any Zimbabwean language, English included; and they could not 
name their chief; the schools in Zimbabwe they had attended; or even a hospital, a clinic. 
However, the Zimbabwean officials‟ determination was not merely that the men were not 
Zimbabwean; the officers ascribed Mozambican citizenship to them. Their “evidence”: marks on 
the men‟s arms. The officers inspected the men‟s upper arms and then their forearms. Missing 
from their upper arms were vaccination scars from when they would have been inoculated against 
tuberculosis, had they been born in Zimbabwe.39 The BCG vaccine is administered at birth, 
leaving a small recognizable scar on the baby‟s right arm, essentially marking the infant from 
                                                 
38
 “Gumbakumba” is a colloquial term used to refer to the trucks the South African Department of Home Affairs 
uses to deport migrants to Zimbabwe, where “-kumba” is a Shona verb defined in English as “to remove 
completely, take away, clear away,” and in Shona as “kutora zvose, pasina zvokusarudza” [to take everything, 
indiscriminately], (Dale 1981 Duramazwi A Basic Shona-English Dictionary) . (For reference to the term in a 
respondent‟s account, see www.unhcr.org/refword/docid/45eecad12html)  
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birth.40 Clearly visible on their forearms were immunization scars located where Mozambican 
nurses inject children when vaccinating them. In the absence of documents, failing the presence 
of witnesses or geographical knowledge, a determination of non-citizenship was made on the 
basis of scars.  
 The marks which ordinarily serve to indicate that a person has been protected against 
peril in case of exposure to pathogens instead serve to expose one to peril, attesting to a 
citizenship or national-tie they may not wish discovered. One‟s own body is made to bear witness 
against oneself. Had the men had documentation, verification may not have resorted to bodily 
inspection, particularly where their claims corresponded to a credible story: temporary residence 
as facilitated by marriage to a Zimbabwean (eliminating the need to speak a Zimbabwean 
language). The use of vaccination marks is deeply flawed, as it implies that one‟s claim to 
citizenship is valid only if they were present in Zimbabwe at a very specific time in their lives 
(e.g. at birth), privileging autochthony and leaving virtually no room for citizenship attained 
through naturalization.  
 
Good Citizens and Good Migrants 
Strikingly, both South Africans and non-South Africans find themselves at the Lindela 
Detention and Repatriation Centre, a significant number of whom carry valid identification 
documents and are not liable for deportation, either because they have valid immigration status, 
or because they are citizens of the country and can therefore not be deported (Klaaren  and Ramji 
2001: 36). Thus, Lindela becomes more than a repatriation centre; its purpose greater than to 
serve as a mere holding place for those awaiting deportation. Rather, it is a place of “non-
citizenship”, where even a person legally recognized as a citizen can be sent because upon 
inspection, s/he lacks some quality. Detention allows for the carving out of an “anti-place” to 
which migrants are sent (McLoughlin and Warin 2008: 261), similar to what Adey (2008) terms 
“non-places.” Detention centers and the condition of detention submit the individual to the state‟s 
authority both physically and symbolically. In the “anti-place” of Lindela, the detainee is kept 
outside “citizenship” itself, outside “membership.” While not completely stripped to “bare life” in 
that detainees are at least legally entitled to some protections of the law, Agamben‟s (1998) 
homo-sacer analogy is compelling in its recognition of the “outside while inside” state. 
                                                                                                                                                        
39
 It is unclear in what year this immunization policy began, but people who were born in Zimbabwe at least 55 
years ago were inoculated in this way, as established from respondents and from consultation with three 
Zimbabwean health professionals.    
40
 BCG leaves a scar because it is intra-dermal, whereas other vaccinations babies receive, such as DPT, are 
intra-muscular or oral (e.g. polio). Note however that BCG vaccines have not always been injected into the 
forearm in Zimbabwe. They used to be lower down on the arm, ironically not wholly unlike the Mozambican 
location (confirmed by interview with Zimbabwean doctor, 24 Jan. 2010). 
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In theory, Lindela becomes an institution through which the state can make normative 
claims about citizenship, belonging and the “South African” identity. In practice, however, it is 
not so much the state as state officials who define the limits of belonging, being the foot-soldiers 
who actually effect the identification and arrest of “foreigners”. The duality of intentions raised 
by migrants complicates the matter somewhat. When police officers act within the law and 
represent the interests of the state, their determination of belonging is largely attributable to the 
state machinery. However, when officers act as individuals, in their own interests, they act more 
as private citizens in uniform, the demarcation of the limits of citizenship and belonging done by 
the citizenry, albeit a citizenry in uniform. The police officer becomes the locus of the interplay 
between the incorporeal state, “South Africa,” which sets and purports to act within the law, and 
the bodied people; between the supposedly impartial and the biased; the selfless and the self-
serving.  
 Immigration enforcement involves the selection of what Chan (2006) terms “good 
migrants” from “bad migrants,” where a “bad migrant” is one whose constitution results in an 
increased likelihood of their being stopped by the police, whether it is because they walk around 
town with heavy loads (“mikwende mikwende”), or they wear a skirt with brightly coloured 
socks. Removing those who do not pass the test to detention facilities effectively “outside” the 
state allows for a reification of notions of “good citizens” and “bad citizens.” Chan (2006: 162) 
argues that in Canada, deportation is part of the process of “shap[ing] the construction of the 
Canadian citizen.” Similarly, in South Africa, inspection and detention of even South Africans at 
Lindela is a way of “shaping the construction of the South African citizen.” A “good citizen” is 
one who carries correct documentation, South African or foreigner, thereby showing submission 
to state power, and specifically, to the inspecting officer‟s show of power. Thus, the non-citizen 
can be a “good South African” by speaking Xhosa, not wearing bright orange socks with a skirt, 
not being poor, and not shopping on Jeppe Street. Failing that, they can be a “good migrant” by 
bearing their passport and presenting it to the officer who asks to see it. Respondents‟ assertions 
of the manner in which migrants who refuse to pay bribes are treated implies that there is a 
policing of “good migrancy,” where a “good” migrant is one who pays the bribe immediately and 
graciously, one who does not insist upon his/her rights or challenge the police and their authority.  
A “good South African” is one who does not show visible markers of non-belonging, 
whether in their clothing, in the form of scars, in their documents, or in their demeanor when 
interacting with state officials. 
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Death and Documents 
The role of documentation as credible witness extends beyond the limits of this life. An 
“identity document” identifies its bearer – as an individual with a specific name, birth date, etc 
(Vasta 2006) and as a member of a collective, as one tied to a certain state. It is in this core 
function that documents can be particularly beneficial or particularly inconvenient to their 
bearers, particularly when the person being identified has died.  
Going into this study, I did not anticipate the emergence of a discourse of death and 
dying. Yet, respondents brought it up time and again. Unlike many studies where concerns 
surrounding death in migration narratives pertain to the foreign land as a place of death, 
debauchery and disease, here what surfaced were anxieties surrounding death and burial, 
presented around issues of the repatriation of the body, and the role of identification documents in 
this process.  
When the issue was raised in the group discussion, it was by older respondents – in their 
mid-to-late thirties, but the respondents in individual interviews who brought up death were in 
their mid-to-late twenties. However, older respondents spoke of the issue more emphatically, 
presenting real-life experiences and anecdotes, whereas the younger respondents simply 
mentioned it and each time in the second half of their interviews.  
While discussing the respondent‟s views on the existence of passports and on requirement 
that migrants carry them around, a female respondent in her late-thirties underscored that 
documents were “good”.  
 
“Besides nyaya dzemapurisa, especially munyika 
dzavamwe, kana ukafa I think zvinoita kuti zvive 
easier. They mean a lot.”  
[Besides police issues, especially in other 
people‟s countries, if you die I think it makes 
things easier. They mean a lot.]  
For her, it is to the bearer that benefit accrues. So great is the advantage of having correct 
documentation on one‟s person should one happen to die that the obligatory nature of the 
requirement that one carries their documents around is not consequential enough to bring up. She 
accepts “the bad” with “the good.” It was on the matter of death that respondents seemed to 
shelve objections about the compulsory nature of the requirement to bear documents. 
Respondents noticeably did not raise the issue of immigration policing when speaking about 
death.  
A 38 year old man, while stressing the difficulty of acquiring documents, even when one 
has a legitimate claim, noted that the passport system and requirements should not be removed. 
He said that he understood why people resorted to lying about their immigration status and 
obtaining fraudulent documents, but he did not support such actions. His reason: 
 
“Vanhu vasina maphepha vanonetsa kana vakafa. 
Vachiri vapenyu vanenge vari right.”  
[People without papers are a problem when they 
die. While they are still alive, they‟re alright.] 
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The gentleman noted that he has a Zimbabwean relative who went to the UK on a 
Malawian passport and died there. The deceased‟s Zimbabwean relatives had problems 
repatriating his body. The UK was only willing to have the body repatriated to Malawi, and 
would not issue a Zimbabwean burial order. Otherwise, the relative would have to be buried in 
the UK. A relative went to one of the schools the deceased had attended in Zimbabwe, and got his 
birth certificate number from their records, which he used to order a copy of his birth certificate, 
which showed that the deceased man was indeed Zimbabwean. The process took two months, and 
the man could only be repatriated two months after he had died.  
On the face of it, the respondent‟s concern was the difficulty of repatriating a corpse 
without accurate documentation. However, given that there had been the option of burying the 
deceased kinsman in the UK, it would seem that the underlying fear is that of burial in a foreign 
country. In Shona custom, there are several burial processes and beliefs that require for the 
deceased to be present, to be buried in his/her ancestral burial ground, associated with the belief 
that the spirits of the dead are invited to return and watch over the living. For a person‟s spirit to 
wonder over the United Kingdom, cut off from its ancestral line and from its living relatives, is 
clearly less than ideal. It is to be a foreigner in the next life: a wonderer, homeless, lost, unknown 
and unclaimed, without any prospect of ever “going home.” Even for a person who does not 
believe in the invocation of the spirits of the dead, the notion of a person being buried alone, in a 
foreign land, does not seem desirable. Consider the importance Western belief systems ascribe to 
marking graves, correctly indicating one‟s name and dates of birth and death on tombstones.  
The gentleman went on to observe:  
“What I have realized is that most Zimbabweans 
havarase maphepha avo ekuZim pavanotenga 
mamwe aya efake. They know kuti one day 
vachadzokera kumusha.”  
[What I have realized is that most Zimbabweans 
do not throw away their Zimbabwean papers when 
they buy these other fake ones. They know that 
one day they will go back home.] 
 
His could be a sense of nostalgia, the expression of a hope, of his desire to return to the 
place he calls “home.” There is contained in his utterance a belief in rootedness, in the 
irrevocability of the tie between person and place. A foreign land can never become “home.” Or 
perhaps it is simply that those who retain their Zimbabwean papers do so as a reflection of their 
desire to return to the country whose documents they do not wish to use. This echoes the notion 
of a simultaneous dissociation and association of identification documents and felt identity. 
Migrants dissociate Malawian identity for example, with Malawian papers. Thus, the Malawian 
passport is simply a document that allows them access to certain places and privileges without 
links to Malawi itself. Yet, at the same time, Zimbabwean passports, IDs, birth certificates are 
kept stowed away safely, so that they can be used to attest to a link between person and place.  
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For the respondent above, everyone ultimately returns to Zimbabwe, whether alive or as a 
corpse. The problem with a corpse is that it is not able to “speak on behalf of itself” and attest to 
its right to reenter Zimbabwe, to its citizenship. It is perhaps when one is dead that one most 
needs their papers to tell where they should be allowed to be buried. After all, as Torpey (1998: 
254) rightly notes: “the passport indicates that the bearer has an incontestable right41 to enter the 
territory controlled by its issuing state.” The respondent underscored that to repatriate a corpse is 
incredibly difficult, especially when it comes to getting the Zimbabwean authorities to admit it 
into the country. This was echoed by the other members of the group discussion, one of the 
female respondents remarked: 
                                                 
41
 Considering the number of people who have been denied reentry into the countries whose (genuine) passports 
they held, perhaps Torpey‟s (1998) assertion should be read as a “[legally] incontestable right to enter…” (254). 
“Chitunha ndochinemaphepha manje! Paperwork 
inoitwa pakutakura chitunha!!” 
[A corpse is what really has papers! The 
paperwork done when carrying a corpse!!] 
 
 Among the multifarious selection of papers a corpse needs to enter Zimbabwe, is a 
document that indicates as close to “an incontestable right to enter” as possible. Where 
citizenship is concerned, documentation is one of the primary witnesses that testifies to it. It has, 
what Wang (2004: 359) calls, a “„high truth claim‟ regarding one‟s citizenship.” The male 
respondent reiterated to the agreement of those present that: 
 
“Better to falsify your status than your citizenship. 
At least you‟re better because you remain a 
Zimbabwean, because kana wafa, unokwanisa 
kundovigwa kuZimbabwe.”  
 
[Better to falsify your status than your citizenship. 
At least you‟re better because you remain a 
Zimbabwean, because when you‟re dead, you can 
be buried in Zimbabwe.]  
 
 By “you remain a citizen,” he meant “you remain a citizen on paper,” the only place for 
which citizenship counts when one is dead. The gentleman went on to inform the group that his 
younger brother had false papers. The brother was living and working in South Africa on a non-
Zimbabwean passport that he obtained through extra-legal means, but more importantly, which 
attest to a citizenship that he not only does not have but does not wish to have. The respondent 
told the group that he had said to his brother: 
“Munin‟ina, kana wafunga kuti wava kuda kufa, 
ndokumbirawo kuti undiudze where your correct 
papers are.” 
[Little brother, when you‟ve decided you want to 
die, please could you to tell me where your 
correct papers are.] 
 
Thus, documentation‟s ability to tie person to place is central in concerns over dying in a 
foreign land, and over not being able to be buried in one‟s native country. Documentation‟s 
second function – of identifying one as a specific individual – comes to bear when death is 
concerned.  
Separate from concerns surrounding posthumous repatriation, respondents highlighted 
complications that arise as when one‟s documentation does not identify them correctly at the time 
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of their death. That is, when what Torpey (1998: 239) describes as the “unique and unambiguous 
identification” of the person according to their documents is inaccurate. During the group 
discussion, a second respondent told of a woman who had died in hospital in Zimbabwe. This 
story was set in Zimbabwe; the people involved were in their country of citizenship and so there 
were no concerns over repatriation. At a time when medical aid was difficult to get in Zimbabwe, 
a woman was admitted into hospital on her friend‟s medical aid. She died in the hospital. 
 
“Akafira kuAvenues. Akafa anezita remunhu 
mupenyu ari kufamba… Apa unenge wapinda 
muchipatara uri Khumalo. Wofa uri Khumalo. 
Wochida kubuda uri Ndlovu.”  
[She died at Avenues. She died while she had the 
name of a live person walking the streets… 
There, you‟ll have gone into the hospital as 
Khumalo. You die as Khumalo. Then you want 
to get out as Ndlovu.]  
 
 
According to the respondent, using borrowed or forged documents is tricky, “because one day 
you‟ll want to be yourself and it‟ll be very difficult.” Younger respondents, when asked if they 
would ever lend their passports to friends or relatives who resembled them, and needed papers to 
enter or exit South Africa, resoundingly said no. Among their reasons: the person may die while 
in possession of their papers, leading not only to the discovery of their facilitation of fraud, but to 
the creation of the illusion of their own death, an illusion whose veracity would be difficult to 
challenge. One female respondent‟s comments on what her passport is to her when she is in South 
Africa are apt:  
 
“It can speak for me. It can tell someone who I am. It speaks for me when I can‟t speak. It is a 
witness as to who I am. It‟s a lawyer. It‟s an advocate. My ID is my advocate on my identity.”  
  
 The 38 year old man‟s sentiments are similarly understandable. When asked what his 
passport meant to him, he said:  
 
“Rusununguko rwangu munyika yevamwe. Pandiri 
ndopane passport yangu…”  
“My freedom in other people‟s country/in a 
foreign land. Where I am is where my passport 
is…”  
 
 It is his freedom to forget who he is, to lose his ability to identify himself in the 
knowledge that he has both a credible and a present witness. It is his freedom to move; his 
freedom to die.  
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SECTION 2: ON GETTING THROUGH (IN SPITE OF WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SAYS)  
 
Undocumented Exits 
 Given the utility of passports and other documentary forms of identification, how then is 
it that so many individuals, some respondents included, fail to obtain correct documentation, to 
avail themselves of this “credible and present witness”? Upon noting that passports were “good” 
to have, respondents in the group discussion immediately went on to point out that problems lay 
with obtaining Zimbabwean passports. When asked why she thought it was as hard as it was to 
get a Zimbabwean passport, one respondent said:  
 
“Havadi kuti vanhu vabude munyika. Manje 
havazivi kuti tinobuda takabata muswe wegarwe. 
Even vakatidzosa tinodzokera ne same way.”   
 
[They don‟t want people to leave the country. 
Now, they don‟t know that we will leave while 
holding onto a crocodile‟s tail. Even if they 
return us, we‟ll go back the same way.] 
 
 The respondent says “we will leave,” including herself among those who would cross the 
Limpopo River in defiance, “holding onto a crocodile‟s tail,” yet she herself had never crossed 
the Zimbabwe/South Africa border except through official border posts. Here, there is a clear 
“us/them” structuring, where “they” are the representatives of the state. The respondent makes 
reference to compulsion on both sides of the border, from both the Zimbabwean and the South 
African states. The Zimbabwean state attempts to control movement by restricting access to 
passports (by making them expensive); the South African state by means of forceful removal – 
deportation. Deportation is instantiated by the presence of passportless migrants – crocodile-tail-
holders. Control of movement from both sides of the border is therefore effected through 
passports, directly and indirectly. In setting up an “us/them” structure, the respondent sets up a 
single “them” that is not overtly disaggregated; by not naming the Zimbabwean state and the 
South African state and instead referring to both as “them,” the respondent groups the two into 
one entity: the limiter of movement, whose control Zimbabwean migrants resist. 
 
Being versus Having: The Person v. the Person on Paper 
 An eighteen year old boy was startled when he was asked on his tenth day at his new job: 
“So what‟s your real name, Cliff?” Almost every waiter at his restaurant is Zimbabwean; almost 
every one of them has a South African ID. That is, they each remain legally Zimbabweans in that 
they have never renounced their citizenship nor taken steps towards changing it. Their South 
African IDs were obtained from various unofficial sources, none of which are likely to be 
sanctioned by the Department of Home Affairs. When the young man inquired what his co-
workers meant by asking after his “real name,” he was told, “Tanga tichifunga kuti Cliff izita 
repaID.” [We figured Cliff was just your ID name.] Each waiter had a real name and an ID name.  
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 A 29 year old respondent also in the food business informed me that she had non-
Zimbabwean documentation which she used in South Africa – a South African national ID and a 
Mozambican passport. The names on the passport and ID were slight variations on her name, 
modified to sound “South African” or “Mozambican.” Depending on which document she used 
where, she was known by slightly different names. She had decided to acquire alternative 
documentation when her efforts to obtain a work permit failed. When I asked whether she would 
consider taking up South African citizenship officially if offered, she said she would not. 42  
 I posed the same question to several other respondents, every single one of whom said 
that they would not. They appreciated the fact that documentation and certain immigration 
statuses allowed for better benefits than others. All but one said that they would consider 
applying for South African permanent residence though; the exception already having permanent 
residence. Most respondents distinguished between “being” a permanent resident and “having” 
permanent residence status. Similarly, respondents spoke of friends and relatives who had 
obtained South African passports, but did not ever refer to those individuals as being South 
African. They were Zimbabweans with South African passports.  
 
Asylum Seeker Permits 
 Similarly, respondents spoke of having asylum seeker permits and/or refugee papers, yet 
not of being asylum seekers or refugees, as though they perceived a distinction between having 
the immigration documentation and the status, what Bakewell (2007) refers to as “handheld” 
versus “heartfelt” status. In many cases, this may be because documents were obtained without 
the bearer meeting the requirements for the permit. The document became a piece of paper they 
used to “swat away” police officers during spot inspections in the city – “mosquito repellent 
papers” as the respondent below describes them. Speaking of asylum seeker permits, one 
respondent noted: 
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 In their study of Congolese migrants in South Africa, Amisi and Ballard (2005) argue that “there is no 
necessary overlap between having South African nationality and being a citizen in the full sense of the word,” 
but that the rights afforded by citizenship need to be negotiated, as explored by Mamdani (1996). Where an 
overlap of nationality and “being a citizen in the full sense” is concerned, the Zimbabwean migrant cited above 
does not desire the latter, making use of both this dissociation and that between document and identity.  
“I have not met a single person with an asylum 
paper who knows how to pronounce it…It‟s not 
asylum. Chiaslum. And they all say “chiaslum.” 
It‟s not asylum. Asylum is synonymous to 
sanctuary. It‟s like someone anoisa mosquito 
repellant. You see its direct benefit, like 
mosquito repellent, the way that an asylum paper 
dzingas maporisa. But without it, in a perfect 
world, you don‟t see the need for it.” 
[I have not met a single person with an asylum 
paper who knows how to pronounce it…It‟s not 
asylum. Chiaslum. And they all say “chiaslum.” 
It‟s not asylum. Asylum is synonymous to 
sanctuary. It‟s like someone who puts on 
mosquito repellant. You see its direct benefit, 
like mosquito repellent, the way that an asylum 
paper chases away/wards off the police. But 
without it, in a perfect world, you don‟t see the 
need for it.] 
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 Ordinarily, asylum is given to those with a “well founded fear of persecution” from which 
they “cannot avail themselves the protection of the state,” often as a result of the states 
participating in their persecution (UNHCR 1951). Asylum permits symbolize a non-citizen‟s 
right to protection. Where Zimbabwean migrants use asylum seeker permits to “ward off” police 
officers, the permits serve a “protective” function, providing a defense (albeit false) during 
inspection – in a very different sense from its original state-intended purpose. The permit is 
reconfigured from a symbol of protection to an actual object of protection, where defense lies it is 
the actual document itself and not in what it symbolizes. While asylum papers may signify 
protection provided by a foreign state to a non-citizen, “chiaslum” protects the non-citizen 
against the foreign state, ironically shielding against the very state that produces the permit. 
“Persecution” becomes persistent police encounters, detention, extortion of bribes, and the threat 
of deportation. It is against these that the “mosquito repellant” papers protect.  
  If migrants dissociate the immigration status and the permit that represents where asylum 
is concerned, perhaps the same can be said of documents that have citizenship implications, such 
as passports and national IDs. None of my respondents were open to the idea of officially 
becoming South African citizens – that is, going through correct legal channels and obtaining 
bona fide South African citizenship. To do so would be to blur the distinction between inscribed 
and ascribed notions of citizenship, of identity. Zimbabwe does not allow dual citizenship.43 
However, respondents indicated that even if dual citizenship were lawful to them, a taking up of a 
new citizenship would somehow weaken their Zimbabwean identity. Those who had South 
African and/or Mozambican documents which imply citizenship (passports, national IDs) also 
had Zimbabwean citizenship documents. One gentleman in his mid-thirties said that this was for 
their eventual return to Zimbabwe, as “They know that one day they will go back home.” Their 
South African and Mozambican papers were acquired through fraudulent means – fake papers 
attesting to a fake identity, created and presented for their utility value, not because they 
corresponded to affective notions of membership.  
However, not all documents were acquired through extra-legal means. Consider the case 
of a gentleman I interviewed who had been in South Africa for close to a year on an asylum 
seeker permit. He had been a member of the opposition in Zimbabwe, a critic of the national 
government who had in fact experienced intimidation at the hands of the state. His asylum claim 
was legally valid; his asylum seeker permit obtained through the right channels. However, he 
emphatically denied being an asylum seeker. He had applied for an asylum permit because he 
                                                 
43
 Taking up South African citizenship would necessitate renouncing their Zimbabwean citizenship. A 2003 
amendment to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act placing limits on the prohibition of dual citizenship only 
exempts citizens of SADC countries by decent from renouncing their SADC citizenship, given that they have 
not gone on to obtain foreign citizenship (kubatana.net  
http://www.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/citamdbill030214.pdf ).  
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qualified for it, and compared to other visas he could have gotten, it came with the most benefits. 
He recognized that documents often imply a certain identity, as evidenced by his emphatic 
rejection of the identity his documents tried to attach to him. He presented himself to South 
African state officials and thereby to the state as an asylum seeker, and to everyone else as 
anything but. The respondent had travelled to Zimbabwe several times while in possession of an 
asylum seeker permit.44 When crossing the Zimbabwe/South Africa border, he did so as a 
“regular” Zimbabwean travelling on a Zimbabwean passport with a 90 day visitor‟s visa. When in 
the South African interior, he used his asylum seeker permit. While his asylum permit was not 
“chiaslum” in the sense that it was obtained through official channels and he had a “well founded 
fear of persecution,” he considered the document as a means to an end, dissociating the symbol 
from what the state intended it to signify. To modify Bakewell‟s (2007) analogy, unlike Angolan 
immigrants in Zambia whose “handheld” citizenship (documents) did not appear to match at all 
with their “heartfelt” citizenship, the Zimbabwean migrants in question hold one set of 
migration/citizenship documentation in one hand and another in the other hand: left- and right-
hand immigration and citizenship documentation. The respondent above holds an asylum seeker 
permit in one hand, a Zimbabwean passport in the other, pulling them out alternately depending 
on where he is, what he needs the papers to grant access to. Note however, that while dissociation 
of symbol from that which it symbolizes occurs with asylum papers, the same cannot be said of 
his relationship with his Zimbabwean passport. The same can be said of the Zimbabwean bearing 
a South African national ID in one hand, a Zimbabwean passport in the other. Dissociation occurs 
with documents obtained through fraudulent means,45 though the direction of implication is 
debatable. Does dissociation occur because documents are fraudulent, or are migrants 
emboldened to obtain fraudulent papers because they dissociate the paper from what the state 
intends for it to symbolize? If the latter, is this the result of migrants‟ enduring attachment to their 
Zimbabwean papers and Zimbabwean national identity? The disjoint between the identification 
document and the identity appears to lie in migrants‟ perception of documentation as a means to 
access ways of being – as tickets – rather than as identifying documents with much bearing on 
their personhood or perception of self.  
This stands in sharp contrast with Vasta‟s (2006: 7) findings of immigrants to the UK 
from other European countries, whose acquisition and use of falsified documents was in an 
                                                 
44
 Technically, according to UNHCR‟s 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees definition of 
“refugee,” the respondent‟s claim would be somewhat shaky as the Convention requires that one be “unable or 
unwilling to return” to their country of origin. However, it could be argued that the respondent‟s willingness to 
risk returning to his place of persecution, and his ability to remain undetected by his would-be persecutors for a 
few days does not negate the reality of the threat.   
45
 It would be interesting to study Zimbabweans resident in Zimbabwe‟s relationship with their documents, as 
well as naturalized South Africans who were once citizens of Zimbabwe in order to evaluate whether the 
condition of being a migrant has affects one‟s perception of their documents when those documents are 
authentic and the symbolic relationship between document and state has not been ruptured. 
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attempt to obtain “legal” status, to be officially registered and legally identified as having bona 
fide British citizenship (c.f. Polzer‟s 2004 account of Shangaan Mozambicans in Bushbuckridge). 
The Zimbabwean migrants above specifically reject the idea of officially becoming South 
Africans, using falsified documents because the documents are outside the official system of 
citizenship-registration and do not officially impart legal citizenship to them. 
 
Access to Ways of Being 
 Migration literature deals with access to services at length, almost primarily addressing 
access to social services and the meeting of basic (survival) needs: food, shelter, healthcare, etc. 
Access to documentation is usually a central theme in this literature, where it is recognized that 
access to documentation affects access to other resources, as lack of documents is among the 
primary reasons for migrants being turned away for example from hospitals. However, not a 
single one of the respondents I interviewed even raised the issue of access to basic social services. 
Rather, respondents spoke of access to banking services – mortgages and car loans – and to 
freedom from spot-inspections – access to ways of being. There was resounding recognition of 
the role of papers in ensuring this access, yet a dissociation of papers from their nationalist or 
citizenship implications.   
 In the words of one young professional: 
 
“I want a South African ID. I don‟t want to be a citizen of another country. I love being a 
Zimbabwean. I just want a passport from South Africa. That‟s all. All.” 
 
 Just before this, the respondent had indicated that her Zimbabwean passport was on the 
verge of expiring and she had neither the time nor the means to travel to Zimbabwe to renew it. 
The respondent noted: 
 
“I don‟t want to be a citizen. I just want the rights. If I were a South African citizen, I‟d just walk into the 
bank and I‟d get a car loan, I‟d get a house loan – even without a job with permanence. Or a citizenship 
that allows me to buy a house. In my country, I can‟t buy a house; in the country where I work, I can‟t buy 
a house.”  
 
 A significant number of Zimbabwean migrants struggle every day to make ends meet – to 
resolve the issue of where to sleep, what to eat, where to find work. Migration literature and the 
media rightly call attention to these issues, often in the hopes that these issues be resolved (the 
Central Methodist Church crisis for example).46 However, it should be borne in mind that this is 
not the singular story of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa. While the need for food and 
                                                 
46
 The Central Methodist Church on Small Street in Central Johannesburg offers shelter to immigrants, many of 
whom are from Zimbabwe. The numbers of those resident at the church have risen from a few hundred in 2007 
to roughly 3000 in 2010. The church has come under criticism as the numbers have spiked, the Gauteng 
legislature‟s health and social development portfolio committee chairperson noting in 2009 that “conditions at 
the church were a disaster and a health hazard” (Mail & Guardian Online 30 Oct. 2009).  
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shelter is critical, the continual portrayal of this single story in migration literature can result in 
the narrow view of the Zimbabwean migrant as one whose hope is always to secure shelter – 
temporary shelter; whose prospects do not extend beyond the next meal, and more importantly, 
who is perceived as one for whom the provision of the next meal is adequate addressing of his/her 
migration issues.  
 
Authorised to Enter but Unwanted  
 A young woman who was at the Beitbridge border on the weekend of the 2nd of January, 
2010, crossing from Zimbabwe to South Africa to return to work, informed me that she had 
arrived at the South African side of the border on a Saturday afternoon, at around 3pm. She 
joined the queue to get her passport inspected and stamped. She spent the rest of Saturday, the 
whole of Sunday, and the better part of Monday standing in the passport queue. Her passport was 
stamped at 4pm on Monday. She was careful to explain that when her turn came to be inspected, 
the South African immigration official simply took her passport, looked at it, and stamped it – in 
a few seconds. The delays are there because officials chat with each other; at which point, she 
leaned her head back and started impersonating Sesotho-like speech. In describing her ordeal, she 
informed me that the sale of food by venders is not permitted at the border. Thus, all that people 
had was water from the taps there to drink, “that bitter water.” Furthermore, she could not leave 
the queue, as she would lose her spot. Another informant, who had crossed the same border just 
before New Year, indicated that while he was at the border, South African “police” officers had 
been walking around “whipping” those standing in the passport line, “grandmothers, women with 
children, everyone.” This was in line with the accounts of several other Zimbabweans to whom I 
had spoken about the border. As per the testimony of a 28 year old software engineer who had 
spent close to two days in the passport queue earlier in 2009: he and the other people in the queue 
had been standing for so long, waiting in that line, they began falling asleep, leaning on and 
clutching a fence that runs alongside the line. Others sat on the ground, in their places in the line. 
Then, South African “guards” walked along the passport line hitting those leaning against the 
fence and those sitting and dozing off in the line, calling them “you Zimbabweans” and telling 
them that “this is South Africa.”  
 The Saturday-to-Monday young woman informed me that there were two queues at the 
border – one for Zimbabweans, and one for South Africans. She did not think there were any 
other nationalities present. Here, the Zimbabwean is synonymous with the “other” in her 
imagination. According to her, there were some Zimbabweans bearing South African passports 
and other travel documents. These were seized by South African officials, and their bearers were 
told that they were Zimbabweans and should therefore have Zimbabwean passports. After all, 
Mugabe has begun issuing passports. When one woman protested that her three children were 
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born in South Africa and even had South African birth certificates, the officers said they did not 
care; that they were all Zimbabweans; and Zimbabweans should have Zimbabwean passports. It 
is unclear whether the confiscated passports were authentic or not, but through the lens of this 
queue-ridden Zimbabwean, the occurrence was perturbing. Bakewell and Biao‟s (2006) “paper 
tigers” analogy comes to mind, where here, passports are “paper tigers” rather than “tiger papers” 
when their bearer fits the South African immigration official‟s notion of “Zimbabwean”, of 
“undesirable,” regardless of their documentation. These documents in which one places stock to 
facilitate international travel; to attest to their citizenship and therefore to their rights to enter and 
remain; are in fact made of paper, and they can not only fail to roar like a tiger, but can be seized 
and ripped up. The immigration officials‟ actions seem to say: these are just pieces of paper; you 
are Zimbabwean regardless of what your papers say; your right to call yourself South African, to 
enter South Africa, is not guaranteed by a piece of paper. 
Those who escape the vetting processes at the border – who either pass inspection or 
evade it – can find once they arrive in Johannesburg that the policing of citizenship and belonging 
continues in the interior. For some migrants, Johannesburg is a place of being ready to either 
justify one‟s right to be present, or circumvent exclusion. Documentation facilitates this policing, 
allowing for the differentiation of those whose presence the state has sanctioned to those who are 
“unwelcome.” Documentation labels the migrant, and the policing of immigration within the city 
means that state agents are constantly reading the permissions or lack thereof. The system of 
documentation attempts to tangibly “remove” the migrant through the ring-fencing of social 
services and separating him/her out from a class of the “desirables” (Chan 2005).47 By labeling 
people as “desirable” or “undesirable” (note Salter 2004:732), documentation marks those who 
have been sanctioned to be present, thereby symbolically “removing” those whose presence the 
state has not authorized. However, the determination of “welcomeness” and the marking and 
regulation of insider/outsider-ness is not a strictly document-mediated process, whether on the 
part of the excluding local or the perceiving foreigner.  
 When explaining his desire to return to Zimbabwe permanently as soon as he completes 
his degree in South Africa, one young man stressed that he did not feel welcome in South Africa. 
“It is so obvious that we are not wanted here.” Apart from the border, he identified two elements 
that cement his sense of unwelcomeness: coming face to face with xenophobic violence, and 
linguistic intolerance. He was in a taxi headed to Bree Taxi Rank in central Johannesburg when 
the May 2008 xenophobic attacks began. Clear is the memory of pulling into Bree; of seeing a 
mob wielding sticks, charging towards his taxi; of the driver asking whether there were any non-
                                                 
47
 Note Van der Leun‟s (2006) account of how citizens‟ (i.e. non-state agents‟) individual “policing” of 
belonging operates as a parallel system of inclusion and exclusion, sometimes having more tangible effects than 
that of state officials. A powerful yet deeply disturbing example of this is the outbreak of anti-foreigner violence 
in South Africa in May 2008. 
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South Africans in the taxi and could they please get out because he did not want his vehicle 
damaged; of feeling faint with relief yet dazed and petrified as police officers descended on the 
mob even as the mob yanked open the door of the taxi; of running through town with police 
officers on either side of him and his fellow passengers; of looking up and seeing people 
congregated on the roofs of buildings – every other building; of running faster than he thought 
possible to the doors of his Braamfontein-based church. It hit him then that he was not wanted in 
South Africa. That was two years ago. When I asked how he could say that the sense of being 
unwelcome was one he carried around “constantly”, he spoke of language. He speaks fluent 
Ndebele and can therefore communicate well in Zulu, and so his issue with language is not that 
he is unable to speak. Rather, he is compelled to speak in Zulu. “If I speak English, people get 
upset, like oh you think you‟re special.” His public transport- shopping in central Johannesburg- 
residing outside the suburbs- life means that he is less insulated from linguistic intolerance than 
car-owning suburbans. He encounters it each time he travels, trades, talks, each time 
remembering that he is “not wanted here.” 
 Yet, it is not him, the 26 year old student, so much as a class/group of people to which he 
happens to belong, that is “not wanted here.” In his narrative, he says: “It is so obvious that we 
are not wanted here.” The Saturday-to-Monday lady‟s account is studded with “we” and “us” 
references. This too was a common thread running through almost all the interviews I conducted. 
Respondents identified unwelcomeness as a collective experience, localized on their bodies, on 
their persons, but otherwise a common reality dispersed beyond the individual. For the foreigner 
in a hostile state, when non-belonging is discussed or expressed, it is in the “we” narrative. The 
individual, while expressing their exclusion from one group, does so while imbedded in another – 
as part of a “we” rather than as an “I”.48  
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 The only respondent for whom the narrative is more “I” is one whose understanding of the bounds of their 
citizenship and their belonging is somewhat different from those of the rest of my respondents. As a white 
Zimbabwean, dispossessed and essentially exiled by the state, to “we” for them may not be as simple or as 
passable. Given that they were being interviewed by a black Zimbabwean (essentialist though it may sound), 
race is inexorably linked to the interviewee and the interviewer‟s co-perceptions of each other‟s possible 
interpretations (note Grice‟s (1975) theory on communicative intentions). Perhaps fearing that to “we” would be 
read as “we white people” and thus invoke its anti-group: “you black people,” the respondent may have avoided 
“we-ing”, given that a race-based distinction of this nature would neither be politically correct nor particularly 
helpful. Besides, perhaps the respondent would not have wished the ellipsis in “we” to be read as “we white 
people” or “we white Zimbabweans” because they do not feel that they “belong” to/ identify with either group.  
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SECTION 3: DOCUMENTS & DEFENCE 
 
Is this Parachute a Knapsack?!49 – When the Bulletproof Vest is Made of Paper  
 There are dual, often contradictory systems of determination of “wantedness”: official, 
determined at the level of the state, and unofficial, determined by individuals. In the former, state 
representatives make determinations based on codified laws and requirements, and endorse 
foreigners‟ permission to enter in their passports in the form of visas or blanket waivers. In the 
latter, individuals (private citizens) acting apart from regulations make judgments according to 
their personal notion of “merit” or “right” to be present. The expression of the populous‟ 
decisions occurs through a range of ways. On the one end of the spectrum is the individual taxi 
driver‟s refusal to answer a commuter‟s questions in English. On the other is a mob wielding 
sticks and carrying gasoline, beating and burning suspected foreigners (see Landau and Haupt 
2007: 8; Landau 2005). As Landau and Monson (2008: 322) showed with the case of Somali 
refugees in Motherwell, mobs do not ask to see permits before they sear their objections into a 
foreigner.50 Be that as it may, documentation remains one of the means through which rights to 
presence are negotiated, particularly with the state and with agents whose operations the state 
regulates (banks, schools, hospitals) flawed as the systems may be. Respondents‟ accounts 
presented elements of the contestation of meaning with regards to documents as items of defense.  
 Even as migrants underscored the value they perceived their documents to be of to them, 
there was a recurring expression of concern about the infirm nature of the same. Most migrants I 
interviewed, in protesting the requirement that they carry their passports around whenever they 
left their houses, stressed the same concern: the document might get stolen or lost. Four female 
respondents indicated that it was inordinately risky to carry around one‟s passport in 
Johannesburg, where petty theft is (reportedly) rampant. The document was valuable in and of 
itself. Besides being requisite when crossing the border to travel “home” (to Zimbabwe) and back 
to work and school (South Africa), it was both expensive and difficult to obtain. Priced at US 
$670 as recently as April 2009,51 (a few months prior to the interviews), Zimbabwean passports 
                                                 
49
 This saying is courtesy of the sitcom Friends (1995), when “Chandler” says, “Dear God! This parachute is a 
knapsack!” (Season 1, Episode 23).  
50
 Beyond not differentiating between legally present and “undocumented” migrants, the clumping of non-
citizens into one seemingly-homogenous group – whether termed “migrants” or “foreigners,” sometimes 
migrants are not seen as citizens of different countries. A Democracy and Governance HSRC report (2008) 
argues that Zimbabweans are “increasingly conflated with all migrants to South Africa.” According to the 
report, a respondent at a South African focus group discussion said, “We can‟t even differentiate them by their 
nations. They are all Zimbabweans to us” (46).    
51
 Curiously, the Registrar General section of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Home Affairs website indicates at the 
time of this writing that an ordinary passport costs $100 000. As the website does not show when it was last 
updated, it is not apparent when these prices were valid/current. They are probably quoted in Zimbabwean 
dollars – a currency which currently does not exist. For a state where the official currency is the US $, a notice 
on the Ministry of Home Affairs‟ website pegging passports at $100 000 is ironic yet… (accessed 7 Jan. 2010 
http://www.moha.gov.zw/index.php?link=rg_travel_docs) 
  
67 
were something of a “gold helmet” – it potential value as a protective item virtually outweighed 
by its monetary value as a commodity. Two respondents said that after a few months of carrying 
their passports around, they decided that the risk of losing the document and therefore not having 
it when they “really needed it” was worse than the prospect of being arrested and detained. (Note 
though that neither respondent had ever experienced a spot inspection on the street.) One woman 
who had had police encounters said of carrying her passport:  
 
“Yinkinga. Kutofamba nayo kuiisa mubraa.”         [It‟s a problem. To walk around with it is to put 
it in your braa.] 
 
 Other insecurities surrounding travel documents included the fear that they would bear 
“bad witness” against their bearers. One respondent, who was in South African on a work permit, 
told of how a vehicle she had been travelling in was stopped by the police one night, as it had 
Zimbabwean license plates. When the officers asked about the citizenship of the respondents, and 
requested to see their passports, the respondent had informed them that she did not have hers on 
her. Her passport was in her handbag, on her lap. As a rule, she carried it around with her. 
However, she had overstayed her visa and was afraid that to present an overstayed visa would be 
worse than to not show any documents at all. The visa in her passport would bear true but 
unfavorable witness against her; it was a direct source of insecurity.  
 The system of documentation serves more than simply as an administrative measure to 
facilitate the enumeration and face-value identification of individuals as “John Brown” or “Peter 
Piper”. As a part of a system of immigration control, documentation like the system in which it is 
embedded, has as its purpose ensuring that the right to give and withhold access to the state‟s 
territory remains with the state itself. This right, along with the determination of who does and 
does not “belong,” is central to the state‟s expression of sovereignty and territorial control, 
particularly given Tilly‟s (1998) notion of the state‟s control over the “the means of legitimate 
movement” (Torpey 1998; c.f. Prem Kumar and Grundy-Warr 2004: 34) and the state‟s right to 
name and label (De Genova 2002). Identification becomes more than “John Brown” but “John 
Brown: alien”; “John Brown: unwanted.” Given the state‟s vested interest in making and 
enforcing these distinctions, the respondent recognized the manner in which producing her 
expired visa could affect her stay in South Africa. 
 Heyman (2004: 307) argues that “legal identifications are affirmed, applied or rejected 
through a bureaucratic police-process called “inspection.”” This occurs throughout Johannesburg 
but particularly at the border. During inspection, concern also arises when the validity of the 
document one presents is questionable. A 28 year old professional was told that his work permit 
was invalid when he presented his passport for inspection on his way out of South Africa. To the 
best of his knowledge, his permit had been obtained correctly, and at no point had he attempted to 
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circumvent immigration regulations. Thus, he was taken aback when the South African 
immigration official to whom he handed his passport proclaimed:  
 
“Chipepa chako hachisi icho. Ndochibvarura.” 
  
[Your little piece of paper isn‟t the right one. I‟ll 
tear it up.]  
 
 The gentleman could not repudiate the accusation. He had been certain until that point 
that his papers were in order, his permit valid. However, he had filed his application through an 
agent. It was not from the hands of a Home Affairs official that he had received his work permit, 
but from an agent. He was aware of the cornucopia of fraudulent documents used by 
Zimbabwean migrants, and the propensity some agents had to employ extralegal shortcuts (like 
“greasing” an official i.e. bribing them). He notes that while he wished to protest – especially 
given he felt the official just wanted a bribe – he remembered that the official could indeed 
destroy his permit, marring his passport, and for all intents and purposes destroying the passport 
itself. He needed both to re-enter South Africa after his holiday, if he was to get back to work on 
time. He placed R300 in his passport and slid it back across the counter.  
 The work permit authorizing the work he had been doing for the previous months, which 
he had believed to be correct, not only caused an embarrassing and aggravating run-in with an 
immigration official, it compromised and endangered his passport. The respondent noted that he 
was upset by the encounter because he felt unjustly subjected to humiliating disparagement. He 
had paid thousands of Rands in order to have correct documentation and be in correct legal 
standing, to avoid such encounters, and there was being spoken to like a lecherous dog asking for 
a bone. The official had referred to the permit not as a work permit but as a mere piece of paper. 
The official had used the disparaging diminutivising prefixed by “chi-.”52 The prefixing is 
mapped onto the person and it is not just the piece of paper that is disdainable/contemptible but 
the passport bearer himself – the man who attempts to shield himself with a “little piece of 
paper,” not understanding that it can just be torn up.  
 Zimbabwean passports indicate the bearer‟s occupation, on the bottom left hand side. In 
so doing, the passport signals something about the bearer‟s possible level of education, income 
level, and general basic class. Mine reads, “Student.” The gentleman in question‟s listed a 
profession comparable to that of “Medical Doctor.” The respondent noted that he had witnessed 
Zimbabweans having the authenticity of their documents questioned at the border, none of whom 
had the look of a “Medical Doctor” about them. In a 2009 Touchstone Pictures movie, Sandra 
Bullock is informed that her application for a Green Card in the United States has been denied 
and that she is to be deported. Bullock replies: “Deported?! It‟s not like I‟m an immigrant or 
something. I‟m from Canada!”  
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 When crossing international frontiers, it is not sufficient to believe within oneself that one 
has a legitimate claim to enter a territory. Nor is it sufficient to be persuaded that one is who one 
believes to be. As Wang (2004: 357) puts it, “identity is about both self-recognition and 
recognition by others” (emphasis in the original). The distinction between the two, between 
“identifications” and “identities”, to use Heyman‟s (2004) term, come about in that the former is 
“imposed from the outside,” the latter “self-assumed” (307, citing Heyman 2001: 130). One must 
be recognised as that which one purports to be, particularly given the implications of the 
consequences. As Wade (2007) surmises, “the record of nationality in the passport is protected by 
bureaucratic procedures and legal regulations… the inscription generates [not only] how a person 
identifies himself [but also]… how he is perceived by others” (159) 
 Here, there was contrariety between how the migrant perceived himself and how the 
immigration official perceived him, or at least, how he believed the immigration official 
perceived him: as one whose life is above board versus as one who attempts to circumvent 
regulation; as one who can afford an above board life versus as one who must supplicate 
immigration officials to take pity on him; as a professional, an expatriate versus as an 
“immigrant”; as a “Canadian” versus as a “Mukwerekwere”. His documents had failed to prove 
his claim, activating his second line of defense: money. The gentleman understood the officer‟s 
threat to destroy his permit as an indication that the officer wanted a bribe. It was the focal point 
of the utterance, the preceding text serving to support it. The respondent read an “unless” or an 
“or else” into the remark: “unless you … I will tear it up” or “… or else I will tear it up.”  
This respondent bribed immigration officials while in possession of authentic, valid documents, 
because he recogised the officer‟s broad discretionary power. His documents having not only 
failed to attest to his right to cross the border, they failed to index him as a first class 
citizen/professional and not as a “migrant”; as one not subjectable to such treatment (Landau and 
Mathers (2007) note how of those who cross the border into South Africa, only some are 
“tourists” while others are “makwerekwere”). Thus, the R300 was more than to preserve the 
structural integrity of the passport and visa, but also to protect against further humiliation, against 
the moment, against inspection, against the scorn and disdain. Not only was he prompted to pay 
because he was unsure whether his bulletproof vest was made of correct material, but money 
became a defense against further humiliation and subjection in a way that his documents had 
failed to. Ironically, Torpey (1998) argues that “identity papers ... constitute the bureaucratic 
equivalent of money” (244), but in instances where identity papers fail and the process shifts to 
extra-bureaucratic, money becomes a substitute for papers. When one‟s defense is illegible in the 
pages of their passports, it can sometimes be read on R100 notes. 
                                                                                                                                                        
52
 Note Brown and Dryer‟s (n.d.) account on Shona Class 14 (ka-), whose diminutive elements operate similarly 
to Class 7 (chi-).  http://www.linguistics.buffalo.edu/people/faculty/dryer/dryer/BrownDryerWalmanDimin.pdf 
  
70 
Levels of Defense: On Resisting  
 The account above is illustrative of the manner in which money and documents are 
employed in defense of one‟s claim to be present in South Africa. The manner in which money 
and documents come to operate alongside each other as paper on which rights are written and 
read is complex. Yet, there appears to be some semblance of order in the “chaos”, to evoke 
Shakespeare‟s (1599) adage.53 One woman who was light in complexion and wore a weave the 
manner of which lent her a “South African” appearance (as per her own estimation), indicated 
that she had never been stopped by the police to be asked for a passport. Rather, people in her 
company were sometimes stopped, especially when it was not clear that they were with her. 
 She told the story of a time when she had been on a train headed to work at the crack of 
dawn and police officers had mounted the train, entered the compartment she was in, and gone 
around picking people out of the crowd for “inspection.” She was not selected as a possible 
foreigner. Those who were selected were taken off the train and asked to produce their 
documents. Interestingly, she noted that of the suspected-foreigners, “Some were South Africans; 
others had passports.” That is, in her eyes and in her understanding/construction of the matter, 
there were two groups: South Africans and Passport Bearers. To be a non-South African is to be a 
passport bearer, and the travel document is not only requisite for foreigners but a symbol of their 
alienness. 
 There was a third group in the respondent‟s account – those who in principle would have 
been Passport Bearers but did not have passports to present: passport-less Passport Bearers. Of 
those who did not produce documentation/documentary support or attestation, some paid off the 
officers. Among those who did not offer bribes (monetary attestation), was a young black 
Zimbabwean man who was familiar to the respondent from the journey, though they were not 
acquainted. The woman intoned that there was general concern over his fate, and as he was being 
dragged off by the police, she decided to step forward and address the officers:  
 
  Respondent: “Where are you taking him?”  
  Officer:  “What‟s he to you?”  
  Respondent: “Ngumalume wam‟.” [He‟s my in-law.] 
  Officer:   “Your sister‟s husband, or did you marry into his family?”
54
 
 
 The young stranger was now her relative. The respondent went on to tell the officers that 
she was travelling with him; that he did not know the way on his own; and that basically, them 
taking him away would greatly inconvenience her as she would then have the issue of following 
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 “Though this be madness, yet there is methods to it.” Hamlet, Prince of Denmark ([1599] 1985) 
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  It is unclear why the officers asked that, and the respondent did not offer insights into it. Perhaps it was to 
determine whether she was telling the truth or not; perhaps it was an attempt at friendliness; perhaps it was so 
that she would not have the last word. However, this is speculative at best. The respondent did not highlight the 
asking as a remarkable event, which is perhaps what is most interesting. 
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up (with them) to deal with. Even as she told the officers that their detention of an inadequately 
documented migrant was inconvenient to her, she herself did not have her passport on her person, 
notwithstanding her status as a Zimbabwean. The officers released the man, and she paid them 
R50. They remounted the train and continued the journey in a separate compartment. The 
respondent had given verbal attestation to why the gentleman ought not to be detained. He was a 
relative of what the police believed to be a South African; his presence was to the so-suspected-
South African‟s convenience. This was not greatly unlike the black man who may have been 
permitted to be without a pass when his Madam insisted that she needed his services. Her verbal 
attestation was complement by monetary attestation. Whether the money reinforced or 
supplemented the relational defense is difficult to tell. What is particularly curious, besides the 
ever present notion of officers selecting out “foreigners” through a visual appraisal process, is the 
fact that she was bold and unencumbered enough to step forward, herself a migrant. She pointed 
out to the interviewer that she had never been stopped and thereby labeled as a “foreigner”, where 
a “foreigner” is characterized as/understood to be one who‟s right to be present is questionable, 
rather than strictly as one who is not a citizen of South Africa. With this delineation, even South 
African citizens can be “foreigners” – as evidenced by the fact that South Africans made up one 
third of those killed during the May 2008 violence, and more immediately by the selection of 
“South Africans” from the train – and “foreigners” like the respondent to be viewed as “South 
Africans.” and was therefore not insecure or afraid. For the respondent, the sense of entitlement 
and empowerment was buttressed by the fact that (i) she had never been stopped as a foreigner 
(ii) her own papers were “in order.” It would appear then that there is an order of attestation: 
documentary; relational; monetary; and verbal, where each of the non-monetary forms are 
sometimes supplemented by money. Consider the words of the Preacher: “A feast is made for 
laugher, and wine maketh merry: but money answereth all things” (Ecclesiastes 10:19 KJV) 
 
On Being Stopped by the Police 
 A female respondent, a mother of three, who had been living between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa for over ten years, indicated that she did not walk around with her passport. It is this 
woman who had spoken up for the young man in the train.  When asked what she would say were 
she ever singled out as a “foreigner” and asked to produce her passport, she indicated: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
“Ndovabvunza nechiZulu: “Passport? Chii ichocho 
chinonzi passport?” because vanhu vemuno 
havamazivika mapassport. “Lini lentho 
ewukhuluma ngayo?””  
[I‟ll ask them in Zulu: “Passport? What‟s a 
passport?” because people from here don‟t know 
of passports. “What is this thing you‟re talking 
about?”]  
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 Her resistance of the passport requirement would come by indirectly claiming South 
African identity, or at least claiming exemption from the requirement, exclusion or otherness 
from the group of whom passports can be expected and requested. When translating her retort 
from Shona into Zulu and restating it, the woman placed her hand on her hip, and cocked her 
head forward and to the side, her posture defying anyone to challenge her claim. 
 A young female respondent, who was constantly getting stopped, relayed her most recent 
run-in with the police. She was stopped near Park Station, and after paying the bribe, she asked 
the officers what she was to do if she were to be stopped again by other officers. She was 
instructed to inform them that she had already been stopped by other officers. Landau‟s (2005) 
much cited reference to migrants as “mobile ATMs” in the eyes of the police comes to mind. For 
this respondent, a withdrawal has already been made, the validity of which was therefore 
assumedly recognizable by other officers. That this could serve as a response indicates that the 
officers recognized that subsequent stops by different officers would not in fact be in order to 
effect detention and deportation but rather to extract payment. Otherwise, they would not have 
indicated a belief that stating that one had “already been stopped” would suffice as a defense. 
When a person is caught speeding and stopped, should they continue to speed, they cannot offer 
as a defense the fact that they have “already been fined” because they are discovered a second 
time still in the errant state. An inadequately documented migrant is still inadequately 
documented the second, third and fourth time they are stopped. The respondent had asked the 
officers point blank: “So if I meet other cops, what‟ll I do?” This she said having told them that 
she only had a certain amount of money on her, and having given them that full amount. Thus, 
she was left with no defense. They offered her a new defense.  
 When relaying the account, she pointed out that she had felt very frustrated and upset – at 
having been stopped; at having had to give the officers all her money. Inflammatory as it may be, 
an analogy to the experience of being robbed seems apt. The respondent added emphatically that 
at the time, if she had been stopped again, she would have yelled at the subsequent police 
officers, telling them that she had already been stopped, especially if they had given her problems 
by refusing to accept her defense. Her defense being: “I have already been stopped.” It seems the 
respondent felt that she had “filled her quota.” That the officers no longer had the right to stop 
her, or at least whatever level of right she may have allowed for in the first officers (enough to 
give over her money rather than scream at them); something changes in her from the first 
interaction to the next anticipated one. I paid you, you gave me a receipt; your receipt should be 
valid in the eyes of those who are like you! That is, the unofficial system should be official 
enough to be recognizable and acceptable as such. 
 Paying off a police officer does not immediately appear as a form of resistance, especially 
when a person‟s immigration status is legal. However, so effective is the threat of detention, the 
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state‟s power to strip to “bare life,” that even though none of my respondents had ever been taken 
to a detention facility, Lindela loomed large in their psyches. The knowledge of the possibility of 
being taken to the detention facility, of the officers‟ power to detain them, and the aversion to 
such treatment was great. For those respondents who spoke of detention at some length, their 
accounts were focused on the ways in which they elude detention, how paying a bribe is better 
than detention, but interestingly, how they somehow classed themselves above those who are sent 
to Lindela. Through bribes, they resisted detention. By acquiescing to the subjection the officer 
exerted on them, they resisted a greater form of subjection by the state through detention 
facilities. They parted with a small amount of money but safeguarded their liberty; trading R50 
for the ability to make it home to cook. When I asked respondents point blank why they paid 
bribes to police officers, one woman said:  
 
“It‟s an easier way of getting away from them. 
Anyway, what do I lose? Than kuti ndinovharirwa 
ndosangana nevanhu vakawanda, ndosangana 
neTB.”  
 
[It‟s an easier way of getting away from them. 
Anyway, what do I lose? Than for me to get 
locked up and be mixed with a lot of people, and 
meet with TB.]  
 
  Another woman said: 
 
“Time plus zvimwe zvandinenge ndichida kuita.” [Time plus other things I will be wanting to do.] 
 
 That is, the second woman has better things to do than to play at this game with the 
officer; than to keep at it. One could read from her utterance the underlying assertion: “I am 
willing to subject herself to this much of the official‟s power (bribe) but not this much (depriving 
me of my liberty, removing me to the Lindela “anti-place.”; jeopardizing my job).” The migrant 
pays a bribe because a protracted interaction with the police detracts an unacceptable amount 
from her time, because she has “things to do.” The police are presented as inconvenience; the 
bribe as acceptable deference to power, while prolonged detention or institutionalized detention 
are unacceptable.  
 Respondents noted that police officers‟ reasons for stopping them to ask for passports 
were not in any way related to the enforcement of the law. In her own words, one respondent 
intoned:  
 
“Aim yavo ndeyekungoti timire…”  
  
[Their aim is simply to make us stop/wait i.e. to 
stop us.]  
 
 This was specifically in reference to passport checks conducted by the police – whether 
SAPS or Joburg Metro55 – along the streets of Johannesburg. Scorn/suspicion over state officials‟ 
motives for their conduct when stopping migrants was a common theme respondents brought up 
in all my interviews except one, the exception being with the (white) respondent who claimed 
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 Respondents did not differentiate between SAPS and Joburg Metro. 
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never to have had a passport-police encounter or to even know anyone who had had one, other 
than at international borders. Disdain over officers‟ motivations was expressed with reference to 
two areas where inspection is done: on the streets of Johannesburg, and at the Zimbabwe/South 
Africa land border56. In a separate interview, another respondent commented that South African 
immigration officials at the land border wish to cause delays and complications in order “to spice 
up their days”; to make their lives less mundane. 
 
The Meaning of Inspection 
 A respondent noted that the police would arrest a person (needlessly) if they did not 
comply, whether their non-compliance took the form of not offering a bribe or not being 
extremely apologetic. That is, a migrant would be arrested if they did not acquiesce to the 
officers‟ exhibit of power and affirm their “superiority” in that interaction. I asked the respondent 
what would happen in a scenario where a migrant bluntly asked the police if they were trying to 
extort a bribe. In this scenario, officers have spent a considerable amount of time explaining the 
gravity of the situation to the migrant, painstakingly explaining that it would be inconvenient to 
the migrant if s/he were to be arrested for not having documents – the interruption to the 
migrant‟s schedule, the night spent in jail awaiting a hearing – and asking the migrant what s/he 
would do (to avoid the inconvenience). This scenario is drawn off accounts I had heard from 
several respondents on how the police ask migrants for bribes. One migrant informed me that 
after explaining the inconveniences to her, the police asked her what she was going to do. That 
being the first time she was in one such interaction, she told the officers that she would simply 
wait until her passport was brought to her by her friends. When the officer reiterated that it would 
be “hard” for her friends to go “all the way to Jeppestown Police Station” to bring her passport to 
her after he had taken her there, she asked him what else she could do. He asked what she thought 
she could do. She apologized for not having her passport with her. To this, he retorted, “You want 
to say sorry with mouth?!” When the young woman informed the office that she did not know 
how else to say sorry, he again said, “Sorry with mouth?! You can‟t say sorry with mouth.” What 
could possibly be another way to say sorry to a police officer who has stopped you on Louis 
Botha Avenue while you were driving a car with Zimbabwean license plates, an officer whose 
underlying concern is presented as the inconvenience detention would visit upon you, a migrant?  
 Thus, I asked the respondent before me what would happen if a person bluntly asked a 
police officer in a similar situation whether s/he was trying to extort a bribe, given that it is clear 
that the officer has no real desire to arrest the migrant and have deportation proceedings initiated 
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 Only one respondent ever made reference to the airport as a point of contact, inspection and interaction. Her 
objective in raising the issue was to contrast the treatment received at the airport and that received at the border, 
where for her, the slowness of border inspections at the Zimbabwe/South Africa border reflected South African 
officials‟ disdain for Zimbabweans. 
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against the migrant. According to the respondent, the police officer would arrest the migrant. This 
she said without hesitation, without second thought. For her, it was obvious. Before I could ask 
why the police would arrest the person, she offered an explanation: “Vanokusunga nekuda 
kukusvotesa” [They will arrest you in order to spite you]. When asked why the police would wish 
to spite a person, the respondent retorted: 
 
“Ndoda kukuratidza kuti inini ndiri mukuru; ndine 
mapowers akawanda kukunda ako.” 
[I want to show you that it is me who is 
greater/bigger; I have more powers than you.] 
 
 One cannot say whether such words have ever escaped the mouth of a Johannesburg-
based police officer or even entered into his/her mind. What is material here is that this is how the 
respondent perceives the officer: the officer‟s motivations, and carried in those, the officer‟s 
perception of her. On the face of it, asking the respondent about the officer‟s motivations was an 
invitation for her to speculate about the officer‟s motives. Its greater purpose was to shed light on 
how the respondent in face views the officer, and through that, how she perceives the officer-
migrant interaction. This particular respondent had been accosted by the police nine times that 
she could remember over the three months prior to the interview, and was in that was somewhat 
anomalous, at least compared to other respondents in the study. The numerous run-ins with the 
police meant though that her responses, while perhaps still by and large speculative, were 
speculation formed over a significant number of interactions, and had numerous opportunities for 
revision and refinement. If not an informed opinion, they were a reinforced one.  
 For the respondent, the officer-migrant interaction is about power. It is an opportunity for 
power to be exerted on her. The respondent is a black migrant woman – a Zimbabwean woman, 
in her late-twenties/early-thirties. She is an ungarnished woman who dresses simply – no make 
up, no jewelry – in muted colours. She wears flat shoes in the interview, and has all the 
appearance of non-frivolity, though her pre-migrant life was not in the rural areas. She strikes me 
as a woman who cleans her own house. Her life straddles Johannesburg and Zimbabwe. Passports 
and the police are a conscious reality in her life, in this version of her life. Much can be inferred 
from her summation of the police officer‟s object in arresting a non-compliant migrant.   
 Note the use of the term “powers” in the original code-switched utterance. The term 
“powers” here refers not only to authority and strength in the sense of “I have more power than 
you,” but also to institutional powers – rendered in the multiple to connote the existence of 
multiple spheres and sources of power. Had the respondent wished only to say, “I have more 
power than you” in the sense of “more authority,” she could have said, “Ndine masimba 
akawanda kukunda ako,” where “masimba” and “powers” are denotatively equal, being direct 
translations of each other, but connote different types of power. Perhaps the respondent‟s use of 
the English term was simply for effect, or a demonstration of linguistic dexterity. The respondent 
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selects the English term “powers” in reference to that power yielded by an officer of a system 
very much established by and steeped in the English [read: colonial] project. Both the foreignness 
of the power and its imposition on an unwilling people are brought to mind. The term “powers” 
here becomes a bridge between the officer-migrant interaction and the broader colonial policing-
black populous interface, at least to the hearer, if not to the respondent herself.  
 Hers does not ring as part of a narrative of victimhood. It is a recognition of the 
authority‟s (perceived) desire and attempt to victimize, without either attempting to illicit a 
sympathetic response from the audience, or echoing some deep-seated belief in her own status as 
a victim. In her construction and representative of herself, the respondent is not a victim, not even 
in the narrow confines of the officer-migrant interaction. To view herself as a victim is 
necessarily to view the officer as a more powerful adversary, it is to acknowledge/claim defeat 
and thereby cede to the officer the power he so desired. 
 In the narrative she presents, the migrant specifically does not cast the narrator [read: 
herself/ the migrant] as victim. The lens is not trained on the migrant. Instead, it depicts the police 
as the aggressor, focusing on the aggressor and not on the victim, thereby indirectly casting the 
narrator [read: migrant; default victim] as champion in the retelling – champion for recognizing 
the intention of the officer; champion for rejecting the authority in the retelling; champion for not 
focusing on the victim status; champion for resisting both victimhood and domination through her 
retelling. In the positioning contained in the narrative, the officer is cast as a super-child, a petty 
person who clings to situational power he would not otherwise have, a power he cannot have in 
and of himself. This over-grown/inflated child is a buffoon in that he does not realize that his 
power is superficial and does not lie within himself; that he conflates the power of the state (of 
the office of policeman) and that of the person as an individual. She sees through his mask, 
through his performance, recognizing it as a performance of power, ridiculing it in her heart, in 
her retelling, in the archiving of her memories. It is not that the officer acts as he does because he 
has the power to do so. More than that. It is that he wants to show you that he has the power: 
“anoda kukuratidza kuti ini ndiri mukuru” [he wants to show you that it is me who is greater]. In 
the narrative, the migrant becomes the mature woman who patiently endures the inconvenience, 
the thrashings of a petulant child who while wielding a stick is himself infantile/idiotic. She bears 
it because it must be borne. This is the cost of being in Johannesburg, of being a foreigner, of not 
having adequate documentation. It has become a fact of life, an everyday occurrence, a thing to 
be endured and moved past.  
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Separation of State and Official 
 In moving from the police‟s action to their motives, the respondent shifts from speaking 
about the police in general terms: “they will arrest you”, to the first person “I”, where she speaks 
from the perspective of the police officer: “I want to show you…” This shift may have been for 
dramatic effect: to show that she believed she understood the officer‟s hidden motivations and 
could therefore express them; that she was able to inhabit the psyche of the officer and from there 
present those motivations. The respondent humanizes the officer by showing that she, a human 
being, can inhabit his thoughts, yet in the very act of humanizing him shows the extent of his 
non-humanity in that he can espouse and profess such beliefs – belief in his own superiority and 
unbounded rights and powers. The alien calls into question the officer‟s humanity. 
 By personalizing the utterance, the migrant personalizes the motives, presenting these 
motives as the officer‟s, as a person, not as the Office of the Police‟s. In this, she connotes 
dissociation between the officer asking for her documents, the officer arresting her in order to 
spite her, and the Office of the Police, or the state more broadly. The separation of person and 
state in the migrant woman‟s perception is conveyed in the “inini ndini ndiri mukuru” [it is me 
who is bigger/greater] rather than “mutemo mukuru” [the law is great; the law is inescapable] or 
“hurumende ihuru” [the government is great]. Thus, she says “ndine mapowers” [I have powers] 
rather than “ine mapowers” [it has powers]. Note also that the officer‟s narrative is presented in 
the single person. “It is me who is greater… I have powers.” The account could have employed 
the encompassing “we” – “we, the police,” “we, my partner and I,” “we, the South Africans,” 
“we, the officers of the state/of the law.” Instead, the respondent underscores the individual 
nature of the officer‟s actions.  
 Both the South African officer who is being impersonated and perhaps more so the 
Shona-speaking Zimbabwean woman relaying the story are from societies where even greetings 
take the form of the plural “sanibonani” or “makadii” even when addressing one single person. 
The honorific “we” is used so commonly in both Shona and Ndebele conversation the narrator‟s 
decision not to use it is noteworthy. This is especially so given that her statement was delivered in 
Shona. In the use of the singular, non-honorific “ndi-” both for the addressor and the addressee 
(the officer and the woman) indicates a clear leveling of the two – a stripping away of cultural 
respects and claims to authority or respect. The officer is just a man, the migrant just a woman. 
They are neither custodians of their cultures nor subjects of the law/state. They are two 
individuals locked in a power struggle or negotiation encounter. They are a man and a woman; 
Mr. So and So and Ms. So and So; residents of Johannesburg battling over the right to access and 
inhabit the city – part of an age-old fight that goes beyond them while remaining strictly confined 
within the bounds of their individual persons: a corrupt police officer and a black Zimbabwean 
migrant. In her experience of individual-state interactions, the police are not there “to serve and 
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protect” but to control, and often unjustly so – to hinder. . Even when acting on behalf of the 
state, the police represent interests that run contrary to her own, a case in point being the 
Zimbabwean Government‟s deployment of police officers to destroy the homes of just under 6% 
of its population57 in the May 2005 “Operation Murambatsvina” (UN Special Envoy Report 
2005). Perhaps the difference here is that for the respondent, the South African state may not be 
seen as being as malevolent as the Zimbabwean state.58 Therefore, to reconcile the actions of the 
officers and her view of the South African state, the respondent concludes that the officers could 
not possibly be representing the interests of the state, nor could their actions be sanctioned by said 
state.59 To her, the officer acts as an individual, and her, an individual. 
 Thus, when the aggressor is seen as the individual and not the state, resistance is taken to 
be against the unfair individual, and not the state. The personalization of resistance results in it 
being migrant individual against police individual. The officer is (almost) stripped of his 
state/official affiliations, wherein he would have gotten his authority. Therefore, he is stripped of 
the backing of a legitimizing state.  
 It is not the state‟s right to ask for passports but the officer‟s right to do so that is 
challenged. When the migrant wriggles out of a documentation situation, s/he has prevailed 
against an unjust agent, and not an unjust state. The state is at fault in as far as it creates or allows 
to go unchecked the systems within which the officer operates. The state‟s ill is its laxness. It is 
guilty of passive facilitation, not active aggression. Using fraudulent documents is then an 
attempt to evade the (evil) extortive officer, and not the state. The officer is no longer a proxy but 
becomes the principal oppressor, the obstacle. He is that which is to be gotten over, gotten away 
from, or gotten around.  
 The existence of a system of documentation, and specifically of a situation where policing 
is done in the manner in which it is in Johannesburg, creates the possibility of an encounter such 
as that described above. It facilitates the negotiation of power, or rights of influence. The system 
of documentation as it is in Johannesburg indirectly produces a state where an officer and a 
migrant become just a man and a woman; an occasion upon which a foreigner can construe the 
workings of an officer of the law not as those of a representative of the state and therefore not as 
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 700 000/ 12 746 990, the population as of 06/2005 according to  www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook   
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 Bratton and Masunungure (2006) argue that based on the results of a 2005 survey of 1200 Zimbabweans, 
Operation Murambatsvina and the state‟s use of repression and coercion “ultimately undermined the legitimacy 
of key state institutions, notably the police force…” (1).  
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 What remains a mystery to me is where exactly this impression derives. Perhaps it is informed by observing 
the manner in which the South African Government allows its citizens to demonstrate against it, with labour 
strikes occurring annually, while the Zimbabwean Government‟s notoriety for repressing opposition is well 
documented. Alternatively, post-majority rule South Africa‟s recent housing projects come in the form of 
constructing low-income housing (RDP Houses) whereas Zimbabwe‟s credits include Operation 
Murambatsvina. (Granted, Operation Garikai attempted to construct houses after Murambatsvina‟s so called 
“tsunami,” but very few of them got off the ground.) 
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backed by a legitimate authority; a situation where an officer is viewed as a private person merely 
cloaked in uniform, masquerading as more.  
 When asked whether the system of documentation is fair/right, the woman said that it was 
not fair.  
 
“Vanondibvunza passport pakutenderera, why not 
pakutenga? They just want money.”  
[They ask for my passport when I‟m walking 
around, why not when I‟m shopping? They just 
want money.] 
 
 Therefore, officers‟ asking for passports is in line with the “they just want money” as the 
migrant has previously expressed a belief that police officers do not genuinely wish to police 
immigration but rather to extort bribes. The “they” there includes police officers and may or may 
not extend beyond them. The use of term “kutenderera” is interesting. It means “walking around,” 
but can imply ambling around almost aimlessly, though it carries an element of freedom – 
freedom to move around “aimlessly” or in a seemingly “directionless” way.  The “va-” [“they”] 
here seems to encapsulate more than the police; it extends to include shopkeepers, and therefore 
the general South African populace (or strictly speaking, people in South Africa who would be in 
a position to ask for some sort of documentation (ID, credit card, etc)); but it appears that when a 
“they” is made to extend in general to people in South Africa, that this is actually intended to 
mean South Africans, which is ironic because it means that in protesting against non-inclusion, 
the respondent is excluding herself and drawing on and projecting the very blanketing exclusion 
she is protesting against. 
 
Separate Rules for Separate Residents: A Return to Apartheid?  
 A South African woman who heard that I was studying documentation approached me 
and began narrating the following story of her experience of being stopped by the police while in 
a vehicle in Johannesburg. She began by declaring: “I don‟t carry my ID. You‟re jazz.” 
Apparently, a police officer asked for her ID. She told him she did not have it. She keeps it at her 
house and she does not even know where it is. She cannot risk losing it because she has been 
carrying it around. “I don‟t have time to go and queue with Home Affairs. If you really want my 
ID, if you‟re really serious about seeing my ID, you can go to my house.” The officer left her and 
went on to a second woman in the car, who happened to be a foreigner (whether or not she had 
identification on her is unclear). The officers asked her where she was from. “I‟m from her 
house.” The woman relaying the story laughed. “They asked her where she was from and she said 
she was from my house! “I‟m from her house and we are going to Wits University and we‟re 
running late.”” It was the foreigner who told the officers that they were running late. She had 
called on associations with the gutsy South African woman (who speaks with a trace of 
something identifiably South African in her voice/accent); a prestigious university – a higher 
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institution; and she had indexed herself as an academic, an elite, above the officers and above the 
system (i.e. the system of harassment, not of law enforcement). To this, something in the officer‟s 
approach changed, or at least the narrator‟s perception of him and of the dynamics of the 
interaction changed, because she assumed a higher, more simpering tone to channel the officer‟s 
next words: “Oh, you are lucky guys. Are you lecturing at Wits?” It stands to debate whether the 
women were “lucky” to be part of Wits or whether they were “lucky” because he was not going 
to pursue the documentation inquiry further. In his statement is signaled a shift from official to 
casual, from inquisitor (higher power) to conversationalist (equal); from officer to man.  
 In this retelling, the police officer is presented as having moved from official to private 
citizen – as having actively made the transition, albeit unconsciously. This presents an interesting 
contrast with the earlier Zimbabwean respondent‟s account of officers who are presented not as 
actively shifting roles within the interaction but as seeming to simultaneously inhabit two roles – 
officer and man – with the officer role serving as a cloak for the underlying man.  
 Contained within the retracting of claws of the officer faced with the South African 
woman was a realizing and an acknowledgement of the uncertainty of his footing in the face of 
these women: assertive citizens/rights bearers who appeared unfazed by him and by the authority 
he had been claiming. Whatever his intention in changing positionality, it was read as a 
concession of defeat, because the reply he got was: “It‟s none of your business and you‟ve 
already wasted a lot/enough of our time.” The women drove off. The non-South African woman‟s 
passport may have been at her home, or in her handbag in the car with her, but she did have 
proper documentation. The South African woman in concluding her story retorted: “I don‟t walk 
around with my ID. I don‟t carry shit. I don‟t even know where my ID is, unless they‟re taking 
me back to the Apartheid times!”  
 The Apartheid reference was a recurring theme in interviews with Zimbabwean migrants, 
each time brought up by the respondent and each time in reference to the requirement to carry 
around and present documents upon demand. One respondent who had had several run-ins with 
the police said:  
 
“Yava Apartheid? Tadzokera kunguva 
yeApartheid here zvamava kuda kuti ndifambe 
nemaphepha? Unoswerera kundibvunza ID kudii?” 
[Is it now Apartheid? Have we gone back to the 
time of Apartheid that you want me to walk around 
with papers? You keep asking me for an ID, for 
what?] 
 
 The parallels between the manner in which passport controls are conducted in 
Johannesburg and the pass system during Apartheid are startling. During Apartheid, people were 
required to carry documentation with them indicating that they had permission from the state to 
be present in a particular area, where the permission was tied to one‟s purpose for being present, 
and was granted only on the basis of very strictly defined criteria, not wholly unlike the present 
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day visa system. Klaaren and Ramji (2001) argue that the South African Department of Home 
Affair‟s disregard for migrant rights enabled by their “extensive use of discretion,” which the 
authors believe stems only in part from immigration legislation‟s leeway for discretion as well as 
lack of oversight and accountability (38; c.f. Van der Leun‟s (2006) discussion on discretion and 
oversight). The underlying cause, for Klaaren and Ramji (2006), is “the policy's essentially 
unchanged status from pre-Apartheid days” (38). The Apartheid government was committed to a 
mission to define the “nation” and ensure that the borders they set were not transgressed. It is not 
surprising that respondents drew a link between their experience of spot checks and temporary 
detention and Apartheid-era policing of movement, membership and belonging.  
 What sets the Apartheid Pass Law requirements apart from general visa systems and 
likens it more to the requirement that foreigners carry passports in South Africa is the racially 
asymmetric manner in which the requirement is applied and enforced. One white gentleman in his 
mid-thirties informed me of a time when he had crossed the Mozambique/South Africa border 
without so much as a passport on him, and not a single person had stopped him to ask to see his 
passport. In his opinion, everyone just assumed that he had the right to be there, to cross over, 
because he was white. This simply serves to illustrate that the breaking of immigration 
regulations is not limited to a single race, yet a person is disproportionately more likely to be 
asked to provide documentary validation of their right to be present if they are black, and appear 
to be of low income.  
 Much of the interaction, the power-play, and the interpretation of it, are dependent on 
perceptions. The South African woman‟s reading of the officer, of law enforcement, of the 
interaction, of his tone, of herself. The respondents‟ actions are informed by these perceptions.  
 
Whose Document Is It? 
 Documents were described by respondents as linked to identity. For those who did not 
expressly indicate this view, they did however imply it through their rejection of the idea of ever 
lending out their own passports to those who resembled them. The only exceptions they were 
willing to make were perhaps to lend their passports to a sibling – a person physically and 
psychologically close to them. One respondent said that there was a very important relationship 
between what was written in ID and who she was – her “identity”. In her words: “One speaks for 
the other.” To this assertion, I asked how this would be affected if there was a discrepancy 
between what was in the document and what she believed to be her identity, for example if the 
names were slightly different.  Her response:  
 
“Hau. Inenge isisiri ID yako. It‟s useless.”  [Hau. It won‟t be your ID anymore. It‟s useless.]  
 
  
82 
 The respondent‟s contention is not a blanket dismissal of all incorrect documents. She is 
opposed specifically to those documents wherein the mismatch is a result of a clerical error or 
some other process the identified person has not sanctioned. This becomes clear in her subsequent 
response to the question “If it is no longer your ID, what is it then?” To this, she answered: 
 
 “Chimwewo chipepa chenemawords akada 
kufanana nezita rako. It has to be exactly as I want 
my name to be.” 
[Some other little piece of paper with words 
which kind of look like your name. It has to be 
exactly as I want my name to be.] 
 
 The ID is “useless” because it does not identify the bearer in the manner in which she 
wishes to be identified. It should be noted that this respondent admitted having used a friend‟s 
passport to cross the Zimbabwe/South African border. The issue for her was not so much that the 
details in the passport a person used and presented to the state ought to accurately represent their 
identity. Rather, it was that the details in the passport one held as one’s own had to match their 
actual specifics. This was in line with her general perception that one‟s passport belongs to them 
– it is the property of the person who obtains it from the government and must be used to that 
person‟s convenience and benefit, where a competing state interest to identify people is 
secondary to the individual passport bearer‟s right to determine whether or not they wished to be 
identified. For her, the individual goes from being a simple passport-bearer – a custodian of state 
property – to being a passport-owner. As the ID belongs to the bearer, it follows that it ought to 
serve the interests of its owner. 
 Another respondent who espoused similar views on it being the right of the passport 
bearer to determine how an when a document is used, said that she would use a passport with a 
name different from her own: “…I don‟t care whose name it says, as long as I remember the 
name on the passport when I go to the bank… I would buy a passport that doesn‟t bear my 
name.” For this respondent, the function of a passport to a resident of Johannesburg was to “open 
doors.” In her words:  
 
“It‟s my justification, my ticket, my right of way. 
It makes available to me things like opening a 
bank account. It‟s very important. My passport 
means getting a bank loan; kusaharaswa 
nemapurisa. I would use a passport with a 
different name.”  
“It‟s my justification, my ticket, my right of way. 
It makes available to me things like opening a 
bank account. It‟s very important. My passport 
means getting a bank loan; not getting harassed 
by the police. I would use a passport with a 
different name.”  
 
 In light of such sentiments, the young woman in the Preface who presented a man‟s 
permit when attempting to enter South Africa becomes a little less astonishing. She was informed 
by those who had crossed into South Africa before her that the Department of Home Affairs 
required the presentation of a valid permit in order to enter the country. Her objective was to 
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enter South Africa; she had a valid permit in her hand, even if it did not belong to her – could not 
have belonged to her.  
 The respondent above, for whom her passport is her “ticket, [her] right of way,” was an 
educated young professional with two college degrees. She had recently had an unsuccessful 
series of encounters with the Department of Home Affairs, where her application for a work 
permit had become a complex and expensive ordeal which had resulted in her both overstaying 
her visa and not having a valid passport for a length of time. The respondent had had a handful of 
encounters with the South African police, where she had been stopped and asked to show her 
passport, each of which had occurred prior to her slipping into irregular status. As to the question 
of ownership of documents and the state‟s right to require them of people, the respondent 
recognized the fact that it was possible for a government to attempt to confiscate a person‟s 
passport. However, she vehemently claimed that she would not surrender her passport.  
 
“Government ikauya kwandiri ikanditi ndipe 
passport yako? Ha! Iwe ungavapa yako?! 
Ndichivapirei passport yangu? I need it. I need 
my passport… You have R20 in your pocket, 
handiti. Would you give it to the Government? 
You wouldn‟t give it to them! The passport is 
mine. It‟s like money. The money also says “this 
belongs to the government” but me, I‟m not 
going to give no government my money! The 
money in my pocket?!” 
[If the Government comes to me and says give 
me your passport? Ha! Would you give them 
yours?! Why would I give them my passport/for 
what would I give them my passport? I need it. I 
need my passport… You have R20 in your 
pocket, right. Would you give it to the 
Government? You wouldn‟t give it to them! The 
passport is mine. It‟s like money. The money 
also says “this belongs to the government” but 
me, I‟m not going to give no government my 
money! The money in my pocket?!] 
 
 This respondent is aware of the regulations, and she knowingly disagrees with them. She 
is aware of the fact that when the question of surrendering passports to governments arises, it is 
for the most part the government that issues the passport that would require it – the Zimbabwean 
Government. Her objection may therefore not be so much with governments‟ rights to reclaim 
passports (and money) so much as with this particular Government‟s right. The respondent, who 
has worked and paid taxes in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, specifically sets apart “the money 
in the pocket.” When money is in one‟s pocket, ownership is direct, immediate. Withholding this 
money from a government that already systematically taxes its citizenry is possible when the 
money is in one‟s pocket rather than in the employer‟s budget, earmarked as income tax. 
Similarly, the passport in one‟s pocket, in one‟s handbag, is close enough to the individual for 
there to be hope of withholding it, especially from a government that seemingly does not return 
that which it has taken. The passport obtained at great pain to begin with becomes all the more 
the property of the individual specifically because it is almost irreplaceable; it is valuable, like 
money.  
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 Not only is the document seen as belonging to the bearer, the identity and the right to 
present or withhold said identity belong to the individual. That is, it is the individual‟s prerogative 
to be identified or not. When asked whether the government had the right to make her carry her 
ID around, the as-I-want-my-name-to-be respondent emphatically said no. 
 
“It has no right! Then, the ID is no longer 
serving me. It must be to my convenience. I must 
have a choice kuti ndoda kufamba neID yangu 
kana kuti handisi kuda…It‟s mine. It shall speak 
when I cannot speak… it‟s me who determines 
when I shall be identified or not. They shouldn‟t 
force me to carry it. Why should it be forced out 
of me? Yah, ok – kana ndapara mhosva, they can 
ask for my ID, but it‟s me who decides whether 
to give it. Hear what I say. If I say I‟m John, I‟m 
John. Why should you believe a piece of paper? 
Pamwe ndatora yanhingi. How do you know?”  
[It has no right! Then, the ID is no longer serving 
me. It must be to my convenience. I must have a 
choice whether I want to walk with my ID or I 
don‟t want to…It‟s mine. It shall speak when I 
cannot speak… it‟s me who determines when I 
shall be identified or not. They shouldn‟t force 
me to carry it. Why should it be forced out of 
me? Yah, ok – if I‟ve committed a crime, they 
can ask for my ID, but it‟s me who decides 
whether to give it. Hear what I say. If I say I‟m 
John, I‟m John. Why should you believe a piece 
of paper? Maybe I‟ve taken so and so‟s. How do 
you know?]  
 
  
 That is, documentation is as unreliable/infirm as evidence as verbal testimony, if not more 
so. Its unreliableness results specifically because people can corrupt it. For the respondent, a 
person‟s assertion of who they are ought to suffice, especially considering that in her view, the 
document ought to attest to an identity its bearer desires. Therefore, if it is the bearer who 
provides the government with the name to the recorded on her passport, how is the document 
more reliable than her verbal claim that her name is John? How much more credible is the 
corruptible document that people can lend to each other and alter? Ultimately, the respondent‟s 
point is not so much that documentation is completely unreliable as that it should be the 
individual – the identified – who determines when and how s/he will be identified. The state‟s 
right to compel testimony is limited to instances where the individual has committed a crime and 
thereby forfeited their right not to be compelled to produce “independent” identification.  
 This argument would be quite compelling if the respondent were speaking as one resident 
in her country of citizenship, limiting the state‟s right to arbitrarily police her. However, her 
complaint is raised against governments in general, including the foreign government of the 
country she is present in but not a citizen of. That is, she does not recognize a modification of her 
rights as induced/produced by her crossing of an international border, of her transition from 
citizen to non-citizen.  
 Her non-discriminatory view of the universality of unfettered rights not to be compelled 
to testify against herself was not shared all respondents. In the group discussion, the following 
exchange occurred:  
PQ: “Papers are an insult to Zimbabweans! Why 
should we walk carrying a paper? Why? I 
can carry many papers in my bag, but 
passport –? I‟m also a human being. Aren‟t 
South Africans human beings? So why 
should I carry a paper?”  
RS: “Kuratidza kuti unemvumo yekuva 
pano.”  
PQ: “Hanti ndiri pano.”  
RS: “But kuva pano hazvirevi kuti wava 
nemvumo yokugara zvachose. Haisi nyika 
yako. 
PQ: “Haisi nyika yangu asi ndiri pano. Saka 
ndakapinda sei? I should use a passport 
when I‟m crossing and when I‟m coming 
only. That‟s when I should see my 
passport.” 
PQ: “Papers are an insult to Zimbabweans! Why 
should we walk carrying a paper? Why? I 
can carry many papers in my bag, but 
passport –? I‟m also a human being. Aren‟t 
South Africans human beings? So why 
should I carry a paper?”  
RS: [To show that you have permission to be 
here.] 
PQ: [I‟m here aren‟t I?] 
RS: [But to be here doesn‟t mean you now have 
permission to stay here forever. It’s not 
your country.] 
PQ: [It‟s not my country but I‟m here. So how 
did I get in?] I should use a passport when 
I‟m crossing and when I‟m coming only. 
That‟s when I should see my passport.” 
Ownership of Identity Documents 
 When I asked the respondent why she felt her passport belonged to her and not to the 
government, she said:  
“Because it‟s mine. Just because it‟s mine. 
Madetails aripo ndeangu. Ndini ndinoichengeta; 
ndinoitakura. I pay for it. If it‟s lost, it‟s me who 
gets into trouble. So it‟s mine. Hanti kana 
ndikafa – dai yanga iri yavo, vaiti ndafa vaiipa 
kunomumwe [laughs]. Manje havadaro. Kana 
ndikafa, ndoenda nayo.”  
[Because it‟s mine. Just because it‟s mine. The 
details on it are mine. It‟s me who keeps it; who 
carries it. I pay for it. If it‟s lost, it‟s me who 
gets into trouble. So it‟s mine. Hey if I die – if it 
was theirs, they would give it to another when I 
died [laughs]. But then they don‟t. If I die, I go 
with it.]  
 
 The respondent challenges the taken-for-granted notion of the ID as the state‟s property. 
It is the state that issues the document; it can revoke it or demand it. Under “Conditions of Use,” 
Zimbabwean passports proclaim: “This passport is the property of the Government of 
Zimbabwe and may be amended, withdrawn or cancelled at any time” (p3). Immediately 
following the declaration of ownership, the passport continues: “The holder or bearer of this 
passport shall forthwith surrender the passport when so required by an authorized official.” That 
statement is made with no qualifications, no room for the bearer‟s objection or discretion. 
Ownership is not shared, according to the passport. However, the respondent above, like many 
others, suggests instead that it belongs to the bearer, the one who “purchased” it, who bears it, in 
whose possession it remains, whose details are inside it. While [fraudulent] documents are 
purchased on the parallel market, the legal acquisition of authentic documents from the 
Government also requires the exchange of money for the papers. For her, a passport purchased 
from the Zimbabwean Registrar General‟s Office belongs all the more to the bearer – especially 
when s/he has paid US $670 for it.  
 The idea of the document belonging to its bearer goes some way to explain another 
element of respondents‟ exception to the manner in which policing of immigration is conducted 
in Johannesburg. Each respondent save for one objected to the random stopping of suspected 
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migrants by the police. While respondents embraced the utility of documents in identifying them 
when they are dead, the manner in which documents defend them when their rights are called 
into question – that is, the general utility of documents in serving their interests, they 
resoundingly objected to being asked to present their passports by the police. That is, they 
objected to instances in which documents were used against them, either to mark them as 
immigrants, or to necessitate the bribing of officials and instantiate contestations of power. 
Where it is accepted that passports and national IDs belong to the state, and the state reserves all 
rights to demand their presentation, such objections would be misplaced.  
 
A Nobody until You Die  
 While it was by far the majority opinion among my respondents that documents ought to 
serve the interests of their bearers, who had obtained this right through the fact of having 
acquired the documents and being their designated bearers, not all respondents privileged this 
idea. There was recognition of documents sometimes serving a purpose other than for their 
bearers‟ convenience. Here, documents went beyond serving as means to an end – whether as 
means to access services, to access spaces, to access certification of identity, or to access ways 
of being. Documents were seen as symbolic in and of themselves, apart from what they accrue 
to their bearers, even when this was detrimental to individuals.  
 One respondent, who stated his emphatic belief in the existence of documentation and in 
governments‟ right to control movement, added that he was persuaded that ultimately, the 
system of documentation could not completely prevent one from returning to their country, 
given that school records, IDs and other such alternatives to passports could be used. I pointed 
out to him that there were some who did not have any documentation whatsoever attesting to 
their Zimbabwean-ness. For example, people who moved from Mozambique and grew up in 
Zimbabwe but had not formally obtained Zimbabwean citizenship. His response:  
 
“Havana kumbobvira vaita maphepha 
ekuZimbabwe? Saka they are Mozambicans. 
They should have made efforts.”  
[They‟ve never had Zimbabwean papers? So 
they are Mozambicans. They should have made 
efforts.] 
 
 For him, they are not Mozambicans because they do not have Zimbabwean papers. They 
are Mozambicans because they have not made a demonstrated effort to officially become 
Zimbabweans. Documentation stands as a physical indication of one‟s national allegiance – an 
expression of one‟s desire to be considered a citizen of a certain country. He disavowed the 
practice of using fraudulent documents, stressing that even though he had close relatives who 
had committed various immigration infractions, he did not condone the practice. I asked him 
about cases where one was unable to call upon documentary evidence to one‟s citizenship, as 
with street kids, orphaned or born to homeless parents, who live almost completely 
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undocumented lives – with no school registration records, hospital records, or other 
documentary verification of their claims to citizenship.60 His response: 
 
                                                 
60
 In July 2004, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that “nearly a 
third of all children [in Zimbabwe] do not possess a birth certificate” (IRIN). 
 
“That‟s the most unfortunate part. You are a 
nobody kusvika wafa.”  
[That‟s the most unfortunate part. You are a 
nobody until you die.]  
 
 This respondent would agree with Torpey‟s (1998) assertion that “people… have 
become dependent on states for the possession of an “identity” from which they cannot escape 
and which may significantly shape their access to various spaces” (239). It is not only for the 
possession of an identity document but for an identity itself that people have come to be 
“dependent on states.” A case in point would therefore be those whose lives do not come with 
documentary evidence of their existence and identity, who are not “linked” to a state on paper in 
a way that delineates their rights – as evidenced when they attempt to legally cross international 
boundaries.  
 However, the majority of my respondents would disagree with this categorical 
perspective that unless one is a person on paper, one is “a nobody until [they] die,” and that in 
order not to be a nobody, one needs their identity to be given to them by the state. They would 
hold rather that what is critical is not the possession of a formally recognized, documented 
identity, but the ability to present one such identity, disagree though they may with the 
conditions under which the presentation of identities is instantiated. Given the existence of a 
documentation-mediated international “filing system” that classifies people according to 
citizenship (Brubaker 1992: 31, as cited in Wang 2004: 357), it is up to the migrant to determine 
how s/he would best be identified, particularly if the migrants in question do not conceptualize 
the impetus behind identifying migrants in terms of the good of the nation-state but view it as a 
contestation between individuals acting outside the interests of the state. Migrants are aware of 
the implications of the identities states attempt to impose on them, with document-enforced 
categories like “citizen” and “alien” being understood as a starting point for negotiation of 
identity. Documentation, while instrumentalised by the state to enforce these categories, serves 
as the very means through which the labels are reworded, reread and re-instrumentalised. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Zimbabwean migrants resident in Johannesburg are constantly grappling with questions 
of identity, membership and resistance. While there remains an urgent need to ensure migrants‟ 
access to basic services (food, shelter, healthcare, etc), it is imperative that discourses 
surrounding documentation and “access” in migration literature evolve beyond an elemental 
“access to services” approach to one that makes room for examining access to ways of being. 
One such approach would need to acknowledge migrants‟ pragmatism – their capacity to read 
themselves in the South African story and redefine themselves by carving out spaces for 
themselves even if in ways and places that are not necessarily sanctioned by the state. An 
approach that privileges examining migrants‟ views – as agentive participants in the processes 
surrounding the formation of the nation-state and the limits of state power – is necessary in 
addressing the incongruence between the disembodied state‟s perspective of its instruments and 
that of individuals. Documentation lends itself to such study because of its dual enabling and 
limiting role; the debatable nature of its ownership; its significance as a primary means of state 
control; and as a symbol of both state power one the one hand and migrants‟ ability to resist and 
exploit that very power, on the other. 
 A form of proof of membership, documentation provides a systematic albeit imperfect 
means of indicating citizenship, codifying rights and “testifying” for or against its bearer. Issued 
by the state for its purposes yet borne by individuals who are either unaware of or disinclined to 
espouse the state‟s agenda, documents are both a nexus for individual-state interaction and a 
locus of renegotiation of meaning and rights. For Zimbabwean migrants, passports are obtained 
at great cost and effort and serve as a requisite item allowing for lawful exit from Zimbabwe and 
entry into South Africa. Passports come to symbolize access, to serve as one‟s “ticket [and] right 
of way,” as one of the respondents above put it. As such, migrants understand passports as 
commissioned to their bearers‟ interests, wherein the bearers have almost exclusive rights over 
them, even when these interests run counter to the intended nature of documents as per the state. 
However, even as the migrant pursues his/her ends, the state retains an interest in the 
identification of individuals, regulation of movement, and control over access, the object of 
regulation being the same document. Documentation becomes the locus of tug-of-war, the 
meeting point of the individual‟s pursuit of his/her interests and the state‟s pursuit of its own. 
When the state exercises control through documentation, when the disjuncture between the 
migrant‟s perceptions and the state‟s intended purposes surfaces, a tension is created and the 
document becomes a fault line.  
The nation-state‟s delineation of its borders and its power to control movement and 
access are called into question. It is evident that the state‟s power to exclude non-citizens is not 
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wholly unfettered. International law and humanitarian principles of non-refoulement (Abell 
1999) present constraints, particularly to states that wish to be considered liberal democracies. 
Similarly, countries of repatriation can refuse to readmit migrants, even if it violates 
international agreements (Roig and Huddelston 2007). Such constraints to states‟ sovereignty 
are generally on a national and international level, emerging from the competing sovereignties 
of other states, and international agreements. However, it is often the state that ultimately 
determines what constraints it will and will not accept (see Dauvergne 2007: 535; Prem Kumar 
and Grundy-Warr 2004: 35-6).  
However, on some level, there is a challenge to the exercise of sovereignty that states are 
less able to contest: the limits imposed at the level of the individual by migrants who challenge, 
resist, and therefore stress the boundaries of state power. Whether through evading inspection 
upon entry; using parallel market documents; or withholding their authentic papers, there is a 
plethora of subversion options, each one illustrative of migrants‟ ability to challenge and 
effectively limit the state‟s power to exclude. If indeed as Torpey (1998) asserts, the state‟s 
monopoly over the “legitimate means of movement” is integral to the exercise of its sovereignty, 
then the evasion of this control challenges sovereignty one infraction at a time, albeit like 
chipping at an iceberg. 
The non-citizen is often seen and treated as “other” and “outside” the process of 
democracy, outside the social contract, yet s/he is intrinsically involved in the redefinition of 
state limits and therefore of the state. Even as the state exerts its influence on the individual, 
dictating the boundaries of his/her freedom of movement, his/her life-space, his/her 
membership, so the individual works back on the state, the points of contact becoming the points 
of resistance, the points of abrasion and co-construction, of co-definition. Granted, the state can 
strip some individuals to “bare life” (Agamben 1998), but for each migrant who is made into a 
homo sacer, there is a multitude of migrants whom the state does not locate, detain and deport. 
The state‟s power to exclude comes to exist for the most part in performances of power and 
shows of force – in the threat of spot-checks, in Lindela, in go-slows at the border. The state-
migrant interaction that results in this resistance and redefinition is centered on documents. 
Thus, the examination of document-mediated individual-state interactions is pertinent to 
understanding migrants‟ perception of the exchanges and the implications of those exchanges, 
particularly given the importance of understanding what it is that is being resisted and what is 
being challenged, from the perspective of the migrant.   
 As shown in this paper, state officials‟ acceptance of bribes indicates to respondents that 
officers‟ objective is not to weed out undocumented migrants; they act in their own interests, not 
as agents of the state. Thus, migrants‟ resistance is not against the state but against its non-
representatives. Resistance does not reflect whole scale rejection of states‟ rights to control 
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movement. As respondents indicated, they do not object to Home Affairs officials demanding 
the presentation of passports. It would probably be inaccurate to conclude that the Zimbabwean 
migrants interviewed here are cognizant of the implications of their actions on the state. Rather, 
they see themselves as individuals engaged in a struggle to assert their rights to access services, 
space, and ways of being in the face of inhospitable regulations but more than that, in spite of 
hostile quasi-state agents who target them as “opportunities”. Documentation, primary among 
which is the passport, when present, serves as a defense, a locus of resistance and self 
representation. If the frustration of the state‟s legitimate efforts to control movement has 
negative implications for sovereignty, what is troubling is the fact of circumstances resulting in 
the perception of state officials as private citizens disguised in uniform, rather than as genuine 
representatives of the state. This is particularly so considering that it is under these conditions 
that the meanings attached to documentation are contested.   
 Because the state is disembodied and calls upon human agents to represent it and pursue 
its ends, the migrant-state interaction is translated from a migrant-state to a migrant-officer 
interaction. Zimbabwean migrants interviewed in this study have come to hold a particular view 
of South African police officers as disingenuous state representatives, as “free agents” pursuing 
their individual agendas rather than as legitimate representatives of the state. Inspection 
becomes a personalized process almost outside the state. Their responses to police officer 
initiated spot inspections are informed by this view. Resistance of movement control is 
understood as meted against the “free agent” police officer/s in question, not necessarily against 
the state. The manner of contestation that occurs can be said to be made possible and even 
brought about by the existence of a system of documentation and by the nature of policing of 
membership in Johannesburg. 
 Where state instituted documents such as passports are meant to grant their bearer 
certain protections by making him/her something of a “diplomatic representative” of his/her 
state (Torpey 1998: 250), defending him/her against foreign states, as well as standing in his/her 
defense against the issuing state, official legitimate documents strip some migrants of 
protections, attesting to a citizenship that renders them more vulnerable to victimization from 
both state and non-state agents. Fraudulent documentation then provides some defense (or a 
veneer of protection) against both the foreign state and its (non-)representatives, and against 
what is sometimes an undesirable association of the individual with a particular state. The 
reversal of protections is not limited to state-imposed documents, or country-of-origin 
documents, but also occurs with migrant-solicited documents like asylum seeker permits.  
Respondents rationalize their conviction of the state-officer dissociation by noting the 
police‟s acceptance of bribes in place of documents, their catch-and-release practice indicative 
of an insincere interest in immigration policing. Zimbabwean migrants are not physically 
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removed from South Africa, in part because of the continued moratorium on deportation even if 
Special Dispensation Permits have still not been issued months after the announcement of their 
introduction. Yet, there is a consistent singling out of a portion of the population and ritually 
exercising membership policing by asking to see passports the lack of which does not legally 
empower officers to have Zimbabwean migrants deported. The persistence of inspection almost 
removed from the system of deportation in which it was once embedded results in inspection 
being a policing of membership, psychologically reinforcing within the unwanted a sense of 
outsider-ness, of an other-ness that seemingly cannot be reversed by the possession of 
immigration papers or by a change in immigration law officially redrawing lines to include 
them. Zimbabwean migrants are legally/officially within the bounds of the state, yet remain 
affectively outside. Fraudulent documents are used to resist these exclusionary exercises. 
Officers‟ motivations are seen as superficial, and the document-mediated migrant-officer 
interaction as a personal contestation between individuals, the exchange suspended outside the 
law, outside the state, outside the regular system of immigration policing whose end is the 
removal of those whose presence has not been sanctioned by the state.  
It is in such spaces that a young Zimbabwean woman attempting to enter South Africa 
would produce a sheet of paper – a corporate permit – with the photograph of an unknown male 
and think to present it as her own. She probably does not believe that she could pass for the man 
in the picture, or that an official could believe that her name was “John” or “Philip.” Rather, she 
has considered the policing of immigration at the level of the individual and surmised that what 
is required of non-citizens is documentation attesting to a claim to enter and be present in the 
Republic of South Africa. Whose document ought it to be? – Its bearer‟s. She is a migrant; in 
her left hand is a permit; she is its bearer. Concealed in her right hand is one or both of two 
things: a Zimbabwean passport without a visa, and/or a R100 note, both awaiting the time they 
will become necessary for her permissions to be read off them. In this moment, at this time, the 
man‟s corporate permit is her permit. She claims the rights it avails. The state might have its 
own notions of what the document ought to symbolize and how it is meant to be used, but when 
the woman‟s turn comes to show her passport and visa to the official at the entrance to the bus, 
she hands over the corporate permit, the man‟s face solemn in the photograph. Her actions say: 
“This is my ID. I am what it says I am. I have what it says I have. I can do what it says I can 
do…” 
 
 
 
 
         
 
  92 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
 
Ambert, Anne-Marie, Patricia A. Adler, Peter Adler, and Daniel F. Detzner. 1995. “Understanding and 
Evaluating Qualitative Research.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 57(4): 879-893. National Council 
on Family Relations. http://www.jstor.org/stable/353409  
Amisi, Baruti and Richard Ballard. 2005. “In the Absence of Citizenship: Congolese Refugee Struggle and 
Organization in South Africa.” Wits FMSP Working Paper Series #16 
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.  New 
York: Verso 
Austin, Reginald. 1975.  Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa: Rhodesia. The Unesco Press: Paris. 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0001/000161/016163eo.pdf  
Bakewell, Oliver. 2007. “The Meaning and Use of Identity Papers: Handheld and Heartfelt Nationality in the 
Borderlands of North-West Zambia.” (Previously entitled “Where the Tiger Does Not Roam: The 
Meaning and Use of Papers in North-West Zambian Borderlands”). International Migration Institute, 
University of Oxford 
Bakewell, Oliver. 2008. “Research beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into 
Forced Migration.” Journal of Refugee Studies 21(4): 432 – 453 
Bakewell, Oliver and Xiang Biao. 2006. “Invitation to Workshop.” Paper Tigers or Tiger Papers: the Paper 
Regime of Modern States for 16 June 2006, Oxford University  
Becker, H. S. 1963. Outsiders: studies in the sociology of deviance, New York: Free Press 
Beeman, William O. Language, Status and Power in Iran (check p200-210) 
Bloch, Alice. 2005. “The Development Potential of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora: A Survey of Zimbabweans 
Living in the UK and South Africa.”  IOM Migration Research Series, No. 17, Geneva 
Bloch, Alice. 2006. “Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives.” Social Policy and Administration, 
40(1):  67-87  
Bloch, Alice. 2007: „Methodological Challenges for National and Multi-sited Comparative Survey Research‟, 
Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(2): .230-247 
Böcker, Anita. “Panacea or Pandora‟s Box? The Introduction of a Generalised ID Obligation in the 
Netherlands.” Paper Presentation. Radboud University Nijmegen 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. “Social Space and Symbolic Power.” American Sociological Association, 7(1): 14-25 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/202060  
Bratton, Michael and Eldred Masunungure. 2006. “Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation 
Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe.” Afrobarometer Working Papers: Working Paper #59. 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo59.pdf  
Broeders, Dennis and Godfried Engbersen. 1999. “Digital Fortress Europe. Policies on Irregular Migration and 
the Weapons of the Weak.”  Challenges of a New Europe 
http://www.inclusionexclusion.nl/site/?Course_information:E-reader  
Brubaker, R. and F. Cooper. 2000. “Beyond Identity.” Theory and Society 29 (1): 1-47  
Cerulo, Karen A. 1993. “Symbols and the World System: National Anthems and Flags.” Sociological Forum 8 
(2): 243-271. http://www.jstor.org/stable/684637  
Chan, Wendy. 2006. “Crime, Deportation and the Regulation of Immigrants in Canada.” Crime, Law & Social 
Change (2005) 44: 153–180 
Chimanikire, D. P. Dr. 2005. “Migration and malformation: case studies from Zimbabwe.” Trade and 
Development Studies Centre. Issue  30. Harare 
http://hepta.designat7.co.zw/tradescentre/download_documents/Zimbabwe%20Migration%20PART%20T
WO.doc 
Coplan, David B. 2001. “A River Runs Through It: The Meaning of the Lesotho-Free State Border.” African 
Affairs 100: 81-116  
Counelis, James S. 2000. “Documentation and Meaning.” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 45 (1-4) 
         
 
  93 
 
Croucher, Sheila L. 2003. Globalization and Belonging: the Politics of Identity in a Changing World.  
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Crush, Jonathan. 1999. “Fortress South Africa and the Deconstruction of Apartheid‟s Migration Regime.” 
Geoforum 30(1999): 1-11 
Dale, D. 1981. Duramazwi: A Basic Shona-English Dictionary. Mambo Press: Gwelo 
Daniel, E. Valentine. 1996. Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence. 
Dauvergne, Catherine. 2004. “Making People Illegal.” Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject. 
Fitzpatrick, Peter and Patricia Tuitt (Eds). Ashgate Publishing 
Dickinson, Emily. 1891. Poems: First and Second Series. Cleveland: the World Publishing Company  
Engbersen, Godfried and Joanne van der Leun. 2001. “The Social Construction of Illegality and Criminality.” 
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 9: 51-70 
FitzGerald, Valpy and J.A. Cuesta-Leiva. 1997. “The Economic Value of a Passport: A Model of Citizenship 
and the Social Dividend in a Global Economy.” Finance and Trade Policy Research Centre, Queen 
Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. Working Paper #4. QEH Working Paper Series 
http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps04.pdf  
Foucault, Michel. 1982. “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry 8: 777-795 
France. 2008. “Naître ou Devenir Français.” Vos Droits et Démarches, Ministère de la Justice. 23 Jan. 2008. 
http://www.vos-droits.justice.gouv.fr/index.php?rubrique=10062&ssrubrique=10206&article=13967  
Friends. 1995. The One With the Birth (Season 1, Episode 23). Director: James Burrows. Writers: David Crane 
and Marta Kauffman. 11 May 1995. DVD. Warner Bros. Television: USA 
Gallagher, Stephen. 2002. “Towards a Common European Asylum System: Fortress Europe Redesigns the 
Ramparts.” International Journal. 57(3): 375-394. 
Gardner, Martha M. 2005. The Qualities of a Citizen: Women, Immigration, and Citizenship 1870-1965. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Goffman, Erving. 1959. “The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.” The Goffman Reader. New York: 
Doubleday. 
Gordillo, Gaston. 2006. “The Crucible of Citizenship: ID-Paper Fetishism in the Argentinean 
Chaco.”American Ethnologist 33(2): 162-176   
http://www.anth.ubc.ca/fileadmin/template/main/images/departments/anso/Faculty_PDFs/Gordillo/Gordill
o_2006.pdf  
Guild, Elspeth. 2007. “Unreadable Papers? Biometrics in Practice.” Are You Who You Say You Are? The EU 
and Biometric Borders. J. Lodge (Ed). Nijmegen: Wold Legal Publishers J. Lodge (Ed.) pp. 31-45 
(Initially entitled “Unreadable Papers? Biometrics in Practice. The EU‟s First Experiences with 
Biometrics: Examining EURODAC.”)  
Gussman, Boris. 1953. “Industrial Efficiency and the Urban Africa: A Study of Conditions in Southern 
Rhodesia.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 23(2): 135-144 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1157038  
Haste, Helen. 2004. “Constructing the Citizen.” Political Psychology 25(3): 413-439 
Hedetoft, Ulf. 2002. "Discourses and Images of Belonging: Migrants between "New Racism," Liberal 
Nationalism and Globalization." AMID Working Paper Series #5: 1-25 
Heyman, Josiah M. 2004. “Ports of Entry as Nodes in the World System.” Identities-Global Studies in Culture 
and Power 11 (3): 303-327 
Hymes, Dell. 1974. Foundations in Sociolinguistics: an Ethnographic Approach. University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Inc 
Higgins, Lesley and Marie C. Leps. 1998. ““Passport, Please”: Legal, Literary, and Critical Fictions of 
Identity.” College Literature 25(1): 94-138 http://www.jstor.org/stable/25112355  
Hobbes, Thomas. 1651 (1968). Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books  
Human Rights Watch. 2007. “Keep Your Head Down: Unprotected Migrants South Africa.” 19(3)a. 
www.unhcr.org/refword/docid/45eecad12html   
         
 
  94 
 
Human Sciences Research Council Democracy and Governance Programme. 2008. “Citizenship, 
Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities.” 
IRIN. 2004. “ZIMBABWE: Reform of Birth Registration Law Urged.” UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. 23 Jul 2004. Harare.  4 Feb 2008. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=50803  
Jedd, Deppman. 2004. The Emily Dickinson Journal 14(1): 84-103. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/emily_dickinson_journal/v014/14.1deppman.html  
Johnstone, Barbara. 2002. Discourse Analysis. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing  
Kihato, Caroline and Loren B. Landau. 2006. “The Uncaptured Urbanite: Migration and State Power in 
Johannesburg.” FMSP Working Paper Series #25. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg   
Klaaren, Jonathan and Bonaventure Rutinwa. 2004. “Towards the Harmonization of Immigration and Refugee 
Law in SADC.” Cape Town, Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)  
Klaaren, Jonathan and Jaya Ramji. 2001. “Inside Illegality: Migration Policing in South Africa after 
Apartheid.” Africa Today 48(3): 35-47 http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4187432.pdf  
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. “Globalization and Sovereignty.” States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy. 
Smith, David A., Dorothy J. Solinger and Steven Topik (Eds).  Routledge  
Ku, Agnes S. 2004. “Immigration Policies, Discourses, and the Politics of Local Belonging in Hong Kong 
(1950-1980)”. Modern China 30(3) http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3181313.pdf  
Kubatana.net. 2003. Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill. Zimbabwe Government Gazette, 14 Feb. 2003. 
http://www.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/citamdbill030214.pdf  
Lakoff, Robin 1995 [1975]. 'Language and the Woman's Place.' In Roman, Camille, 
Lammers, Ellen. 2003. Young, Urban Refugees in Kampala, Uganda: Some Thoughts on the Ethics of 
Fieldwork and Issues of Representation. http://migration.wits.ac.za/lammerswp.pdf 
Landau, Loren B. 2005. “Immigration and the State of Exception: Security and Sovereignty in East and 
Southern Africa.” FMSP Working Paper Series #15. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg   
Landau, Loren B. 2005. “Transplants and Transients: Nativisim, Nationalism and Migration in Inner-City 
Johannesburg.” FMSP Working Paper Series #19. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg   
Landau, Loren B. 2006. „Transplants and Transients: Idioms of Belonging and Dislocation in Inner-City 
Johannesburg.‟ African Studies Review, 49(2): 125-145 
Landau, Loren B. and Iriann S. M. Haupt. 2007. “Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: 
Insertion and Self-Exclusion in Johannesburg.” FMSP Working Paper Series #32. University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg   
Landau, Loren B. and Kathryn Mathers. 2007. “Tourists or Makwerekwere: Good Versus Bad Visitors and the 
Possibility of Ethical Tourism in South Africa. FMSP Working Paper Series #27. University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg   
Landau, Loren B. and Tamlyn Monson. 2008. “Displacement, Estrangement and Sovereignty: Reconfiguring 
State Power in Urban South Africa.” Government and Opposition 43(2):  315–336 Blackwell Publishing  
Levitt, Peggy. 2001. The Transnational Villagers. Los Angeles: University of California Press 
Lipsky, Michael. 1983. Street Level Bureaucracy. Russell Sage Foundation Publications 
Macchiavello, Michela. 2003. “Urban Forced Migrants in Kampala: Methodologies and Ethical and 
Psychological Issues.” FMSP Working Paper Series #1. Wits University, Johannesburg  
Mackenzie et al. 2007. “Beyond „Do No Harm‟: The Challenge of Constructing Ethical Relationships in 
Refugee Research.” Journal of Refugee Studies. Vol. 20 pp299-319 
Mail & Guardian Online. 2009. “Central Methodist Church Could Face Closure.” Johannesburg. 30 Oct. 2009. 
16 Feb. 2010 
Malkki, Lisa. 1992. “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National 
Identity among Scholars and Refugees.” Cultural Anthropology 7(1): 24-44 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press  
         
 
  95 
 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1845. “The Holy Family.” Karl Marx: Selected Writings.  London:  Oxford 
University Press, 2000 
Mathers, Kathryn and Loren Landau. 2007. “Natives, Tourists, and Makwerekwere: Ethical Concerns with 
„Proudly South African‟ Tourism.” Development Southern Africa 24(3): 523-537 
McDonald, David and Sean H. Jacobs. 2005. “(Re)writing Xenophobia: Understanding Press Coverage  of 
Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 23 (3): 295-325.    
Mead, George H. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Miller, Christopher. Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French. University of Chicago Press, 1985 
Misago, Jean-Pierre. 2005. “Responses to Displacement in Africa: The Irrelevance of Best Practice.” Wits 
University Forced Migration Studies Programme, Johannesburg  
Montgomery, David. 2006. “An Anthem‟s Discordant Notes: Spanish Version of „Star Spangled Banner‟ 
Draws Strong Reactions.” The Washington Post. 28 Apr. 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/27/AR2006042702505.html 
Morris, Lydia. 2002 Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants' Rights, London: Routledge. 
Muzondidya, James. 2002. “Towards a Historical Understanding of the Making of the Coloured Community in 
Zimbabwe, 1890-1920.” Identity, Culture and Politics 3(2): 73-97  
Muzondidya, James. 2009. “From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1997.”  Raftopoulos, Brian and Alois Mlambo, 
Eds. Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. Weaver Press: Harare 
Myers-Scotton, Carol and William Ury. 1977. “Bilingual Strategies: the Social Functions of Code-Switching.” 
Journal of Linguistics 193: 5-20 
National Consortium for Refugee Affairs (NCRA) and Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the 
Witwatersrand. 2006. “The Documented Experiences of Refugees, Deportees and Asylum Seekers in 
South Africa: A Zimbabwean Case Study, a Written Submission Prepared by Civil Society Organisations 
Working on the Refugee and Asylum Seekers‟ Human Rights Issues in South Africa, for Presentation to 
the Minister of Home Affairs.” Refugee Protection in South Africa 2006  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2009. “Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters, 1880s-1930s.” Raftopoulos, 
Brian and Alois Mlambo, Eds. Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. 
Weaver Press: Harare 
 Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2002. “Local Attitudes towards Citizenship and Foreigners in Botswana: An Appraisal 
of Recent Press Stories.” Journal of Southern African Studies 28(4) 
O‟Malley, Padraig. 2010. “Racial Legislation 1806-1947” and “The Apartheid State.” Nelson Mandela 
Foundation Centre of Memory and Dialogue. 14 Feb. 2010. www.nelsonmandela.org/index,php.memory 
Orwell, George. 1949. Nineteen Eighty-Four. (1992) London: Everyman 
Osteen, Joel. Lakewood Church, Houston, Texas  
Palmary, Ingrid. 2009. Personal Communication. 
Peberdy, Sally. 2001. “Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South 
Africa.” Africa Today 48(3): 15-32 
Pecoud, Antoine (Ed) and Paul de Guchteneire (Ed). Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free 
Movement of People. UNESCO and Berghahn Books, 2007 
Penrod, Janice, Deborah B. Preston, Richard E. Cain, and Michael T. Starks. 2003. “A Discussion of Chain 
Referral As a Method of Sampling Hard-to-Reach Populations.” 
Journal of Transcultural Nursing 14: 100-107  
Polzer, Tara. 2004. ““We Are All South Africans Now”: the Integration of Mozambican Refugees in Rural 
South Africa.” FMSP Working Paper # 8. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg  
Polzer, Tara. 2005. “Adapting to Changing Legal Frameworks: Mozambican Refugees in South Africa – an 
Historical Overview.” FMSP Working Paper Series # 17, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.  
Polzer, Tara. 2007. “Identity Documents and Service Provision in Border Areas – Facilitating Local 
Development.” Discussion Brief: National Department of Home Affairs. FMSP, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg  
         
 
  96 
 
Polzer, Tara. 2008. “Invisible Integration: How Bureaucratic, Academic and Social Categories Obscure 
Integrated Refugees.” Journal of Refugee Studies 21(4): 476-497 
Polzer, Tara and Laura Hammond. 2008. “Editorial Introduction: Invisible Integration.” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 21(4): 417-431 
Ponterotto, Joseph G. 2005. “Qualitative Research in Counseling and Psychology: A Primer on Research 
Paradigms and Philosophy of Science.  Journal of Counseling Psychology 52(2) 
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1851. General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century. Dover Publications, 
2003. http://fair-use.org/p-j-proudhon/general-idea-of-the-revolution/  
Ranger, T. 2005. “The Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Zimbabwean Asylum: Female Voices.” Third 
World Quarterly-Journal of Emerging Areas 
Reitzes, M. and N. Crawhall. 1999. Accessing the SADC Amnesty: The Urban Experience. The New South 
Africans? Immigration Amnesties and their Aftermath. J. Crush and V. Williams. Cape Town, Southern 
African Migration Project. 37 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right. 
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm 
Salter, Mark B. 2006. “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: 
Borders, Bodies and Biopolitics.” Alternatives: 31 (2): 167-189 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1961. “Preface.” In Frantz Fanon. 2004/1964. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove 
Atlantic, Inc.  
Scheiden, Kara M. 2009. “Exploring Conceptions of Legality and the Meaning of Asylum Law in 
Johannesburg.” M.A. diss., University of the Witwatersrand: Johannesburg  
Scott, Joan 1999. 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis.' Gender and the Politics of History. New 
York: Columbia University Press 
Shakespeare, William. 1599 [1985]. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 
Sisulu, Elinor, Bhekinkosi Moyo and Nkosinathi Tshuma. 2007. “The Zimbabwean Community in South 
Africa.” Buhlungu, Sakhela et al (Eds). State of the Nation: South Africa 2007: 552-573. HSRC Press: 
Cape Town 
Smith, Anthony D. 1996. “Culture, Community and Territory: the Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism.” 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72(3): 445-458 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2625550  
Smith, Anthony D. 2002. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Polity, Whiley-Blackwell Publishing 
Sokoloff, Natalie J. 1987. “The Increase of Black and White Women in the Professions: a Contradictory 
Process.” In Bose, Christine E. and Glenna D. Spitze (Eds). Ingredients for Women’s Employment Policy. 
Albany: State University of New York Press 
Solomon, Hussein. 1997. “Towards the Free Movement of People in Southern Africa?” Human Security 
Project, Institute for Security Studies. Occasional Paper No.18 
http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=&slink_id=684&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 
South Africa. 2001. “2001 Statements: CEO, Chairperson, Board of Proudly South African.” 3 Jun. 2001. 
National Economic Development and Labour Council. http://www.nedlac.org.za/press-
room/statements/2001-statements/psa-chairperson-board.aspx 
South Africa. 1996. “Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.” 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN005172.pdf  
South Africa. 1998. “Refugees Act, 1998. Act No. 130.” Government Gazette, 2 December 1998:  No. 19544 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). 2000. „Open Hearings on Xenophobia and Problems 
Related to it.‟ http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/downloads/Xenophobia%20Report.pdf  
Tevera, Daniel, and Jonathan Crush (Ed). 2002. Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International 
Migration in Zimbabwe. Southern African Migration Project. Migration Policy Series No. 25 
Tienda, Marta. 2002. “Demography and the Social Contract.” Demography 39(4): 587-616   
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3180822.pdf 
         
 
  97 
 
Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” Bringing the State Back In. P. B. 
Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Torpey, John. 1998. “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate “Means of 
Movement.” Sociological Theory 16: 3: 239-259 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 1951. Article 1A (2). Convention and Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. Geneva, 1951: 2007. http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf 
Van der Leun, Joanne. 2006. “Excluding Illegal Immigrants in The Netherlands: Between National Policies 
and Local Implementation.” West European Politics 29(2): 310-326 
Vasta, Ellie. 2006. “The Paper Market: 'Borrowing' and 'Renting' of Identity Documents.” Draft Paper 
presented on 16 Jun 2006: Paper Tigers or Tiger Papers: The Paper Regime of Modern Societies 
Workshop  
Vidal, Dominique. 2008. “Le Nouvel Age des Migrations Mozambicaines à Johannesburg.” Saúde e Direitos 
Humanos 5(5): 25-43. Ministerio da Saude Fundaçao Oswaldo Cruz: Brasilia 
Vigneswaran, Darshan.2008. “A Foot in the Door: Access to Asylum in South Africa.” FMSP Working Paper 
Series # 40, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
Wade, Peter (Ed). 2007. Race, Ethnicity and Nation: Perspectives from Kinship and Genetics (Biosocial 
Society). Berghahn Books, Berghahn: New York 
Wang, H. L. 2004. “Regulating Transnational Flows of People: An Institutional Analysis of Passports and 
Visas as a Regime of Mobility.” Identities-Global Studies in Culture and Power 11 (3): 351-376 
Waugh, Linda R. 1982. 'Marked and Unmarked: a Choice between Unequals in Semiotic Structure.' Semiotica 
38 (3/4): 299-318 
Weber, Max. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” 1959. http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf  
Wilson, Thomas M. and Hastings Donnan. 1998. Border Identities: Nation and State at International 
Frontiers.  
Wimmer, A, and Schiller, Nina Glick. 2003. „Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study 
of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology.‟ International Migration Review 37(3):576-610 
Zhang, Benzi. 2004. "The Politics of Re-homing: Asian Diaspora Poetry in Canada." College Literature 31(1): 
103-125 
Zimbabwe. 2005. Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, as amended on September 14, 2005 (up to and 
including Amendment No. 17) 
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms/UsefulResourses/ZimbabweConstitution.pdf 
Zimbabwe. “Zimbabwe: History of Land Policy, 1891-1994.” Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement. http://www.lands.gov.zw/landreform/landreform.htm 
 
 
         
 
  98 
 
APPENDIX A: Guiding Questions for Formulation of Interview Questions 
 
 
Main Questions 
 
- What, if anything, is the relationship between identity documents and identity from the 
migrant‟s perspective? 
- What meaning do migrants attach to identification documents as a form of state control, both 
as citizens (e.g. of their countries of origin, or some other country) and as non-citizens (in 
host countries)?  
- How do migrants‟ experiences of their countries of origin inform their view of 
documentation both as issued by the country of origin and by their host countries?  
- Does the meaning depend on the relationship between the migrant and the nation/state 
issuing the document?   
- Is there a morality that attaches when talking about documents? From whence does this 
morality come, what form does it take on, how is it expressed, and what does it dictate?  
- How does documentation relate to migrants‟ understanding of rights and responsibilities of 
migrants, citizens, non-citizens and the state? 
- What are migrants‟ views on the role of the state (e.g. and especially where facilitating and 
controlling movement, regulating belonging, giving and denying privileges/access, issuing 
passports, visas, permits, etc are concerned)? 
- How does documentation relate to migrants‟ understanding of citizenship? 
 
Sub-Questions 
- How and why are identification documents obtained by migrants?  
- How is the process of attaining documentation related (or not) to migrants‟ perception of 
documentation, citizenship and identity? 
- Do those documents confer a certain identity to their holders?  
- How is identity created/produced and negotiated? 
- What informs all these views?  
e.g. education, migrants as products of (other) states and as products of the (failed or 
successful) nation-building/state-building projects of their home countries; migrants as 
agentive; migrants as constructors of meaning; migrants as products of 
migration/experience of migration; migrants as David facing Goliath state – identity 
documents as stones/sling/Goliath/nothing  
conceptions of state and of documents (as form of state control to be manipulated for 
migrant benefit wherever and however possible) as informed by conceptions of state and 
state control from home country, i.e. as informed by migrant history and experience of 
citizenship and experience as subject (especially Zimbabweans). (Interaction with host-
state as informed by xenophobia/ reception by locals)  
- How do migrant conceptions compare with those of nationals of their host countries, and to 
their own perceptions when depending on their perspective (as nationals or non-nationals)? 
- What bearing may all this have on nation-building, sovereignty, conceptualisation of the 
nation-state, and on service provision?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
  99 
 
APPENDIX B: Sample Interview Questions 
 
1. Do you feel like you understand what this study is about and what your role is? 
2. Having understood, would you still like to participate in the study? 
 
Biographical Data 
1.  Respondent‟s sex? 
2.  How old will you be on 31 Dec. 2009, in years? 
3.  What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
4.  How would you describe your race? 
 
Migration &  Economic History 
Is this the first time you‟ve been in Johannesburg? 
How long have you lived in Johannesburg? 
What is your main source of income? 
Are you currently employed/earning a living? 
Please describe how you earn a living. 
What counties have you ever been a citizen of? 
How did you become a citizen? 
 
Experience of Documentation & the Law   
What documents have you ever had in South Africa? 
What documents do you have at the moment? 
What documents do you need on a day to day basis? 
How do you manage without documents? 
What documents have you ever tried to get/applied for? 
How did you try to get them? 
Did you encounter any problems? 
How did you manage to work around the issue/resolve it? 
Have you ever had a passport from any country? 
Which international borders have you ever crossed? 
Which documents did you use/not use to cross the border?  
Have you ever had to grease an officer – like a police officer, soldier or home affairs person? 
Have you ever had to grease anyone else while South Africa? And while in …? And in Zim? 
Have you ever been asked to produce an ID by an officer in Johannesburg? What happened? 
 
Beliefs & Opinions   
Do you think people should be asked to show ID by officers in the street? Why? 
Do you think people should ever be required to show ID? When/where/why? 
Do you think people should be required to have passports or visas to cross the border?  Why? 
Is it ok for someone born in ……… to get an ID from another country, like ……….? 
Are there some cases where it‟s ok/not ok? Why? 
If you have an ID from Mozambique/SA does that make you a Mozambican/South African? 
What if a person decides that they now want to be a South African – how do they become a South 
African? 
Do you consider yourself a Zimbabwean? 
Have you always considered yourself a Zimbabwean? 
What does it mean to you be Zimbabwean?  
Would you ever want to become South African? 
This is going to sound like a strange question, but what is it exactly that makes one a Zimbabwean or a 
South African? So, if I wanted to become a South African, what would I have to do? 
And how would I stop being a Zimbabwean? 
Can I be a Zimbabwean and a South African at the same time? 
So, if I‟ve never had a passport or a Zim ID, can I still be a Zimbabwean? 
I hear a person needs a passport to cross back into Zim. What happens if someone tries to go back home 
but they don‟t have a passport? Will they just let them through? Should they? 
Why do you think the government has rules about papers (documents)? Is it right? 
Ok, so say you have a passport. Whose passport is it – is it yours, or the government‟s? How come?  
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APPENDIX C: CONSENT FORM 
 
Interviewee’s Copy 
 
Documentation Study, Wits University FMSP   
Principle Investigator: Kathryn Takabvirwa (071.688.6829) 
Supervisor: Tara Polzer 
Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand  
 
Purpose: 
To get a better understanding of the way people view and understand identity documents like passports, IDs, 
etc 
 
Procedures: 
Participation in this study will involve being interviewed by Kathryn. I expect the interview will last about 
45minutes to an hour. 
 
Expected Risks and Benefits: 
There are no direct benefits to participants, and participants will not be compensated financially. However, 
because the interview is a bit long, participants will be offered a small snack. At the end of the interview, there 
will be information available from the interviewer on legal methods of accessing migration documents. It is 
possible that in participating in this interview, past experiences may be brought to mind, which might not be 
pleasant to remember. Another risk of the study is that the participant might disclose activities that are not 
permitted by the law. However, all the information collected in this study will be held in the strictest 
confidence and the interviewer will take measures to protect the identity of the respondent.  
 
Confidentiality: 
All responses will be kept and recorded anonymously. No identifying information will be collected. The 
participant will be asked not to even mention their name, and will be referred to by a pseudonym even during 
the interview. The participant will not be asked for their contact details.   
 
Voluntary Participation: 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate without any penalty, 
and you are free to stop the interview at any point. You are also free to withdraw your consent even after the 
interview, which means that even after the interview, you may contact the researcher and ask that your 
information be excluded from the interview. You may withdraw your consent for any reason.  
 
Questions and Concerns: 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please feel free to ask them at any point. If you would 
like to contact the investigator after the interview, you can reach me at: 
 
Kathryn Takabvirwa 
kathryn.documentation@gmail.com  
Or on 071.688.6829  
 
If you have any questions you do not wish to address to me directly, please feel free to contact my supervisor: 
Tara Polzer 
Forced Migration Studies Programme 
University of the Witwatersrand 
P. O. Box 76, Wits 2050 
Johannesburg  
  
 +27 (11) 717 4032 
info@migration.org.org.za     
 
Please note, by agreeing to participate, you do not waive or forfeit any rights or protections accorded you by 
the laws of South Africa. The interviewer is also bound by the guidelines of the University of the 
Witwatersrand‟s Code of Ethics for Research on Human Subjects, which you can access at 
http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Research/Ethics.htm  
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APPENDIX D 
Excerpt from Exchange with Respondent: Original Transcription 
 
Respondent is a 50 year old Zimbabwean woman; married with children; has white collar job and 
higher education 
 
“What does your ID mean to you?” 
“It can speak for me. It can tell someone who I am. It speaks for me when I can‟t speak. It is a 
witness as to who I am. It‟s a lawyer. It‟s an advocate. My ID is my advocate on my identity.” 
Do you feel that there is a relationship between an ID and your identity?” 
“Yes! A very important relationship. One speaks for the other.”  
“So how is that affected senge kana zita racho riripa ID riri different from yours?” 
“Hau. Inenge isisiri ID yako. It‟s useless.” 
“Inenge yava chii saka?” 
“Chimwewo chiphepha chenemawords akada kufanana nezita rako. It has to be exactly as I want 
my name to be.” 
 “Does the government have the right to make you carry your ID everywhere?” 
“It has no right! Then, the ID is no longer serving me. It must be to my convenience. I must have 
a choice kuti ndoda kufamba neID yangu kana kuti handisi kuda.  
“Well, whose document is it? Does the ID belong to the government or to you?” 
“It‟s mine. It shall speak when I cannot speak… it‟s me who determines when I shall be 
identified or not. They shouldn‟t force me to carry it. Why should it be forced out of me? Yah, 
ok – kana ndapara mhosva, they can ask for my ID, but it‟s me who decides whether to give it. 
Hear what I say [i.e. let that be enough]. If I say I‟m John, I‟m John. Why should you believe a 
piece of paper? Pamwe ndatora yanhingi. How do you know?”  
“So the ID belongs to you? Not to the government?” 
“No. It‟s mine.” 
“Why is it yours?” 
“Because it‟s mine. Just because it‟s mine. Madetails aripo ndeangu. Ndini ndinoichengeta; 
ndinoitakura. I pay for it. If it‟s lost, it‟s me who gets into trouble. So it‟s mine. Hanti kana 
ndikafa – dai yanga iri yavo, vaiti ndafa vaiipa kunomumwe [laughs]. Manje havadaro. Kana 
ndikafa, ndoenda nayo.”  
 
 
Excerpt from Exchange with Respondent: Translated Transcription  
 
Respondent is a 50 year old Zimbabwean woman; married with children; has white collar job and 
higher education 
“What does your ID mean to you?” 
“It can speak for me. It can tell someone who I am. It speaks for me when I can‟t speak. It is a 
witness as to who I am. It‟s a lawyer. It‟s an advocate. My ID is my advocate on my identity.” 
Do you feel that there is a relationship between an ID and your identity?” 
“Yes! A very important relationship. One speaks for the other.”  
“So how is that affected say if the name on the ID is different from yours?” 
“Hau. It wouldn‟t be your ID anymore. It‟s useless.” 
“What would it have become then?” 
“Some other little paper/piece of paper with words that resemble/kind of look like your name. It 
has to be exactly as I want my name to be.” 
 “Does the government have the right to make you carry your ID everywhere?” 
“It has no right! Then, the ID is no longer serving me. It must be to my convenience. I must have 
a choice whether I want to walk with my ID or I don‟t want to.” 
“Well, whose document is it? Does the ID belong to the government or to you?” 
“It‟s mine. It shall speak when I cannot speak… it‟s me who determines when I shall be 
identified or not. They shouldn‟t force me to carry it. Why should it be forced out of me? Yar, ok 
– if I‟ve committed a crime, they can ask for my ID, but it‟s me who decides whether to give it. 
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Hear what I say [i.e. let that be enough]. If I say I‟m John, I‟m John. Why should you believe a 
piece of paper? Maybe I‟ve taken so and so‟s. How do you know?”  
“So the ID belongs to you? Not to the government?” 
“No. It‟s mine.” 
“Why is it yours?” 
“Because it‟s mine. Just because it‟s mine. The details in it are mine. I‟m the one who keeps it; I 
carry it. I pay for it. If it‟s lost, it‟s me who gets into trouble. So it‟s mine. Hey if I die – if it 
were theirs, they‟d give it to someone else/another when I died? [laughs]. But they don‟t do that. 
If I die, I take it with me/I go with it.”  
 
 
 
 
